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ABSTRACT 
 
 
My dissertation focuses on the moral philosophy of Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza in the 
context of the revival of Stoicism within the seventeenth century. There are many 
misinterpretations about early modern ethical theories due to a lack of proper awareness of 
Stoicism in the early modern period. My project rectifies this by highlighting understated Stoic 
themes in these early modern texts that offer new clarity to their morality. Although these three 
philosophers hold very different metaphysical commitments, each embraces a different aspect of 
Stoicism, letting it influence but not define his work. By addressing the Stoic themes on the 
morality of these three authors, I also hope to help better capture the intellectual climate of the 
time by bringing Stoic themes into the foreground.  
Stoicism is a Hellenistic philosophy that considered the passions a sickness of the 
intellect and the source of all human suffering; they believed the cure was virtue, which was 
obtained through replacing irrational passions with rational beliefs. Stoicism had a revival in the 
Renaissance ushering in a wave of Neostoic authors who play an important role in shaping the 
intellectual landscape of the following centuries. My first two chapters discuss Descartes, who 
wrote a “provisional morality” early in his public life, only (as I show) to ignore the subject of 
ethics until near his death. In my first chapter I argue that, though many present-day scholars 
misread Descartes’ first ethics as part of his final ethics, this earliest “provisional morality” 
mimics Neostoic Skeptics such as Montaigne and is provisional because his method of doubt is 
also provisional. In my second chapter I show that Descartes’ late, and more developed, moral 
	 v 
theory attempts to synthesize a variety of ancient, and seemingly contradictory, ethical traditions: 
Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism. In many ways Descartes embraces Stoic morality, 
but as a mechanist he does not view passions as an intellectual sickness; rather they are a 
physiological event, an amoral instrument that can be used to help control one’s irrational 
desires. I further defend my thesis externally by showing that this is the reading supported by 
Descartes’ contemporaries including critics such as Leibniz and early Cartesians such as Antoine 
Le Grand and Pierre-Sylvain Régis. 
My third chapter discusses Pascal, who embraces Stoicism differently. Pascal offers 
Stoicism as the first tier of a binary ethics: modeled after Augustine’s city of God and city of 
man, it is an alternative moral code for those who are ignorant of the good and true happiness. 
Finally, in my fourth chapter, I discuss two common misinterpretations of Spinoza’s ethics: one 
of them neglects the Stoic influence on his thought while the other embraces it too strongly, 
portraying him as an unadulterated Stoic. Although there are ways that he is more Stoic than 
Descartes and Pascal, such as in his panpsychism and monism, this does not extend to his 
morality. Rather than accepting either of the two readings, I highlight anti-Stoic themes that are 
also present. I conclude that if the discussion is contained to his morality, Spinoza is no more 
Stoic than the other Neostoics I discuss in previous chapters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The influence of Stoicism on early modernity is pervasive: for many authors during this 
time, it was a source of their philosophical thought; for others, it was a point of criticism against 
their contemporaries who dared to embrace the Hellenistic school. Unlike the early modern 
Epicureans, who unabashedly embraced Epicurus’ philosophy, the early modern Stoics—or, 
Neostoics—were more subtle in their use of Stoicism, typically synthesizing it with their other 
philosophical and theological commitments to create something uniquely their own while also 
unquestionably Stoic.1 This appropriation is most typically found in their moral philosophies, 
though not exclusively. In present-day scholarship, the role of Stoicism in the 17th century 
intellectual landscape is understated, and more often ignored. Without a proper awareness of 
Stoicism’s influence, misinterpretations of early modern ethics have abounded. It is my goal in 
this dissertation to rectify this problem by examining the Stoic influences on the morality of 
three philosophers—René Descartes (1596-1650), Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), and Benedict 
Spinoza (1632-1677). This will result in gaining further clarity into their ethical theories and, as 
a result, place them into the context of this Neostoic revival, a research project that has been 
neglected before now. 
With the amount of commentary that already exists on Descartes and Spinoza, and the 
oversight of Pascal’s philosophical contributions, there is question as to what room there is for 
this project. The literature on their work is vast, and even long neglected areas of investigation, 
such Cartesian morality, have received a good deal of recent interest. Likewise, Pascal is known 																																																								
1 Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) was an Epicurean. Although he synthesized Epicureanism into his Christian theology, 
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for his contributions to mathematics (binomial coefficients, a counting machine, the cyloid, 
infinity), the natural sciences (experiments on the void), and theology, but Anglophone 
philosophers tend to dismiss his philosophical contributions. At best, Pascal is presented as a 
skeptic, or a mystic whose only relevance is an argument for religious belief commonly referred 
to as “the Wager.”2 It is not even immediately obvious what is common between them that can 
be identified as “Stoic” to deserve extensive treatment together, not to mention that they have 
very different metaphysical commitments: Descartes is a rationalist who rarely lacks confidence 
in his ability to understand the world, Pascal often draws attention to human epistemic limits to 
question our access to metaphysical knowledge, and Spinoza is a panpsychic monist and 
determinist.   
I believe such a project is not only plausible, but also necessary precisely given the 
current intellectual climate. In the volumes of literature written on Descartes and Spinoza there is 
a multiplicity of errors, especially pertaining to their respective moral philosophies. The same is 
true of Pascal—I believe one reason for the lack of philosophical interest in Pascalian literature 
is that few scholars have taken the time to understand the fragments making up the Pensées or to 
read his minor treatises; as a result, his work is misunderstood.3 One key to solving these issues, 
																																																								
2 His argument is that if someone believes religion is likely true, and wishes to believe but is not sure if s/he should, 
when weighing the odds of risk versus benefit of belief and disbelief, it is more rational to believe than not to 
believe. The argument is part of a larger fragment, “The Discourse on the Machine,” and should not be taken outside 
of Pascal’s many arguments to determine the true religion, though the Wager is commonly presented outside of 
these contexts. (Pensées S680/L418). 
3 The Pensées of Pascal are a collection of fragments that were found among Pascal’s belongings. He seemed to be 
composing a philosophical treatise that functioned as something like a defense of the Christian religion. The papers 
were collected and published posthumously in 1670 (the Port Royal edition) with very little sensitivity to the 
argument that Pascal may have intended to forward. As a result, the treatise has become something like a puzzle (or 
a critical editor’s nightmare). Undergoing several editions, editors have tried to undo the damage of the first edition. 
Of these, the most recent is the lauded work by Phillip Sellier whose edition has become the new standard, replacing 
the Lafuma edition, while Jean Mesnard’s critical edition is forthcoming as Volume VI of his Œuvres completés.  
Pascal also has many minor treatises that are typically overlooked by a philosophical audience, if not 
altogether disparaged. For instance, Desmond Clarke warns that, “There is a complementary reason for urging 
caution about reading Pascal as a philosopher. He wrote much but published little, none of which was philosophy in 
the sense in which that term is used today […]. Apart from his brief essays on the vacuum and the Provincial 
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I argue, is to rediscover the Stoic roots in each of them, roots that these authors appeal to 
themselves and were once appreciated by their contemporaries. In doing so, there is a great deal 
to be learned still about these ethical theories that I begin to uncover in the following chapters.  
To carve out a broader historical and philosophical background, Stoic philosophy 
emerged during the Hellenistic Period (c. 323-31 BCE), an era known for political and social 
unrest. Out of this turmoil, new philosophical schools emerged, most notably the Stoics and 
Epicureans. Like Plato, these philosophers attribute their legacy to the Socratic tradition, 
appealing to the Cynics and Cyrenaics respectively.4 The Stoics began as a sect who gathered at 
the stoa poikilê to hear the teachings of Zeno of Citium (333-261 BCE). The school expanded 
rapidly to become one of the most dominant ancient moral philosophies, peaking in popularity 
during the Roman period. Stoicism was an attractive philosophy for this age, securing the good 
life inwardly during a time of external upheaval and unrest. It also had a broad appeal, given that 
the Stoic teachings were tremendously egalitarian for their time. To see this, the Stoic canon 
speaks for itself. The last two great Stoics were Epictetus (c. 50-130 CE) and Marcus Aurelius 
(121-180 CE): the first, a freed slave with very little social prestige, and the second, a Roman 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Letters, all his writings were edited and amended posthumously by collaborators who were still involved in the 
theological controversies that had dominated Pascal's later life. For example, he seems to have contributed to an 
early version of the Port-Royal Logic that was subsequently published in 1662; and the Entretien avec M. de Sacy 
was composed many years after his death, based on the recollections of an editor.” (Clarke [2015]). This is 
overwhelmingly false, and the disparaging tone obvious. The manuscript for De l’Esprit géométrique, a study on 
Cartesian method that is used in Arnauld and Nicole’s Port Royal Logic, is available even though it was published 
posthumously. It is hard to understand how this work is unphilosophical, unless we are also to accuse Descartes and 
Arnauld of the same for their geometric methods. If its posthumous publication excludes this work as unreliable, 
then we would also have to call many other posthumous works into question including Spinoza’s Ethics. Also, in the 
introduction to a newly discovered manuscript of Entretien avec M. de Sacy, Jean Mesnard provides a compelling 
case that although the dialogue itself is the construction of a later editor, the content is almost certainly taken from 
fragments written by Pascal himself. (See the introduction to Pascal [1994]). My point is that Pascal has plenty to 
say as a philosopher if enough pause is given to allow him to speak.  
4 The Cynics, founded by Diogenes of Sinope (404-323 BCE), taught that the human end was to return to natural 
desires, throwing off external constraints imposed by society. Zeno of Citium was a Student of Diogenes who 
embraced some of his teachings such as returning to nature, though he disagreed to what that meant. The Cyrenaics, 
founded by Aristippus (435-355 BCE) were a school of hedonists. Unlike Epicurus whose negative hedonism taught 
that the best way to obtain pleasure, the Highest Good, was to live a simple life, the Cyrenaics believed that the only 
pleasures that can be guaranteed are those immediately at hand, where denying a pleasure in hope of a greater 
pleasure lacks this certainty. See Arrington (1998), Brunschwig and Sedley (2003), Gill (2013). 
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emperor, the most important person within the largest empire to that point in history.5 Because 
the Stoics believed that any person is capable of achieving tranquility regardless of his or her 
external fortunes, its teachings remain a bit general if not vague, a quality that makes it easily 
molded into any role or circumstance in life.  
In part because of this broad appeal, recognizing what Stoicism actually entails is not as 
immediately obvious as it may seem. In the teachings from various strains of Stoicism, there are 
of course similarities. They teach that the universe is divine and contains the divine will. They 
describe everything in the universe as nature, and in something like pantheism, everything in the 
universe is God and thus belongs to God.6 They also believe everything occurs due to prior 
causes according to nature, and is thus fated or determined. Since nature is God, to say that 
everything occurs according to natural principles is the same as saying that whatever happens 
occurs according to the divine will. Subsequently, all that happens is not only necessary, but it is 
also good, as determined by divine providence.  
The Stoics taught that the passions are a sickness of the intellect and the source of human 
suffering; they believed the cure was virtue, which was obtained through replacing irrational 
passions with rational beliefs. Passions are not to be conflated with emotions, as the aim is to 
replace passions with rationally caused emotion, with the difference being whether the feeling is 
caused internally from reason (rational emotion) or from external causes (passions). Arising from 
the passions, a person becomes unnecessarily attached to other people and material objects, 
falsely believing these external goods to be their own. Because of this, when misfortune strikes, a 
person who believes an evil befalls him or her is mistaken: the real cause of suffering and 																																																								
5 From Epictetus, the Discourses and his short but famed Enchiridion (“Handbook”), a collection of short aphorisms 
as a guide for living the Stoic life, are available. The best-known work by Marcus Aurelius is his Meditations.   
6 It is a small step to move from a nature that is God, which is described in terms of physics and understood through 
reason, to atheism. There is question, though, as to whether the classical Stoics would have been psychologically 
capable of atheism similar to how it is understood today. 
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anxiety are false beliefs, such as the delusional judgment that counterfactuals were possible or 
that a different fortune would have been better. This is a mistake, since reason tells us that all 
fortune, whether good or bad, is necessary and unfolds exactly as it must according to the divine 
will. Reason, on the other hand, should remind us that everything contained in the universe is its 
part and thus belongs to it; as a result, nothing external belongs to anyone in particular, but is on 
loan from the universe to use and enjoy for some time. Therefore, if someone loses a limb, for 
instance, one must remember it was in God’s good providence to do so, and that soon enough the 
whole body will be returned to God anyhow.7 Likewise, if someone loses wealth, a spouse, or a 
child, the Stoic sage will remember that these things were not his or her own but they belonged 
to God; these goods are to be enjoyed during this time, and when taken, the wise person knows 
the goods were given back to the universe. The result should be gratitude for the time with them, 
and equal contentment that the good has now been returned—it could not have happened any 
other way, and it was according to divine providence, which is always good.8 
 However, there are also several varieties of Stoic thought that take exception to particular 
‘Stoic’ doctrines.9 Among the Stoics there were those who believed some external goods are 
preferable to others, rejected monist psychology (that only one substance exists and our thoughts 
are merely modes of that substance), forwarded a Platonist Stoicism, required external goods for 
the good life, and ignored physics.10 The best way to understand these traditions, then, is not a 
rigid set of dogma to which philosophers must adhere, but something closer to a family 
resemblance among various doctrines. In his articulation of family resemblances, Wittgenstein 																																																								
7 Seneca, De Providentia, II.1-6. 
8 Seneca, Epistle XCIX (On Consolation to the Bereaved, 2-3). Epictetus, Encheiridion 3, 14, 26. See Seneca (1917, 
1920) and Epictetus (1983). 
9 This is similar to Cartesianism, for instance, where there were Cartesians who at one point or another denied 
almost every claim that is arguably central to Cartesian doctrine: there were Cartesian Empiricists such as Jacques 
Rohault who focus on experimentation and ignore metaphysics, Cartesians who rejected substance dualism such as 
Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and so forth. See Schmaltz (2002), Dobre and Nyden (2013), Ariew (2014). 
10 Aristo, Posidonius, Panaetius, and Seneca/Epictetus, respectively, held these opinions. (Sellars [2006], 5-13)  
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describes them through giving an example of the category of ‘games’—it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to set forth a rigid set of necessary and sufficient conditions to define what a game is, 
as there always seems to be some exception. He writes,  
What is common to them all? Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they 
would not be called ‘games’” but look and see whether there is anything common to all. 
For if you look at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
affinities, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! ... And we 
can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way, can see how 
similarities crop up and disappear. And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the 
large and in the small.11 
 
Though the conditions to demarcate a game—or a Stoic—may not be precise and articulate, 
there are important affinities and shared similarities that, when looked at as a whole, are 
distinctive. For Stoics these distinctive similarities are that the passions are a disease caused by 
false beliefs, and while passions are the source of human suffering, they have a cure, which is 
virtue or rational beliefs. 
 The Stoics were prolific, although for the early Stoics (from Zeno until around 200 CE) 
most of the manuscripts are lost and we know them through the transmission of their accounts 
through ancient historians.12 For middle and late Stoics, however, there is more primary literature 
available.13 A common mode of their expression was letter writing; the Stoic epistles tend to 
focus on applying their doctrines to a variety of topics, such as the problem of evil, political 
governance, and dealing with tragedy.14 In its final forms in the ancient world, the school took on 
a nearly religious tone with teachings shifting from entire philosophical systems that included 
their logic, metaphysics and physics, towards exclusive of all but moral philosophy. The 																																																								
11 Wittgenstein (2009), 36e. Philosophical Investigations §66. Also, §66-§77. 
12 Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Galen, etc. 
13 The middle Stoics began around 200 CE and the late Stoics the first two centuries CE. I borrow the dates and 
categories of “early,” “middle,” and “late” Stoics as outlined by Sellars (2006), though he is right to note that these 
distinctions are contentious. (Sellars [2006], 8). 
14 Seneca, De Providentia.; Seneca, De Clemenia. See Seneca (1927). 
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followers of Epictetus, for example, behaved more like religious disciples applying his dogmatic 
doctrine than philosophers seeking to better understand the world. It is perhaps for this reason 
that the movement stagnated.15  
As the Hellenistic and the Roman periods came to an end and the medieval period 
followed, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle reigned, exemplified by Augustine’s Platonism 
and Aquinas’ Aristotelianism. Although no new Stoic literature was being written during this 
stage of history, the philosophy was persistent: originally latent in the epistles of St. Paul, it rose 
as both a foil and a minor authority for the Christian Scholastics.16 In the Renaissance, Stoicism 
began to grow from its place as a subordinate philosophy. The Renaissance Humanists showed a 
renewed interest in classical Greek and Latin texts, often translating them into the common 
vernacular. Among these Humanists were Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) and Guillaume du Vair 
(1556-1621). Lipsius made new editions of Seneca’s texts and authored his own treatise, De 
Constantia (1584), in which he baptized Stoic philosophy into Christian thought. Du Vair 
followed this path, translating Epictetus’ Enchiridion (1586) into French and synthesizing the 
Stoic and Christian philosophies in his own work, which included the Philosophie morale de 
Stoïques (1585). This movement, now referred to as Neostoicism, saw itself as filling the role of 
interpreting classical Stoicism; but like Plotinus’ Platonism, they took liberties—at times, 
tremendous liberties—as they reintroduced Stoicism to the world. No longer merely a 
handmaiden to other philosophies, Stoicism was reborn. Other Neostoics emerged, including the 
ecclesiastic Pierre Charron (1541-1603) who took eclecticism further, synthesizing Pyrrhonist 
																																																								
15 Sellars (2006), 26-30. For more on Stoicism, see Inwood (2003), Sedley (2003), Sellers (2006), Gill (2013). 
16 See Enberg-Pedersen (2004) for Stoicism and St. Paul and the Appendix for a list of some medieval references to 
Stoicism and the Stoics.  
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and Stoic philosophies, adapting them both to support his theological convictions.17 His treatise 
De la Sagesse (1601) sold tremendously well, a copy of which would later fall into the hands of 
a young Descartes in 1619. Johannes Molitor, a Jesuit priest who knew the youth, worried that 
Descartes put too much confidence in the capabilities of human reason and gifted the book to 
him, hoping Charron’s skepticism would help cure him of this hubris.18 Michel de Montaigne 
(1533-1592) also has Stoic themes throughout his work, though his allegiances are less clear. His 
magnum opus, the Essays (1580), is a collection of semi-biographical tales and short musings 
with common themes of turning inward to find truth, and his considerations of various 
philosophies and topics. While Montaigne’s Stoicism is less obvious (or certain) than the other 
Neostoics, Charron read him as a Stoic, and this is the reading of him that is popularized in some 
circles.19 This Neostoic landscape is diverse, more so than classical Stoicism, and those in the 
tradition readily reject and admit aspects of Stoic thought as needed to create a coherent 
philosophy in the light of their other intellectual commitments.  
During this time, there is a strong reaction against Scholastic philosophy and its reliance 
on the authority of Aristotle that continues to escalate into the 17th century. While early 
modernity is known as the dawn for a new age of modern philosophies, the seeds of these 
philosophies are laid much earlier.20 Because of the work of Humanists in the previous century, 
philosophers in the early modern period had access to a variety of ancient literature for the first 
																																																								
17 Pyrrhonism was a school of skeptics who followed the teachings of Pyrrho (360-270 BCE). Against the Academic 
skeptics, a group from Plato’s New Academy who believed the only thing they knew is that they know nothing 
(Plato’s Apology 21a-e), the Pyrrhonian skeptics believed nothing could be known, even that belief itself, and so the 
wise man is one who seeks a life of balance and indifference towards beliefs. 
18 Clarke (2006), 64; 334-335. 
19 Although the most popular of the Essays, An Apology for Raymond Sebond ends up influencing both Descartes 
and Pascal, the influence is most obviously skepticism, not Stoic; this does not mean that there are not other Essays 
where Montaigne comes across more Stoic, nor that his remedy for living the good life when ignorant of the good is 
altogether foreign from the Stoic sage. (See In Defence of Seneca and Plutarch (Essays II.32) and On Books (Essays 
II.10) as examples of more explicitly Stoic works.) 
20 See Ariew (2011). 
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time in centuries. Without having to return to the authorities of Scholasticism that they were 
trying so hard to leave behind, Skepticism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism allowed for alternatives 
from which the early moderns could draw in forming their new philosophies. In the case of 
Stoicism, the Neostoics even already did the work of ‘baptizing’ the pagan philosophy for 
Western Christian consumption. 
In the past several years there have been significant gains in rethinking how to understand 
the history of philosophy, especially in early modern circles. Tremendous work by Roger Ariew, 
Daniel Garber, Edwin Curley, among others, has questioned previous methods of examining 
historical texts in isolation, and has uncovered a great deal of external evidence that helps to 
shape how authors such as Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz should be read. Even 
so, although Stoicism is a persistent, though admittedly sometimes subtle, background for early 
modern thought, this influence was neglected until very recently and the literature that has 
emerged on the topic is sparse. Most of this commentary focuses on how Stoicism affected 
particular canonical figures and it typically lacks the appropriate contextual sensitivities. It is 
important, for instance, to be aware of the other Neostoics and medieval treatments of Stoicism 
before making general claims about how Stoicism affected a particular 17th century author. As a 
result, the current literature largely misunderstands the role of early modern Stoicism, and 
subsequently only confuses—not clarifies—our understanding of early modern thought. It is 
towards these ends that I turn. 
My first two chapters discuss Descartes, who wrote a “provisional morality” (morale par 
provision) early in his public life, only (as I show) to ignore the subject of ethics until near his 
death. Historically, the morale par provision was considered a temporary morality, one 
constructed to provide moral guidance until an ethical theory could be provided after he 
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constructed a metaphysics and physics. In striving to recognize how various articulations of his 
moral philosophy relate with one another, recent literature identifies the morale par provision as 
a first step in Descartes’ greater moral project: broad Stoic maxims that are filled in with more 
specific detail later through his Passions of the Soul and related correspondence. Specifically, in 
my first chapter I argue that, though many present-day scholars misread Descartes’ first ethics 
this way, the “provisional morality” of Part 3 from the Discourse on Method should be taken 
provisionally. However, rather than repeating older arguments to do so, I show that it is part of 
Descartes’ broader method of doubt. In Part 1 and 2, he enters into a skeptical mode which 
copies Montaigne and Pierre Charron in style and content; he does not emerge from this 
skeptical mode until Part 4 when he introduces the cogito. Part 3, then, is a natural extension of 
Part 2: rather than offering something intended to be taken too seriously, Descartes is recalling 
the advice of a Stoic sage offered by Montaigne and Charron for how to lead the good life when 
apodictic knowledge is unattainable. In short, the morale par provision is provisional because his 
method of doubt is also. Part 3 is another part of his method of doubt that he does not emerge 
from until Part 4.  
In my second chapter I show that Descartes’ late, and more developed, moral theory 
attempts to synthesize a variety of ancient, and seemingly contradictory, ethical traditions into 
his own morality. I begin by first arguing that the Passions of the Soul is best understood as a 
physics of man, a work in physiology, not a treatise on ethics. This interpretation is not only 
better supported by Descartes’ published treatises and private correspondence, but it is also the 
reading that early Cartesians take when reconstructing Cartesian morality. I then argue that, if the 
Passions of the Soul is foremost a physics of man, then there is significant interpretive benefit in 
how to understand his other late ethical writings. I show that in many ways Descartes embraces 
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Stoic morality, but as a mechanist he does not view passions as an intellectual sickness; rather 
they are a physiological event, an amoral instrument that can be used to help control one’s 
irrational desires. This is the foundation in which he believes his moral philosophy reconciles 
Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian accounts of the good, virtue, and the passions. I further defend 
this thesis by showing that this is the reading supported by Descartes’ contemporaries including 
critics such as Leibniz and early Cartesians such as Antoine Le Grand and Pierre-Sylvain Régis. 
The topic of my third chapter is Blaise Pascal, a figure often overlooked by Anglophone 
philosophers. He is important in this context as he illustrates the complexity that sometimes went 
into adapting Stoicism in eclectic philosophical systems. Pascal has a number of influences that 
he carefully synthesizes into one complete philosophical program, most notably Augustine, 
Descartes, Montaigne, and Epictetus; by understanding how he draws upon these resources, it is 
possible to reconstruct his morality from the confusing Pensées fragments and other minor 
works. Pascal’s credit to Epictetus is explicit and his way of incorporating Stoicism into his 
system is novel and nuanced. I will show that Pascal offers Stoicism as the first tier of a binary 
ethics: modeled after Augustine’s city of God and city of man, it is an alternative moral code for 
those who are ignorant of the good and true happiness. True happiness is found in knowing and 
loving God, which allows a person to order his or her desires according to their proper end; 
however, in a postlapsarian state, loving God is impossible without effective grace. That is, as a 
precondition for knowing or living God, he must choose to dispense grace upon that individual. 
Since there is no guarantee of this happening, Pascal wants his interlocutor to pursue God and 
the good nonetheless, and not abandon them to the worst state, concupiscence. His answer then, 
is Neostoic—reduce passions and submit oneself to the good will of God. Best case, this will 
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better prepare one to receive divine grace; worst case, it is an alternative morality which allows 
the reprobate to have a less miserable life than s/he would if enslaved to the passions.  
My fourth chapter is on Spinoza’s morality, and it takes a different tone. Rather than 
arguing for a particular reading as I did with Descartes and Pascal, I push back against two 
common misinterpretations of Spinoza vis-à-vis Stoicism: one of them neglects these influence 
while the other embraces it too strongly, portraying him as an unadulterated Stoic. Rather than 
accepting either of the two readings, I argue that, if the discussion is contained to his morality, 
Spinoza is no more Stoic than the other Neostoics I discuss in previous chapters. Although there 
are ways that Spinoza is more Stoic than Descartes and Pascal, evident in their physics and 
metaphysics, these affinities do not extend so well to his morality. When it comes to his moral 
philosophy, there are several ways that Spinoza is anti-Stoic that should be taken into 
consideration. My goal is neither to understate the Stoic influences on Spinoza, nor to reduce 
him into an unqualified opponent of Stoicism. Rather, I argue that Spinoza is a Neostoic, fitting 
comfortably into an established tradition known for eclectic tendencies, selectively accepting and 
rejecting doctrines as they see fit within their broader philosophical project.  
As a methodological note, I try to be textual and contextual, balancing internal and 
external evidence as much as possible to defend the thesis in each chapter. For external evidence, 
when speaking of one author influencing another, I limit myself to those cases where it is 
generally accepted that one author read the other in question; for example, I allow Charron’s Of 
Wisdom but not Plato in examining the morale par provision. In other cases, I limit myself to 
those things that an author has said about either himself or his own work elsewhere, such as what 
Descartes said in the introductions to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy (1647)21 
or the Passions of the Soul (1649). The same is true of their correspondence, and with some less 																																																								
21 This date is for the French edition. The first edition in Latin without this Introduction was published in 1644. 
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weight, what was said by their contemporaries. My primary texts that I appeal to for Descartes 
are the Treatise on Man (1664), Discourse on Method (1637), the Meditations on Philosophy 
(1641/1642), and the Principles of Philosophy (1644/7). I also draw a great deal from the 
correspondence with Princess Elisabeth (dated May 21, 1643 through October 9, 1649), Queen 
Christina (dated November 20, 1647 through February 26, 1649) and Pierre Chanut (dated June 
15, 1646 through March 31, 1649), the French ambassador to Christina’s court. In Pascal, my 
primary texts are the Pensées as well as Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et Montaigne 
(1655?) and De l’Esprit géométrique (1658?).22 For Spinoza, I limit my discussion to his Ethics 
(1677). I omit the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (c. 1661), the Short Treatise on 
God, Man, and His Well-Being (1662) and the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670) since the 
secondary literature I engage in during this current study limits itself to the Ethics. More could 
be said, I am sure, if these texts were also considered, but this will be left for future studies.23 
My research on this topic, though hard earned, is still in its infancy; I do not pretend to 
exhaustively treat these topics. There is plenty more that could be said about Cartesian, 
Pascalian, and Spinozistic morality and its relation to Stoicism. However, what I do set out to 
accomplish is, first, to give a perspective from which to rethink which traditions influence the 
ideas of these great thinkers, and as a result, how we as an intellectual community can better 
understand their thought. By rethinking their moral philosophy through this lens, I will also 
provide a better understanding of how Stoicism shapes the early modern landscape, making room 
for future research in these areas. For this second accomplishment, it is fitting that my final 																																																								
22 The first edition of the Pensées was in 1670, though as I note in fn3, this Port Royal edition was not without 
significant errors in its organization, the Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et Montaigne and De l’Esprit 
géométrique (written c. 1658) The exact dates for the Entrentien are not clear since it seems to be composed by an 
editor out of fragments. All three of these were published posthumously, but there is good reason to accept their 
reliability. See Mesnard’s discussion of the texts’ history in Œuvres III, 368 and Entrentien avec M. de Sacy (1994), 
“Introduction.”  
23 Justus Lipsius has a political program that would be interesting to read beside Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus.  
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chapter is on Spinoza, and not only in how each of the authors relate with one other individually. 
It is true that the chapters follow one another according to their historical chronology and 
philosophical development, and in this sense it is already an effective organization. But by 
ending with Spinoza among the Neostoics, it helps to sketch out the overarching theme that I 
work towards demonstrating—there is widespread influence of Stoicism in early modernity, and 
this is demonstrated by its appropriation even among philosophers who radically disagree with 
one another in so many ways.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
DESCARTES’ FIRST MORALITY: A PYRRHONIAN MORALE PAR PROVISION 
 
 
 When it comes to unraveling Descartes’ moral philosophy in present-day literature, 
commentators commonly see their task as understanding how various articulations of his 
morality relate with one another.24 There are at least three places where Descartes discusses 
moral philosophy. The first is early in his public life – in part three of the Discourse on Method 
Descartes provides his morale par provision (“provisionally morality”), a list of rules to assist in 
living well. The remaining two are much later: his final treatise, the Passions of the Soul, and 
correspondence from the same period with Pierre Chaunt, Queen Christina, and most 
significantly, Princess Elisabeth.25 The literature that strives to draw connections between these 
works is often insightful and not lacking in interesting textual evidence. However, I believe this 
process is fundamentally limited if not altogether flawed, as it operates under the assumption that 
the various articulations of his morality do in fact relate with one another. I am not sure that they 
do. While there may not be any inherent harm in seeing connections that Descartes himself did 
not intend, in the case of the ethics, I believe it is a distraction that makes his later ethics, which 
are already difficult to systemize, even more opaque. 
For this reason, my goal in this chapter is to investigate whether the morale par provision 
relates to his later ethics in any significant way; by significant, I mean whether or not it should 
																																																								
24 See LeDoeuff (1989), Marshall (1998), Shapiro (2006), Naaman-Zauderer (2010), Shapiro (2011), Gilby (2011). 
25 Some authors attribute ethical themes to his Meditations on First Philosophy. I disagree, the reasons for which I 
will address in the body of this chapter. 
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be used in order to inform his later ethics. Traditionally, the morale par provision was 
interpreted as a temporary morality to be disposed of once an established ethics was offered.26 
The reasons for this reading may seem obvious at first glance. Just prior to offering the rules that 
are his morale par provision, Descartes says he intends on building a morale par provision as 
temporary housing “lest I should remain indecisive in my actions while reason obliged me to be 
so in my judgments, and in order to live as happily as I could during this time...”27; it is a 
temporary construction, he says, so that he may live comfortably while tearing down the old 
house and constructing plans for the new. For this reason, many authors have argued that the 
morality is provisional—a temporary construction to be demolished when appropriate.28 Donald 
Rutherford aptly describes the morale par provision under this reading as “just that – provisional 
rules that Descartes will follow while he carries out his search for certain knowledge.”29 
In more recent years, however, there is a movement in Descartes scholarship to argue that 
the moral philosophy established in the Discourse is “permanent and universal” in terms of his 
overarching moral project.30 This trend begins with Michèle Le Dœuff, whose reading in her 
influential text Recherches sur l'imaginaire philosophique has been widely embraced by the 
Anglophone world.31 Le Dœuff argues that the term par provision is a legal phrase, a “juridical 
term meaning ‘what a judgment awards in advance to a party’”.32 Since Descartes would be 
aware of this legal sense of the term, she argues that in the Discourse on Method he is laying 
down a universal moral code, general maxims which are completed when ethical particulars are 
																																																								
26 Laporte (1945), Rodis-Lewis (1957), Schneewind (1997). 
27 AT VI, 22; CSM I, 122.  
28 Rodis-Lewis (1957), 9-24. Also Schneewind (1997), 185-187, etc. 
29 Rutherford (2008). 
30 I quote Cimakasky and Polansky (2012), 353. 
31 Le Dœuff (1989). Anglophone texts include Marshall (1998), Shapiro (2006), Naaman-Zauderer (2010), Shapiro 
(2011), Gilby (2011), and Cimaksky and Polansky (2012).  
32 LeDœuff (1989), 62. 
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provided in the later ethical works.33 Other contemporary commentators do not attempt such an 
externalist approach, and instead freely pick from the corpus of Descartes’ texts both published 
and unpublished, public and private, to create a systematic account of Descartes’ morality based 
on these various articulations.34 Both of these approaches share a common goal of reconstructing 
a Cartesian ethics that does not exclude the gains made in the Discourse.  
Although I appreciate the contextualist aim of Le Dœuff’s thesis and the desire for each 
of these authors to draw upon all of the treasures left by Descartes in reconstructing a Cartesian 
ethics, I find that I cannot embrace either of these present-day views. Of course, by forwarding 
the thesis that the morale par provision is indeed temporary, I may be criticized as looking 
backwards not forwards. However, I believe these readings are a distraction to understanding 
Cartesian ethics, adding misleading criteria and forcing a misemphasis upon certain themes. If 
that is the case and it makes his unfinished ethics, which are already difficult to systematize, 
even more opaque, then it would be unwise to keep moving forward.35 When going on journey, 
the responsible traveler must sometimes pause, and if it is discovered that s/he is going in the 
wrong direction, then s/he must correct course; sometimes this means ‘going backwards’ when 
an incorrect turn has been made in the direction opposite to that which one intends to be 
traveling. Though my defense of the older reading is novel, in a sense I do move backwards, but 
it is so that we might once again move forward more productively. This is my goal at present, 
then; it is not to offer a more robust account of Descartes’ ethics: I leave this task for my second 
chapter. 
																																																								
33 LeDœuff, (1989) 66-69.  
34 John Carriero’s and Lilli Alanen’s monographs best capture this position. See Carriero (2009) and Allanen (2003). 
35 Of course, Descartes would advise in his third rule once a decision has been made that one should remain resolute, 
like finding one’s way out of a forest! (Discourse on Method Part 3; AT VI, 24-25) 
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 I wish to defend the original thesis that Descartes should be taken seriously when he 
states that the provisional morality is temporary, but I will read it in a way that pays closer 
attention to influences that heavily shape the first three parts of the Discourse. To accomplish 
this, the chapter will consist of three sections. In the first I call into question the relevance of the 
morale par provision to his final morality by showing how unconcerned Descartes appears to be 
about moral philosophy until much later in his public life; in the second, I argue for a new 
reading of the morale par provision by showing that it is a natural Neostoic extension of the 
skepticism outlined just prior to it; in the third and final section, I will anticipate and then 
respond to the objection that Descartes proclaims the lasting importance of the morale par 
provision himself, drawing a comparison between it and a new list of moral guidelines in a letter 
to Princess Elisabeth.  
 
I. An Early Indifference Towards Morality 
In his writing, Descartes cover a wide breadth of topics. Even in his private 
correspondence, these discussions concern metaphysics, Baconian experimentation, biology, 
philosophical and scientific method, mechanics, physics, medicine, and many other topics in 
speculative and natural philosophy.36 In spite of the many pages written on different topics, until 
late in his public life, he almost entirely neglects the topic of morality. It is not until he begins 
corresponding with Princess Elisabeth, the Princess of Bohemia, that he begins any prolonged 
discussion of morality.37 If Descartes intended the morale par provision to serve a role in his 																																																								
36 For discussions of medicine in the correspondence see AT I, 648 (Huygens, 4 December 1637); AT II, 500 
(Mersenne, 9 January 1639); AT II, 570 (Mersenne, 20 February 1639); AT III, 120 (Mersenne, 30 July 1640); and 
AT III, 271 ([Pollot?], Mid January 1641). For discussions of mechanics, see AT I, 434 (Huygens, 5 October 1637); 
AT I, 648 (Huygens, 4 December 1637); AT II, 500 (Mersenne, 9 February 1639); AT II, 542 ([Debeaune?], 30 
April 1639); and AT III, 212 (Mersenne, 28 October 1640). 
37 May or June 1645 (AT IV, 218), 21 July 1645 (AT IV, 251), and 4 August 1645 (AT IV, 263). Misfortune struck 
Elisabeth concerning her nobility and health, and Descartes responds with medicinal and moral advice. Deborah 
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final ethics, it is strange that he typically neglects, and sometimes actively avoids, the topic. This 
omission should call into question his concern for writing a morality during this time and thus 
the role the Discourse should play in a final moral theory.  
There is one explanation for his silence on morality that would allow for its continued 
importance, that Descartes had interest in moral philosophy but was quiet about it. By 
comparison, Descartes does not write about the Regulae in any of his other works and 
nonetheless the treatise seems to be of some importance to him. It underwent at least one major 
revision and, depending on how one interprets the forthcoming findings from the new Cambridge 
Manuscript, there is some possibility that he continued working on the manuscript until much 
later in his life. Although it is possible that he hints at the Regulae in the Discourse on Method 
when he says that the method of the Discourse is not his method in its entirety, this is only 
conjecture. If an argument from silence fails to undermine the importance of the Regulae, then 
why would it succeed for morality? If this is the case, the objection is that there is no immediate 
inference from Descartes’ silence on morality that should be drawn: that he is sometimes silent 
on morality implies no more than the tautology that sometimes he is silent on morality. I believe 
this explanation fails to be compelling, however, because in spite of similarities, there is an 
important difference that makes this analogy fail in relevant ways. Although Descartes does not 
discuss the treatise of the Regulae itself, he is clearly concerned with method at large; method is 
important for him, even if he is silent about composing a specific treatise. This is not the case 
with his moral philosophy. With his morality, it is not a specific treatise that he is silent about, 
but the entire branch of moral philosophy itself. 
  																																																																																																																																																																																		
Brown notes that medicine and morals are not always easily distinguishable. I believe she is correct. See Brown 
(2008), 38-40. However, Descartes makes a distinction between them: medicine is for good of the body, morals are 
for the good of the soul. That they influence each other does not reduce them to the same thing. 
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I.a. Ethics in the Meditations on First Philosophy? 
The more compelling objection, then, is that Descartes actually does discuss ethics in the 
eight-year period; if so, then it is more likely that he laid down the morale par provision as a 
foundation that he continues to slowly build upon while constructing an ethics over time. In one 
sense, this objection is true; Descartes seems to discuss morality in the Meditations. In the third 
meditation, for example, Descartes talks of evil: 
Now as far as ideas are concerned, if they are considered alone and in their own right, 
without being referred to something else, they cannot, properly speaking, be false. For 
whether it is a she-goat or a chimera that I am imagining, it is no less true that I imagine 
the one than the other. Moreover, we need not fear that there is falsity in the will itself or 
in the affects, for although I can choose evil things or even things that are utterly non-
existent, I cannot conclude from this that it is untrue that I do choose these things.38 
 
Then again, in the fourth meditation, “Were I always to see clearly what is true and good, I 
would never deliberate about what is to be judged or chosen. In that event, although I would be 
entirely free, I could never be indifferent.”39 According to Descartes, ignorance of the good is the 
cause of indifference, and the appropriate response to indifference is to withhold judgment: 
“Because the will is indifferent in regard to such matters, it easily turns away from the true and 
the good; and in this way I am deceived and I sin.”40 Likewise, in the fifth meditation, Descartes 
discusses resoluteness. This topic mirrors the doctrine of constancy from the second maxim in 
the morale par provision and later in his morality.41And then, finally, the sixth meditation 
contains a discussion on pain and pleasure in terms similar to the Passions of the Soul.42  
																																																								
38 AT VII, 37. AC, 20-21. Quotes from the Meditations as well as the Objections and Replies will use the translation 
by Ariew and Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2000) unless indicated otherwise. Here, Descartes 
considers his criteria of truth and the nature of ideas and he only discusses immorality (that is, choosing evil) only in 
so far as it helps to illuminate his criteria. 
39 AT VII, 37; AC, 21. 
40 AT VII, 58; AC, 33. 
41 Descartes discusses the limits of knowledge for atheists compared with theists. Descartes expands on these themes 
in the replies to the second set of Objections: “I do not deny that an atheist could know clearly that the three angles 
of a triangle are equal to two right angles; I am simply affirming that his knowledge is not true scientific knowledge, 
since no knowledge that can be rendered doubtful seems to deserve to be called scientific knowledge. And since we 
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It is not unreasonable to see ethical themes in these examples – some of Descartes’ 
contemporaries, the authors writing against Descartes in the Objections and Replies, certainly 
saw them. Mersenne, in the second set of objections, criticizes Descartes’ criteria of truth, 
arguing that: 
…if the will never goes astray or errs when it follows the mind’s clear and distinct 
knowledge, and if the will lays itself open to danger when it allows a conception of the 
understanding that is not at all clear and distinct … there would be practically nothing 
that might permissibly be embraced by the will, since we know practically nothing with 
the sort of clarity and distinctness you require for that kind of certainty which is immune 
to all doubt.43 
 
Descartes replies: 
…what renders the will certain, if what it follows is not clearly perceived? And who has 
ever denied…that the more clearly we understand something before assenting to it, the 
less danger there is of our being involved in error…? But a concept is said to be obscure 
or confused only because something unknown is contained in it.44 
 
Descartes concludes that it is unimaginable to only assent to truths completely known, and so 
when a person assents to a belief of this sort, s/he should hold on to it with the resolve of it being 
completely evident, reiterating the second rule of the morale par provision and directing 
Mersenne to revisit the Discourse on these matters rather than continue discussing them.45 As for 
Descartes’ current concerns,  
…I would like you to recall that in matters that can be embraced by the will I drew a very 
careful distinction between the conduct of life and the contemplation of truth… the fact 
that the contemplation of truth was the only topic I dealt with in my Meditations is borne 
out of both by the entire project and by what I declared in no uncertain terms at the end of 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
are supposing him to be an atheist, this person cannot be certain that he is not being deceived in those very things 
that seem most evident to him, as has been sufficiently shown.” (AT VII, 141; AC, 83) 
42 AT VII, 86-88. 
43 AT VII, 126. AC, 74. 
44 AT VII, 147; AC, 87. 
45 In the Reply to the Second Objection: “Yet from time to time one thing must be chosen from a number of things 
that are completely unknown and, once chosen, it is no less to be held on to than if it had been chosen for very 
evident reasons, so long as no reason can be entertained to the contrary, as I explained on page 26 of my Discourse 
on Method.” (AT VII, 149; AC, 88)  
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the First Meditation, where I said that I could not indulge too much in distrust, since I 
was bent not on outward accomplishments but only on knowledge.46   
 
In spite of what Mersenne may have first thought, the Meditations only discuss the 
contemplation of truth, not the correctness of action.  
Likewise, in the fourth set of objections Arnauld pushes for Descartes to elaborate on 
errors committed in sorting true and false beliefs from errors of moral judgment.47 In a rare 
moment of admitting error, Descartes yields to Arnauld’s objection, making a late addition to the 
body of the Meditations. In an expanded preface, he adds: 
But here one should meanwhile bear in mind that the Meditation there is no discussion 
whatsoever of sin, that is, the error committed in the pursuit of good and evil, but only the 
error that occurs in discriminating between what is true and false. Nor is there an 
examination of those matters pertaining to the faith or to the conduct of life, but merely 
speculative truths known exclusively by the means of the light of nature.48 
 
While Descartes’ concession is pragmatic—he tells Mersenne to include the amendment so that 
others will know he is reasonable and either be more willing to voice their disagreements or be 
less stubborn in accepting his views49—it is also an odd way of granting Arnauld his objection. 
Rather than agreeing to discuss morality based on the objection, Descartes restates with 
heightened emphasis that he is not addressing matters pertaining to the conduct of life in this 
work.50 
																																																								
46 AT VII, 149. AC, 88. 
47 AT VII, 215-216. 
48 AT VII, 15. AC, 8.  
49 See the 18 March 1641 letter from Descartes to Mersenne. (AT III, 334) 
50 The careful reader may note here that I omit the fifth set of objections with Gassendi and the correspondence with 
Hyperaspites. I do so because the letter to Gassendi at best addresses medical, not moral, concerns and at worst is 
only addressing metaphysical concerns. Similarly, the letter to Hyperaspites focuses on epistemic certainty. I already 
elaborated on both: In the fifth set of objections, Gassendi suggests that Descartes should move beyond foundational 
concerns to moral philosophy in the Meditations. In his response, Descartes describes the human tendency to err as a 
negation of choosing correctly, not a positive quality in itself. When we judge incorrectly, the will is judging 
independently apart from the intellect. Belief in a material mind, for instance, is judged as true because it was judged 
true in the past, not because the intellect actively judges that it is so. He illustrates these limits by considering 
someone who judges whether an apple is good for eating. In this case, the senses are insufficient for a sound 
judgment; by its smell or color, someone may judge that a poisoned apple is nutritious. These sensations clearly do 
not provide sufficient evidence that the apple is good to eat and it may even be that a person’s desire to consume the 
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 There are several points that should be taken away from this brief overview of the 
Meditations. The first is that Descartes is consistently emphatic through this period that his 
concerns are metaphysical and not moral. Whenever correspondents raise moral themes in their 
objections, Descartes is quick to remind them of his current indifference on the subject: he either 
draws his interlocutor back to metaphysics or dismisses the objection, directing them back to the 
Discourse. He is so emphatic about this point that, in addition to repeating it often in his replies 
to objections, he also amends the Preface to make his disinterest even clearer. The second is that, 
even in these cases, Descartes only discusses morality when prompted by an interlocutor to say 
more about it. This is hardly evidence that he actually desired to talk about ethics, found it 
important, or thought it was necessary to talk about during this period.51 To summarize, the 
number of times Descartes mentions morality in the Meditations and its Objections and Relies 
are few, and when he does, it is always at the bidding of a correspondent in order to say he is not 
presently concerned with the subject.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
apple is the cause for the judgment that it is beneficial for the body. (AT VII, 376) Descartes concludes that for any 
given object, “there may be many things about it that we desire but very few things of which we have knowledge. 
And when we make a bad judgment, it is not that we exercise our will in a bad fashion, but that the object of our will 
is bad.” (AT VII, 376; CSM II, 259) Descartes is explaining to Gassendi why it is that people hold false beliefs, and 
this illustration of a poisoned apple is offered to assist him with offering this explanation. It is true that the judgment 
of whether an apple is beneficial or harmful to eat moves beyond the metaphysical concerns of the Meditations, but 
he only offers it as an example to address the metaphysical concerns raised by Gassendi. Even supposing that 
Descartes is more invested in this example than the text warrants, at very best these concerns are medicinal and, 
contrary to morality, medicine is a topic that he discusses often in his correspondence, so it is not much of a surprise 
to see it here.  
As for the correspondence with “Hyperaspites,” during the period in which the text of the Meditations is 
coming together, Descartes has an exchange with “Hyperaspites,” a champion for Gassendi. Descartes hoped to 
publish this letter and his response along with the other objections and replies, but it was received too late to be 
included with the others.  (Descartes’ letter to Mersenne, 17 November 1641; AT III, 447) Descartes tells 
Hyperaspites that “It would indeed be desirable to have as much certainty for the conduct of our lives as is needed 
for the acquisition of knowledge; but it is easily shown that in such matters so much is not to be sought or hoped 
for.” (AT III, 422; CSMK, 188) In short, as in the sixth meditation, Descartes is reminding Hyperaspites not to apply 
his epistemic certainty to morality; they are not the same. 
51 It is similar to those times when I am teaching ethics to my first year students ethics: they will sometimes ask me 
about Ayn Rand and, assuming their questions are relevant to the topic at hand, I will answer them. This is no 
indication as to how much I actually care about, or wish to spend any effort considering, the writings of Ayn Rand. 
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 Even if, Descartes is not concerned with morality in the Meditations as I have shown, that 
does not make it any less important for his future ethical project. In the Preface to the French 
edition of the Principles of Philosophy he discusses the order of his philosophy, describing it as a 
tree: the roots of metaphysics will flow into the trunk of physics, and from the trunk of physics 
will grow the applied philosophies, each with its own end: medicine, mechanics, and morals.52 In 
his tree of philosophy, medicine, mechanics, and morals are posterior to his metaphysics and 
physics. It is fitting that in discussing metaphysics he includes topics with ethical implications 
such as the will—it will ‘flow’ through the trunk and into the branches. We should think of the 
metaphysics (like the physics) as preconditions for morality. 
 To offer an example, in the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas famously offers five 
arguments for the existence of God. Just prior to these demonstrations, he answers the question 
whether it is possible to demonstrate that God exists. Aquinas replies that, “The existence of God 
and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, 
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace 
presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected.”53 For Aquinas, 
natural knowledge can function as a precondition for faith, but the two are not identical; 
similarly, for Descartes, ethics presupposes metaphysics—a doctrine of the will may be a 
precondition for blameworthiness, for instance. 
The remaining problem now is why he would choose to omit morality in the Meditations 
after including it in the Discourse.  There are a few reasons why this may be the case. For one, 
Descartes’ Meditations is undertaking a different type of project than the Discourse. He writes in 
the preface to the Meditations, “The intent there [in the Discourse] was not to provide a precise 																																																								
52 AT IXb, 14-15. The end of medicine is health, the end of mechanics is the use for which a human artifact is 
intended, and the end of morality is virtue or the good life.  
53 ST I.2 
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treatment of [God and the human mind], but only to offer a sample and to learn from the 
opinions of readers how these issues should be treated in the future.”54 In the Discourse, 
however, he is trying to accomplish much more.55 It was a wide and ambitious project, 
advancing a metaphysics, morale par provision, and physics, though he admits none of them 
were treated in their entirety.56 All of this is in contrast with the narrow, metaphysical focus of 
the Meditations: that is, to provide a foundation for his physics by proving the existence of God 
																																																								
54 AT VII, 7; AC, 4.  
55 Also, while the Discourse and its reception are important historically and philosophically, it does not present 
Descartes’ mature philosophy. He did not think the Discourse was a completed work from the start.  The Discourse 
was more of an afterthought to his scientific treatises for which it served as a preface. His correspondence leading up 
to its publication shows his efforts focused on the scientific treatises that became the Meteorology, Optics, and 
Geometry. Descartes makes no mention of the Discourse until a year before its publication when he tells Mersenne 
that he decided to include a preface to the three treatises. (Letter to Mersenne; March 1636 (AT I, 338); Though he 
mentions a little metaphysical treatise fairly early (Letter to Mersenne from 25 November 1630 [AT I, 177]), its 
stated purpose of proving the existence of God and the soul is different than that of the Discourse on Method. This is 
not to say that Descartes viewed the Discourse as an unimportant document; though he did not consider it a final or 
comprehensive product, (Letter to [Vatier], 22 February 1638. (AT I, 558)) he saw it as a step in a process toward 
developing a more complete metaphysics and physics. He actively pursued criticisms of the Discourse, requesting 
two hundred copies to distribute (Letter to Mersenne, March 1636; AT I, 339) and he requested objections from his 
correspondents. This was common in his interactions with Mersenne and Huygens as well as with their colleagues 
and acquaintances. One reason why Descartes may have asked for comments could be that he fears being 
misunderstood: he goes as far as to include instructions in the prefaces of his publications for how to properly read 
them, and confides in those closest to him that he is concerned for his reputation. In spite of this concern, it does not 
change the fact that he also explicitly makes the request in his letters to search for errors in his writing. Descartes 
pleads to Mersenne: “continue to tell me all those you hear. Make them as unfavorable to me as you can; that will be 
the great pleasure you can give me.” (27 February 1637. AT I, 349; CSMK, 52-53) Similarly, he writes later that 
year that, “those who bring some error to my attention will always please me more than those who bring me praise.” 
(Letter to [Noel], October 1637; AT I 454; CSMK, 74) This sentiment is repeated to Plempius in letter dated 20 
December 1637. (AT I, 475) After Galileo’s condemnation, his concern is surely more than an inflated self-image or 
a desire to live undisturbed by uncharitable criticisms lest Galileo’s fate become his own. Though it seems that his 
original vision was to publish the Discourse with Objections and Replies, this idea was abandoned to write the 
Meditations in this way. 
 I strongly believe that though Descartes rarely admits to being wrong, the requests for comments on his 
work are not only rhetoric. As early as 1630, seven years before the Discourse is published, he tells Mersenne that 
he had interest in publishing a work that included objections from others and his replies to those objections. He 
brings this up again in a letter to Mersenne from Early June of 1637. (AT I, 377) Upon receiving these criticisms, he 
embraced many of them in action, if not in word, as evidence of his sincerity: there are clear differences between the 
Discourse and the Meditations on First Philosophy resulting from considering objections raised by even some of his 
fiercest critics. Many objections arose in letters from Pierre Petit, for example, who Descartes specifically alludes to 
in the Latin preface to the Meditations. Jean-Luc Marion argues that the whole of the Meditations’ body should be 
seen as a reply to the objections to the Discourse. (Marion [1995], 7, etc.) One of these changes is the order of 
philosophy in the Meditations, where the placement of a proof for the existence of God is moved to precede 
mind/body dualism. 
56 He writes in a 22 February 1638 letter to [Vatier] that he was not trying to teach his whole method in the 
Discourse, but only enough to show the treatises were not casual thoughts. (AT I, 558) 
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and the immortality of the soul. Here, he has a much narrower scope, intending that his physics 
will follow in a future publication.57 
Another motivation for omitting discussions of morality from the Meditations may relate 
to Descartes’ choice of publication language: the Discourse was published in French while the 
Meditations was first printed in Latin. There are several reasons for him to do this. For one, it 
was more practical; he began receiving correspondence in Latin, not French, and wanted 
consistency in language throughout the Meditations.58 Aware that a Jesuit audience would be 
more receptive to a Latin text than a French manuscript, another incentive was political: to win 
favor with the faculty at La Fleche.59 Because of these reasons, his choice of publication 
language may be overdetermined.60  
Nonetheless, another explanation that Descartes gives helps explain the inclusion of the 
provisional morality in the Discourse and its omission from the Meditations. This explanation is 
as follows: both languages appealed to large numbers of readers, but had two very different 
audiences. The French language appealed to a broader demographic because it also included 
those not formally educated, such as woman, among its readership; but, geographically, it 
reached a smaller, francophone region. In contrast, Latin appealed to a smaller demographic of 
learned individuals, but reached much further geographically. Descartes was concerned that if he 
gave his strongest arguments in French he would corrupt the “weak minds.”61 In a letter from 
																																																								
57 Descartes begins writing the Principles of Philosophy after distributing the Meditations while waiting to receive 
the objections that he will publish along with his replies in the finalized edition of the Meditations. In his response to 
Arnauld in the Reply to the Fourth Set of Objections, for instance, Descartes mentions having his own Summa of 
Philosophy in front of him. (AT VII, 254) He also makes note of the text to Regius in a February 1642 letter. (AT 
III, 523) 
58 Letter to Mersenne, 27 July 1638. (AT II, 267) 
59 Letter to Mersenne, 27 July 1638. (AT II, 267) 
60 He may also feel the need to follow Montaigne less closely, including his Stoicism, since the Latin style does not 
resonate with the Montaignian essay that Descartes mimics in the French Discourse. This speaks forward to the next 
part of my chapter, though, so I will leave it here. 
61 Letter to [Silhon], May 1637. (AT I, 354); [Vatier], 22 February 1638 (AT I, 558) 
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1637, he admits that the arguments for God’s existence in the Discourse were not the strongest; 
however, in order to strengthen them he would have to first offer a more robust skepticism, and 
“…I was afraid that this introduction [of more skepticism] would look at first as if it were 
designed to bring in skepticism, and would disturb weaker minds, especially as I was writing in 
the vernacular.”62  
Since Descartes is already concerned that his skepticism will disturb “weak minds,” it 
makes sense, then, when writing in the common vernacular, French, that he takes extra care to 
include the morale par provision along with his doubt. He does this precisely to subdue any 
possibility of future moral misgivings that might come upon those of “weak mind” while still in 
the mode of skepticism. Arnauld highlights this point in the fourth set of objections to the 
Meditations: “…surely the author himself admits in his Discourse on Method that this style [of 
doubt] is dangerous to people of ordinary intelligence.”63 Descartes’ reply affirms this. He 
refrained from treating more sophisticated skeptical arguments the Discourse, he says, because it 
was written in French; he “reserved them instead for these Meditations, which I warned early on 
should be read only by those who have both intelligence and learning.”64 The doubt in the 
Meditations he claims is not suited for people of all intelligence; when writing in Latin, which 
also implies a more learned audience, he is more comfortable delving deeper into skepticism 
since he does not fear leading “weak minds” astray in the same way as when he is writing in the 
vernacular. With this concern also vanishes the need for a provisional morality.  
 
 																																																								
62 Letter to [Silhon], May 1637. (AT I, 354); He says something similar in 1638: “the principle reason for its 
obscurity is that I did not dare to go into detail about the arguments of the skeptics, or say everything which is 
necessary to with draw the mind from the senses.” (Letter to [Vatier], 22 February 1638; AT I, 560; CSMK, 86) 
63 AT VII, 215. AC, 128. 
64 AT VII, 247. AC, 148. 
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I.b. One Remaining Detail 
 Up to this point, I have argued that Descartes was silent about morality after the 
Discourse in order to distance myself from readings that place too much emphasis on the role of 
the morale par provision in a Cartesian ethics. To do this, I have shown that his silence 
concerning the Regulae is not a relevant enough comparison to deflate my concern. I have also 
shown that his only discussion of ethics, not to be confused with the metaphysical preconditions 
for ethics, are when he is compelled to talk about it by others in the Objections and Replies. On 
each of these occasions he reminds his objector that he is uninterested in discussing moral 
philosophy, going so far as to add this disclaimer into the Preface of the Meditations.  
 So now I will address a remaining detail, the final reference to morality by Descartes 
before his 1645 letters to Elisabeth (other than the “provisional morality”). A year after the 
publication of the Discourse, Descartes writes to Pollot. In this letter, Descartes writes in 
reference to the moral rules of the Discourse, that “I apply this rule mainly to actions in life 
which admit of no delay, and I use it only provisionally, intending to change my opinions as 
soon as I can find better.”65 He is merely reiterating what he already said in the beginning of the 
third part of the Discourse:  
Now, before starting to rebuild your house, it is not enough simply to pull it down, to 
make provision for materials and architects (or else train yourself in architecture), and to 
have carefully drawn up the plans; you must also provide yourself with some other place 
where you can live comfortably while building is in progress.66 
 
Aside from the morale par provision, in this only other explicit reference to morality before the 
letters to Elisabeth, Descartes reinforces the provisional nature of the rules in the third part: they 
are meant to serve as a guide for actions that cannot be postponed and will be demolished when a 
complete ethics is offered.  																																																								
65 AT II, 35; CSMK, 96. 
66 AT IV, 22; CSM I, 122. 
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 I have shown, then, that the only references to morality Descartes makes until later in his 
public life are very few and reaffirm that the morale par provision is temporary (and not to be 
taken in the legal sense offered by Le Dœuff) as well as that he is unconcerned with ethics at this 
time. There is a real indifference towards morality before he begins discussing the topic with 
Elisabeth, making the morale par provision an anomaly that warrants a different explanation. It 
is this explanation that I turn to in my next section.  
 
II. An Alternative Reading of the Morale Par Provision  
Up to this point I have been making a case that the morality in the third part of the 
Discourse is an anomaly, a brief moment when Descartes discusses moral philosophy with any 
interest or detail prior to correspondence much later in his life. Even if this is the case, then its 
anomalous inclusion in the Discourse deserves an explanation. In the last section, I offered some 
possible motivations—differences in both language and philosophical emphases of the Discourse 
and Meditations. However I believe there is something much deeper and interesting going on 
which motivates Descartes to include the morale par provision in the third part of the Discourse. 
In short, I believe that the provisional morality is a natural extension of the Neostoic skepticism 
outlined just prior to it. The provisional morality occurs under a ‘veil of doubt,’ which Descartes 
does not emerge from until the fourth part. In a sense, the morale par provision is not actually an 
anomaly, because his interest is skeptical, not moral; he is extending his skeptical program that 
he begins in the first two parts. 
Two authors central to the development of the Discourse and Meditations are Montaigne 
and Pierre Charron. Montaigne was one of the most influential figures to emerge from the 
Renaissance. Famous for penning his tremendously popular Essays, one of particular 
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philosophical influence was the essay, an Apology for Raymond Sebond. In this apology, 
Montaigne defends Raymond Sebond’s La Theologie naturelle against recent attacks.67 It is 
hardly an apology, though, as his argument reduces to skepticism: Raymond’s critics are 
mistaken, but only as much as everyone is mistaken. The criticisms against Sebond’s natural 
theology are just as absurd as their object of the attacks because pursuing natural knowledge is a 
fruitless endeavor. The Apology includes classic Pyrrhonian arguments that Descartes 
unapologetically embraces later in the Meditations: our senses deceive us, we cannot be sure if 
we are awake or sleeping, and all expressions of our cognitive faculties lead to circular 
arguments.68  
Pierre Charron is lesser known than Montaigne today, but he is arguably just as important 
for the development of early modern thought. Richard Popkin goes as far as to consider him 
among the fathers of modern philosophy, and I do not disagree.69 Charron, a priest who 
systematizes Montaigne’s fideism of the Apology, attempts to lead his author to a crisis of doubt; 
this Pyrrhonian crisis will affirm that human knowledge is impossible by natural reason, and 
human effort should instead be turned towards custom and self-knowledge. Charron’s wise man 
is a Stoic sage, arrived at by doubt, and synthesized with his Christian faith, similar in ways to 
what the Renaissance Neostoics (e.g., Justus Lipsius and Guillaume Du Vair) did before him. 
Charron also interpreted Montaigne in this Neostoic tradition but whether this interpretation is 
fair or not is unclear. What is clear, however, is that his reading of Montaigne helped to inform 
the Stoic aspects of Charron’s own thought. Descartes read Charron as well, receiving a copy of 
																																																								
67 Montaigne had promised his father that he would translate La Theologie naturelle. In 1581 he fulfilled this 
promise, translating the text from Latin into French. 
68 Clarke (2006), 191. 
69 Popkin (1954), 831. 
	31 
On Wisdom when he was young.70 This early exposure to Charron also likely affected Descartes’ 
reading of Montaigne, helping him draw out Stoic-like themes latent in the Apology and more 
explicit in other essays.  
The influence of these two authors is paramount for framing the first parts of the 
Discourse, which are nearly a précis of these two works in both thought and style. Montaigne’s 
style in the Essays is distinct. Written in an elegant French, Montaigne offered semi-biographical 
aggrandized stories and thoughts on various topics, with focus on turning inward towards self-
discovery and knowledge. Descartes repeats this Montaignian style in the Discourse, which he 
also calls an “essay” put forward “merely as a story or, if you prefer, as a fable”.71  It is written in 
French and provides an embellished autobiographical account of his journey to understanding 
that begins with self-knowledge: je pense, donc je suis.  
The influence on the content of these first parts of the Discourse is also significant, most 
specifically in laying out a method of doubt. In the first part, Descartes lays out a provisional 
skepticism that he does not emerge from until the fourth part. One of the most central Pyrrhonian 
themes present in both Montaigne and Charron is the doctrine of indifference. Skepticism in this 
tradition teaches that for every proposition, its opposite can be proposed with equal rhetorical 
force. Since reason cannot rationally compel a person to judge in favor of either a proposition or 
its negation, s/he should embrace indifference, acknowledging that nothing can be known with 
certainty, even uncertainty. Descartes echoes Montaigne’s disenchantment with Scholastic 
education, raising his own distaste for the Jesuit education he received at La Flèche.72 Recalling 
the Pyrrhonian equilibrium traced throughout Montaigne’s Apology, he applies it to the apparent 
																																																								
70 Rodis-Lewis (1999), 44-5. See also Clark, 64. 
71 AT VI, 4; translation from Roger Ariew’s translation found in Descartes’ Philosophical Essays and 
Correspondence (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2000), 47 
72 Clarke (2006), 191.  
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futility of education itself: for every reason to affirm one intellectual pursuit, there was an 
equally compelling reason reject it. Reading of classical texts and studying history are beneficial 
to know more about other people and judge more soundly, but at the end it is no different than 
traveling, and too much traveling makes one a stranger in his or her own country, and so forth. 
Descartes mimics other skeptical tropes from their writing, such as an emphasis custom and its 
role in shaping beliefs:  
I thought, too, how the same man, with the same mind, if brought up from infancy among 
the French or the Germans, develops otherwise than he would if he had always lived 
among the Chinese or cannibals. […] Thus it is more custom and example that persuade 
us, rather than any certain knowledge.73 
 
It is not until the end of part two, when he wanders into method, does he deviate even slightly 
from Montaigne and Charron. When he offers this method, prescribing resources to begin 
untangling human knowledge, he has not yet emerged from the veil of doubt he has placed upon 
himself. This emergence from doubt occurs in the fourth part with his Cogito, the expression of 
self-knowledge. Once the reader is free from the grasp of provisional skepticism in the fourth 
part, s/he is able to begin applying the rules of method given earlier to solve problems and learn 
new truths based on those discovered.  
The question remains of what to make of the third part. I have already discussed how the 
Discourse begins by repeating the skepticism of Montaigne and Charron almost verbatim, in 
content and style. For this reason, I would like to return to these two authors. An important 
difference between their projects and Descartes’ is that their doubt is not provisional. Both 
remain committed to uncertainty, rejecting the ability to naturally obtain knowledge. However, 
their skepticism does not result in paralysis, no more than it does in Sextus Empiricus. 
Skepticism should lead a person to self-knowledge and tranquility. For Charron and Montaigne 																																																								
73 AT VI, 16; CSM II, 119. Compare this with Charron’s De la sagesse II.2.  
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(or at least Charron’s Montaigne), the goal is nonetheless wisdom, and the Wise Man is none 
other than a Neostoic Sage. Most clearly outlined by Charron, there are two illnesses that plague 
the good life: giving oneself to external corruptions and the passions. Popular opinion is 
misleading, and distracts one from the search for truth. As for the passions, they are a sickness of 
the intellect and a source of all human suffering; the cure is virtue, which was obtained through 
removing irrational passions. There are four remedies that Charron lays out. The first, and basest, 
is to foster insensibility, as it is better to be numb to everything than succumb to the passions. 
His second is to invoke passions to suppress one another, followed by actively avoiding those 
circumstances that arouse passions. The fourth and highest remedy is to confront passions with 
reason. This virtue is a “firmness of the soul by means of which one foresees and confronts 
things without trouble.”74 In rejecting external influences and removing the passions, the wise 
man is able to conquer his self. In the search for truth, the wise man also empties his mind, 
letting indifference serve religion, as that person is free to follow the God and the Church.75 
Similarly, life is a performance, where “the wise man will often […] play one role before the 
outside world and another in his mind.”76 Charron writes, “He must do and behave outwardly for 
public respect and offend no one, in accordance with the law, custom, and rites that the country 
observes and requires.”77 All of these should serve the ultimate purpose of seeking truth and they 
require constancy.78 “Wisdom is a regulated handling of our soul with moderation and 
																																																								
74 On Wisdom II.I; Translations from Charron (1998), 54-5.  
75 On Wisdom II.II; Charron (1998), 60-63.  
76 On Wisdom II.II; Charron (1998), 59. 
77 On Wisdom II.II; Charron (1998), 59. 
78 For more comparison, see Popkin (1954), 831-837.  
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proportion,” he says, “that is a balance and a sweet harmony of our judgments, actions, manners, 
and a healthy constancy of our mind.”79 
In rightly understanding the morale par provision, then, there are a few things that we 
already know. First, that it is a temporary housing while the new housing is drafted and 
constructed; second, that it occurs under provisional doubt. This second point I believe is 
particularly important in understanding it. If Descartes so closely follows Montaigne and 
Charron in the first two parts, and he does not remove this skeptical veil until the fourth, I 
suggest that the third part should be understood as an extension of these first two parts. When 
approached in this context the similarities are striking. Consider the advice for Charron’s wise 
man: follow the customs of one’s country, value constancy, conquer oneself through neglecting 
the external world and overcoming passions, and to make seeking wisdom the highest of life’s 
pursuits. These are, of course, exactly the three (or four) rules that Descartes prescribes in the 
provisional morality. For Descartes, they are to first, “obey the laws and customs of my country, 
constantly holding on to the religion in which, by God’s grace, I had been instructed from my 
childhood”; second, “to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I could”; third, to “conquer 
myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world”; and 
fourth, to review occupations for life, and “I could not do better than […] spending my whole 
life cultivating my reason and advancing, as far as I could, in the knowledge of the truth.”80 
 It seems, then, that the third part of the Discourse is an explicit extension of the Neostoic 
skepticism in the first two parts. This reading, that the morale par provision is merely an 
extension of the skeptical part of his project solves several problems. First, it explains why 
																																																								
79 De le sagesse II.I. This is cited in its original French in Kogel (1972), 280; the translation is mine. Kogel offers an 
astute discussion of the differences between Charron and Montaigne on constancy here. Charron was firm in his 
commitment to this Stoic doctrine while Montaigne waived some. (Kogel (1972), 36-37) 
80 AT VI, 23-27; translation from Descartes (2000) by Roger Ariew, 56-48.  
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Descartes is otherwise unconcerned with morality until later in his public life. Although many 
present-day commentators are correct that there are Stoic themes embedded here, that is because 
these are the themes that Charron and Montaigne (at least Montaigne vis-à-vis Charron) also 
emphasize. At this point the Stoicism seems somewhat happenstance; though Descartes could 
have presumably picked a different ethical tradition to fit into the provisional morality, this is the 
one that Montaigne and Charron followed, and while still ignorant of the good, he maintains 
their project to the end, not stopping at doubt, but concluding with how the wise man should act 
when ignorant of the good.  Descartes’ morality is provisional because his doubt is also.  
This is not to say that Descartes wrote his provisional morality while ignorant of classical 
Stoicism. Stoicism was extremely popular in the seventeenth century and, as an alternative to 
Aristotelianism, it would presumably be an attractive ethical tradition for a modern thinker such 
as Descartes.81 However, I already showed that Descartes did not express any concern for 
morality before, during, or soon after writing the Discourse; given the sum of my evidence, I 
believe that is fair to say that his silence that follows the Discourse is because in this work he 
was more interested in following the skeptical project to its end, with its Neostoic conclusions, 
than he was in providing anything like a morality in itself.  
 
III. The Objection From a Letter to Elisabeth, 4 August 1645 
In one final point on this matter, an obvious objection to my thesis is that when Descartes 
does begin discussing ethics later in his life, in describing conditions for a life of contentment he 
recalls the rules of morality in the Discourse on Method to Elisabeth.82 In a letter from 1645, he 
																																																								
81 Anti-Aristotelianism was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Descartes as he also criticizes other early 
modern critics of Aristotle such as Hobbes and Gassendi.  
82 4 August 1645. AT IV, 265; I also discussed above that he recalls them in the Meditations, but showed it was 
always dismissive in a sense, to redirect his interlocutor back to metaphysical concerns. 
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lays out the following conditions which he says relate to the three rules of morality from the 
Discourse: (1) to always employ his mind to discover what he should (or should not) do in all the 
circumstances of life, (2) to have firm and constant resolution to carry out what reason 
recommends without being diverted by his passions or appetites, and (3) to guide himself 
according to reason, acknowledging that all goods which he fails to possess are outside his 
power.83 These are parallel with three rules of morality from the Discourse: (1*) to obey the laws 
and customs of his country and religion, (2*) to be firm and decisive in his actions upon adopting 
them, regardless how doubtful, and (3*) to master himself instead of fortune, changing desires 
instead of the order of the world.84  
There is undoubted similarity between the conditions and the rules, which Descartes 
makes explicit. For this reason, it is easy to equivocate them, drawing a bridge between the old 
and new morality. However, he does not say how they are related, merely that they are. It is 
sensible to pause to investigate how they are related and not just assume they are the same rules 
without investigation. And upon examination, the two sets of rules are quite different. In (1), 
Descartes tells Elisabeth that we should employ our minds, while in (1*) he writes that he ought 
to follow custom. Likewise in (2), Descartes states we should use reason without being diverted 
by passions, but in (2*) he recommends resoluteness regardless of how doubtful an opinion he 
has resolved to follow. Finally in (3), he writes that reason should guide him, enabling the 
realization that it is beyond his or her own power to possess goods that are not already in 
possession; however in (3*) he suggests he should master himself, changing his desires instead of 
the order of the world.  
																																																								
83 4 August 1645. AT IV, 265. 
84 AT VI, 22.  
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The rules of morality and the conditions for contentment do not clearly map onto one 
another. Rather, the differences perfectly correspond with my thesis: if Descartes is in the mode 
of a skeptic, it is best to follow custom given one’s ignorance of the world, all opinions are 
doubtful so any constancy must exist in spite of doubts, and self-mastery is a path that one can 
control by changing his or her desires even when ignorant of the good. These rules of the 
Discourse mirror Charron and Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian Neostoicism as discussed above, and 
seem appropriate while under the provisional doubt in the first four parts of the Discourse. On 
the other hand, his conditions for contentment sent to Elisabeth frame similar themes, but now 
from the perspective of someone who has a foundation for rational beliefs: employing our minds 
(not the non-rational process of following customs), executing reason without diversions (not 
constancy in face of uncertainty), and by means of reason recognize our current state (not by 
means of desire). Quite differently from the morale par provision, these conditions emphasize 
right living while quite confident of reason.  
In the 4 August 1645 letter, Descartes is saying something new to Elisabeth, not merely 
repeating the rules from the Discourse. His later project is drastically different in nature, trying 
to build a rationally certain foundation for morals that benefits from gains made in metaphysics 
and physics, as opposed to operating under the skeptical mode as he does in the morale par 
provision. Though both resonate with a sense of Stoicism, the morale par provision is an ad hoc 
morality included by extending the provisional doubt through part four of the Discourse. It is a 
guide for living well when ignorant of the good. Differently, the list of conditions given to 
Elisabeth is one coming from a place of knowledge and certainty; it resonates with the emphasis 
in classical Stoicism that the irrational passions must be replaced with true beliefs. I will now 
turn to Descartes’ later ethics in my next chapter.  
	38 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
 
PASSIONS EMBODIED: DESCARTES’ LETTERS TO ELISABETH REVISITED 
 
 In my last chapter, I focused on Descartes’ earlier morality, demonstrating that the 
morale par provision was an extension of the provisional skepticism that he imitates from the 
Pyrrhonian Neostoic Pierre Charron, and the Essays of Montaigne vis-à-vis Charron. I now turn 
my attention to Descartes’ later morality, typically identified with the Passions of the Soul and 
later correspondence, especially with Princess Elisabeth, Pierre Chanut, and Queen Christina. 
Since Descartes left behind no comprehensive or systematic ethics, his later morality must be 
reconstructed from these sources.85 In forming a reconstruction, there are two general tendencies 
in present-day literature. The first is to treat the Passions of the Soul as an ethical treatise and the 
correspondence as its handmaiden.86 The second is to classify his morality into one of several 
ethical traditions: Virtue Theory, Stoicism, Deontology, Platonism, and so forth.87 There is often 
a good amount of textual support given for these positions, and there is a great deal that can be 
																																																								
85 There are several authors who claim that the morale par provision is the first part of a broader ethical theory. See 
LeDœuff (1989), Marshall (1998), Shapiro (2006, 2011), Cimakasky and Polansky (2014). In the previous chapter I 
rejected this claim, arguing that it is not intended as part of a morality in itself, but that it extends from the 
provisional doubt and is borrowed from Charron and Montaigne. 
86 See Marshall (1998), Alanen (2003), Carriero (2009), Shapiro (2006), Naaman-Zauderer (2010), Shapiro (2011). 
87 Lisa Shapiro identifies him as a Virtue Theorist (qua Stoic), John Marshall as a Stoic, Noa Naaman-Zauderer as a 
Deontologist, and Joseph Cimakasky and Ronald Polansky as a Platonist. See Marshall (1998), Shapiro (2006), 
Naaman-Zauderer (2010), Shapiro (2011), as well as Cimakasky and Polansky (2012). Donald Rutherford also 
recognizes Stoic themes in Descartes. However, I believe Rutherford’s interpretation is properly balanced, and 
avoids identifying Descartes within any normative tradition. Rutherford describes ways that Stoicism helped shaped 
Descartes’ thought, bracketing it within the claim that “there are substantial doctrinal differences between Descartes 
and the Stoics. Given this, the attempt to label him a ‘Stoic’ in any strict sense of the word must be rejected.” 
(Rutherford (2014), 131). 
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learned from these studies.88 Still, I believe both of these tendencies are fundamentally 
misguided, and when following them one misreading compounds upon another.  
It is true that Descartes often appeals to ancient ethical traditions when articulating his 
ethical theory in letters, so I empathize with the motivation to classify Descartes into familiar 
normative categories. However, I suggest that rather than attempting to follow any particular 
school, Descartes is creating his own morality; this theory, he believes, can be best explained 
through appealing to familiar traditions such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism. 
Furthermore, he believes these three positions no longer contradict one another when understood 
through his philosophy. This chapter is composed of two sections in which I will argue for this 
conception of Cartesian morality. In the first, I cast reasonable doubt on the claim that the 
Passions of the Soul should be read primarily as a treatise on moral philosophy; I will argue 
instead that it should be read foremost as Descartes’ physics of man. In the second I will sketch 
out Descartes’ morality, a section that itself will be composed of three parts: first, I will outline 
Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian themes in Descartes’ letters, showing they are presented with 
equal admiration and criticism; I will then analyze Descartes’ claim that his morality 
encompasses all three of these traditions. Descartes thinks they are reconcilable on the summum 
bonum and on virtue, and I argue that the physiological understanding of the Passions of the 
Soul, established in the first half of the chapter, provides space for this synthesis to occur.89 
Then, finally, I will show that Descartes’ way of forwarding his own morality—presenting his 
ethical position by appealing to other schools of thought—is not new and in fact there is a strong 
																																																								
88 I find the work done by Lisa Shapiro to be especially helpful, for example. 
89 In previous versions of this chapter that were presented at the 2015 American Philosophical Association Pacific 
Division Meeting and at the 2014 Princeton-Bucharest Summer Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, it was 
presented as a conditional argument: If the Passions of the Soul are understood foremost as a physics of man, then it 
allows for the interpretive payoff which I suggest. I believe the upshot of the consequent also serves as further 
evidence to show that the antecedent is more likely to be true. 
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historical precedent for this approach. Descartes cites competing authorities to lend support to his 
moral philosophy, and though he embraces aspects of their thought, sometimes explicitly, he 
means them instructively and does not self-identify as a member of any particular ethical 
tradition other than his own. 
 
I. The Passions of the Soul as Physiology 
There is no strong consensus from modern literature on how to treat the Passions of the 
Soul, and it seems that scholars today are not quite sure what to make of the treatise. There are a 
few ‘standard’ readings, but not much agreement as to which one is correct.  
One opinion rejects outright that Descartes was writing a physics of man. Lilli Alanen, 
for instance, does not devote a sustained commentary on the Passions (her primary concern is the 
Cartesian theory of mind), but in her brief treatment of the text, she promptly dismisses a 
physiological reading: 
The fact that Descartes gives so much space in his Passions to the description of the 
bodily states causing and accompanying the emotions has led the commentators to 
classify his view among physiological or sensation theories. That is wrong: Cartesian 
emotions, although expressed in bodily states and behavior, remain essentially cognitive. 
They are not, qua bodily, mere expressions of “brute” or “blind” nature, but also complex 
patterns of acquired and learned reactions, carrying meaning and functions of their own.90 
 
She supports this claim with the following example. Suppose I see a Rottweiler 
approaching and, due to a preexisting belief that Rottweilers are dangerous, I become frightened. 
In this case, the arousal of fear is caused by physiological changes that promptly occur upon 
seeing the dog. Although the passion of fear is caused through involuntary physiological 
reactions, fear itself is not physiological; fear occurs in the mind’s passive reception of these 
																																																								
90 Alanen (2003), 324. 
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physical sensations.91 Alanen is right to recognize that particular sensations associated with fear, 
such as a quickened breath or beating heart, must have an intellectual component. In her 
example, these sensations only occur because a person has an idea of fear and it is only because 
of this idea that the pineal gland delivers the physical sensations representing fear. However, I 
believe it is important to frame this discussion in broader context. Descartes has already 
established his metaphysics in the Meditations; it is perfectly reasonable, then, even in a physics 
of man that he would draw from the theory of mind established in the Meditations. Deborah 
Brown draws attention to the physiological aspects of this process, recalling Articles 35-6:  
The movement of the animal spirits caused by a perception of a wolf [or in Alanen’s 
case, a Rottweiler] are very rapid and cut deep grooves in the surface of the brain, 
establishing a propensity for the spirits to rush in there and cause in the soul a passion of 
fear whenever the same or a similar image is formed on the brain.92  
 
Brown acknowledges physiological aspects present in Descartes’ description. While Descartes 
claims that the mind receives the representation of a passion, it is merely receiving a message, an 
impression. There are metaphysical aspects, of course, that must inform a comprehensive 
account of the passions. As Descartes tells Elisabeth, he has already established a theory of mind 
in his metaphysics; he has metaphysics available at-hand and is now ready to discuss the body.93 
It would be a bit absurd to expect Descartes to abandon the work that he established earlier, 
especially since his order of philosophy demands that the physics should follow from the 
metaphysics—if the Passions is a physics of man, the ‘trunk’ of physics will benefit from the 
‘roots’ of the metaphysics. Alanen’s claim, then, misunderstands a physiological reading of the 
Passions as one that ignores his established metaphysics; instead, as Descartes moves up the 
‘tree of his philosophy,’ he derives new types of knowledge that can be used alongside those 
																																																								
91 Alanen (2003), 184. 
92 Brown (2008), 46. 
93 Letter to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643. (AT III, 663) 
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previously discovered. His problem at hand, the new subject of inquiry in the Passions, is one of 
a natural philosopher. 
 Other present-day commentators do not reject that the Passions has aspects that are best 
identified as a physics of man, but still tend to neglect physiological themes, preferring to treat 
the text as a moral treatise. Lisa Shapiro, for instance, develops a Cartesian ethical theory 
drawing from the Passions in addition to the correspondence and morale par provision. She 
explains that the Passions are a “follow up on the morale par provision of Part 3 of the 
Discourse on Method”94 that comes by request of Princess Elisabeth to define the passions “in 
the middle of a discussion concerning the regulation of the passions, virtue, and the sovereign 
good.”95 The Passions contain “a worked out moral psychology and some further insight into 
Descartes’s ethics,” which she expounds into a more robust ethical theory.96 
 
I.a. The Passions of the Soul as Natural Philosophy 
Rather than accept either of these readings, I believe there is compelling internal and 
external evidence that the Passions of the Soul is foremost a physics of man.97 When he first 
begins writing the treatise, he tells Mesland that he is fearful to write a morality because of the 
theologians.98 Later, when Descartes is readying the Passions for publication, Descartes 
proclaims in an accompanying letter that, “my intention was to explain the passions only as a 
																																																								
94 Shapiro (2006), 269; See also Marshall (1998), 96 and Shapiro (2011), 453-458. 
95 Shapiro (2006), 268. 
96 Shapiro (2006), 273-4. 
97 This reading is not necessarily contrary to Shapiro’s thesis—it is possible that the Passions of the Soul contains 
both physiological and moral themes. I push back at her claim, though, that it should be recognized as a moral 
treatise since morality seems at best a subordinate theme of the main project of the physics. My thesis, of course, is 
contrary to Alanen’s. 
98 See Descartes’ letter dated 2 May 1644, believed address to Mesland. (AT IV, 110) 
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natural philosopher [en physician], and not as a rhetorician or even as a moral philosopher.”99 
Though Descartes gives detailed account of the passions in this final publication, this taxonomy 
is according to each passion’s physiological phenomenon, absent of prescriptive moral theory 
until these themes begin to emerge in the third part.  
The Passions consists of three parts. The first two are almost exclusively physiological. 
Here Descartes describes how passions arise in the body and their corresponding physiological 
traits: physical coldness, paleness in the face, and so forth.100 In part one, Descartes differentiates 
living bodies from other bodies in that they have movement; they are machines, as if a wound up 
clock.101 These movements are caused in one of three ways: by animal spirits, which move from 
the brain to parts of the body through nerves; by blood, which is heated through the heart then 
pushed throughout the body; and by muscular movement which are caused through several ways: 
through the body itself, the mind, or external stimuli like perceptions.102 It is no surprise that he 
offers the third way, self-movement through the mind, given his stated purpose to Elisabeth in 
writing a treatise on the passions. He draws on metaphysics established in his previous writing, 
but maintains his focus on physics: the passions of the soul, he writes, may be defined “generally 
as those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, and 
which are caused, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits.”103 When he 
expands on the definition in Articles 28-29, his account is making empirical observations of a 
natural philosopher, not a prescriptive moralist: perceptions are merely knowledge caused by 
																																																								
99 AT XI, 326. I recognize that earlier I quote Alanen dismissing this claim. I believe my evidence will speak for 
itself to support my reading against hers.  
100 The 17th century artist Charles Le Brun has a series of sketches based on the Passions of the Soul where he tries 
to capture the appearance of each passion on a person’s face using Descartes’ descriptions. 
101 a. 6 (AT XI, 330-331) 
102 a. 7-26 (AT XI, 331-347) 
103 a. 27 (AT XI, 349; CSM I, 338-339) 
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external objects that result in movements of animal spirits. There is physical interaction between 
objects, the senses, the pineal gland, and the soul that excites these movements.104  
Some topics discussed in the first two parts clearly have moral implications, but that 
should not be confused with a morality. For example, when Descartes gives an account of the 
passionate pursuit and aversion to things, such as a person shunning something that was 
previously harmful, it is given in terms of the brain’s predisposition to send animal spirits to 
particular parts of the body, which has no immediate moral implications.105 Imagine there is a 
person, Eustace, who hates beer because, after becoming too intoxicated once, the mere thought 
of beer causes physical revulsion. When he sees, smells, or tastes beer he is repulsed. Eustace’s 
immediate rejection of alcohol does not have direct moral implication—it is a physical response 
due to the harm that beer had previously caused his body. Of course after the immediate reaction, 
he may then think of the moral consequences of intoxication. However, that moral deliberation is 
not a passion. The passion is an immediate revulsion, a physical response. This is what Descartes 
describes.  
Likewise, in Article 41 Descartes discusses the will, but it is absent of blameworthiness; 
he is bracketing the conversation, describing its physiological aspects and building upon the 
metaphysical gains he made in the Meditations. In defining strong and weak souls, for instance, 
his account lacks concern for which inclinations one should take towards particular behaviors.106 
His advice is not much different than that of a trainer who may through habituation instill habits 
and behaviors into an animal. A dog trainer may train a dog not to eat chocolate, for example. 
For a dog, an aversion to consuming chocolate is good, and this is a behavior formed through 
																																																								
104 a. 34-36 
105 This is a significant theme of Parts Two and Three.  
106 a. 49 
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conditioning.107 The only difference between this example and its human application is that with 
humans there is a ghost in the machine; because humans have souls, each person can be his or 
her own ‘trainer,’ conditioning the will by means of one’s own intellect.  
In Part Two, Descartes describes, orders, and enumerates the passions. Though the 
passions (including scorn, pride, envy, love, desire, hatred, courage, and remorse) are clearly of 
moral importance, similar to his treatment of other topics in the Passions, he is giving a 
biological description of how the body experiences these passions: rising through heat, blood 
flow, and animal spirits. The biologist who observes and records the quickened heart rate, 
flushed face, and furrowed eyebrows of an angry man is by no means forming an ethics – there is 
no normative or prescriptive force. So Part Two’s taxonomy of the passions consists of almost 
exclusively biological descriptions: after much laughter, for instance, one feels inclined towards 
sadness because the most fluid part of the blood from the spleen is expended and coarser blood 
returns to the heart.108 Likewise, trembling occurs during anger because this passion releases too 
many animal spirits into the brain and as a result cannot “be directed from there in an orderly 
way.”109 And so forth.  
In the first two parts, then, he is recounting physiological responses to external stimuli, 
closer to William Harvey’s work on medicine than the Stoics or any other normative tradition. It 
is only in the final article (a. 148) of Part Two that Descartes writes on anything clearly related to 
morals, virtue. Concluding Part Two with virtue is fitting because, in Part Three, Descartes 
begins bridging the gap between his physics and moral philosophy. It is only in this third part 
where Descartes begins touching on moral themes with any substance. Nonetheless, if the 
Passions itself is a moral treatise, it is deeply unsatisfying—Part Three is brief and lacking in 																																																								
107 Chocolate is toxic for dogs. 
108 a. 126  
109 a. 118 (AT XI, 416; CSM I, 369) 
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depth. While it is true that a badly developed moral philosophy is still a moral philosophy (just a 
poorly conceived one – just as a kitschy and uninspired Thomas Kinkade landscape is still a 
painting), I believe Descartes has earned enough respect for us not to surrender his morality so 
expediently. But if the Passions is a physics, it need not be satisfying qua morality; Descartes 
clearly has more to say about ethics from his correspondence at the same time that he chooses to 
omit.  If his goal was not to create a morality in Part Three, but to build a ‘bridge’ between the 
physics of man and ethics, making the connections between the two clear, then the fact that there 
is overlap between the third part of the Passions and the correspondence on ethics is to be 
expected.  
 In one final thought before moving to the next section, some advance the thesis that the 
Passions of the Soul is foremost a treatise on medicine110 while others recognize both medical 
and moral themes, drawing connections between the two. It was not uncommon, after all, 
following the influence of Galen, for treatises on the passions to simultaneously operate as both 
natural and moral philosophies.111 This second thesis resonates with an ambiguity in some parts 
of the Passions, as well as his correspondence with Elisabeth, where Descartes describes the 
negative consequences that follow from passions as bad (mal): mal could mean vicious or 
morally blameworthy, but it also can refer to bodily harm, an ambiguity found in the virtue of 
temperance, for instance. Gluttony (failing to exhibit temperance) is a moral failure, but also bad 
for one’s health. Expressing a similar reading, Deborah Brown notes, “There is little distinction 
then for Descartes between the ‘cures’ for unruly passions and the practice of moral philosophy 
itself.”112 She is right that he does often discuss physical remedies for the passions, and that his 
																																																								
110 Shapin (2000); Aucante (2006). 
111 Brown (2008), 29; 29fn3; also Levi (1964).  
112 Brown (2008), 35. 
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remedy is in part psychotherapeutic:113 tranquility is found through the acquisition of knowledge 
and forethought, using reason correctly, reflecting upon Divine Province, and the correct 
understanding and exercise of the will.114 She concludes, however, that: 
Descartes’ statement in the Preface to the Passions that he will approach the passions en 
physicien does not, therefore, indicate that he intends to reduce the passions to 
physiological processes or ignore their moral status, but nor does it tell us what exactly he 
thinks he is doing that is so new.115  
 
Her concern raises an important point of disagreement concerning the nature of the passions but I 
am not sure that it fares better than arguments for the Passions as strictly a morality. If the 
Passions of the Soul is a precondition for morality, then it would also be a precondition for 
medicine. At this point, Descartes has still failed to offer a physics of man and the Passions, 
especially parts one and two, lacks the prescriptive force of a moralist or a medical doctor.  
 
I.b. The Order of Philosophy and a Physics of Man 
As discussed briefly in my first chapter, the order of philosophical inquiry is central for 
Descartes: without the correct order, the philosopher loses his or her certainty in judgments. 
Descartes is concerned with the correct order of his philosophy, ensuring that clear and distinct 
ideas precede ideas deduced from them. In the Preface to the French edition of the Principles of 
Philosophy, he violently distances himself from his former disciple Regius who among other 
things, “changed the order” of his philosophy.116 Thus, when he writes of order in the same 
preface, we should be attentive: in his tree of philosophy, medicine, mechanics, and morals are 
posterior to his metaphysics and physics. This is echoed in a letter to Chanut dated 15 June 1646: 																																																								
113 In the sense expressed by Martha C. Nussbaum in Therapy of Desire and which follows from Hellenistic 
philosophies, especially Stoicism; Nussbaum (1994). I recognize this is a bit of an anachronism, but common 
enough in the literature that I will use it to convey my point. 
114 Brown (2008), 35. She appeals to Passions of the Soul arts. 50, 211, 76, 176,v 138, 148, 170, 145, 156, and 161.  
115 Brown (2008), 35.  
116 AT IXb, 20; translation from Roger Ariew’s Descartes (2000), 230. 
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"I must say in confidence that what little knowledge of physics I have tried to acquire has been a 
great help to me in establishing sure foundations in moral philosophy."117 Appealing to the 
metaphor of a tree, Descartes believes that sound reasoning begins with metaphysics, which are 
the roots or foundation upon which physics rests. The branches and fruit that stems from physics 
are medicine, mechanics, and morals. As a result of this order, physics must be discovered 
anterior to morality. Descartes’ publications lay this groundwork: first the metaphysics in 
Meditations on First Philosophy followed by the physics in Principles of Philosophy.118  
The Principles contains four parts: The Principles of Human Knowledge, The Principles 
of Material Things, The Visible World, and The Earth. Though he concludes the Principles in 
four parts, he envisioned six parts as necessary for a complete physics: 
I would not add anything further to this fourth part of the Principles of Philosophy if, as I 
originally planned, I was going on to write two further parts – a fifth part on living things, 
i.e. animals and plants, and a sixth part on man.119 
 
A comprehensive treatise on physics would have included biology or physiology—a physics of 
living things and a physics of man—and it was his original intent to include a fifth and sixth part 
dedicated to each respective topic.120 However, he explains that, “I am not yet completely clear 
about all the matters which I would like to deal with there, and I do not know whether I shall 
ever have enough free time to complete these sections.”121 Rather than postponing the 
publication of his physics indefinitely while he works out a physics of animals and of man, 
Descartes chooses to send the Principles to press with only four parts. In place of parts five and 
six, he includes ten sections at the end of part four to offer preliminary thoughts, what he calls “a 
																																																								
117 AT IV, 441; CSMK, 289. Italics mine. 
118 In my last chapter I explain why I omit the Discourse on Method from this list. 
119 AT VIIIA, 315; CSM II, 279. 
120 This is not uncommon for its seventeenth century use. I will show later in this chapter how Le Grand and Régis 
use it this way, for example. 
121 AT VIIIA, 315; CSM II, 279. 
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few observations,”122 concerning objects of the senses—a sketch of what may be contained in the 
physics of living things and of man.  
 Descartes does not intend these observations as a replacement for a complete physics; he 
means them provisionally until he obtains clarity and can write a full physics of living things and 
of man. A reasonable question to ask here is whether he gives an account of these topics 
elsewhere in a way we can reasonably assume that Descartes would have deemed them as an 
acceptable substitute for parts five and six of the Principles. The only known manuscript that 
could contend for them is the Treatise on Man, which is indeed a physics of man. However, there 
are two problems with considering this in place of Principles V and VI. The first is Descartes’ 
failure to include it in the Principles. The Treatise on Man is an early work, written even before 
the Discourse on Method.123 If Descartes had already written a physics of man that he believed 
was sufficient, it would be strange for him not to use it in the Principles or for him to have 
written in part four that he was not clear about what he wanted to deal with in the final two parts. 
The second concern is that he failed to share the Treatise on Man with any of his confidants. 
Descartes is constantly sharing his work with correspondents, asking for their advice and 
comments, especially for works that were still being drafted and not yet ready to be published. 
When he writes the Discourse, Meditations, and Passions, he shared his work to extract 
comments from his audience.124 He also authored a treatise on animals a year after the Principles 
were first published; he shares this with Elisabeth.125 If he saw potential in his Treatise on Man 
as his physics of man, it is not clear why it remained secretive, especially since it would have 
more closely related to the topics that he and Elisabeth corresponded than a treatise on animals. 																																																								
122 AT VIIIA, 315; CSM II, 279. 
123 He was composing the Treatise on Man along with The World around 1629-1633, prior to both the Discourse on 
Method and its treatises (Optics, Geometry, Meteors) as well as the condemnation of Galileo. (CSM I, 79) 
124 I discuss this earlier in this chapter and in the previous chapter. 
125 Letter from 6 October 1645 (AT IV, 304) 
	50 
For these two reasons, this is very unlikely the physics of man that he hoped for, the one that 
would bridge the gap between the first four parts of his physics and the practical philosophies of 
medicine, mechanics, and morals.126  
With this methodological and conceptual gap missing between physics and morality, so is 
this important precondition for Descartes’ ethics missing given his philosophical order. He 
believes physics are essential for framing morality, so there must be something about physics 
that cannot be overlooked in constructing a moral philosophy. It is surprising, then, that many 
commentators altogether skip the physics of man and begin reconstructing a Cartesian morality 
with the Passions of the Soul, assuming that it is a treatise on ethics.  
 
I.c. The Cartesian (Re)construction of the Passions of the Soul 
While a physiological understanding of the Passions of the Soul may seem novel in 
contemporary literature, the earliest Cartesians favor this reading. Among them was Antoine Le 
Grand,127 a Franciscan friar sent to England where he was assigned tutoring as an ecclesiastical 
duty.128 Though his first publications discussed the philosophy of Duns Scotus, he earned a 
reputation for himself in authoring a text propagating Seneca’s Stoicism, Le Sage des Stoiques, 
ou l'Homme sans Passions, a philosophy to which he says he swore his allegiance.129 Less than a 
decade later, however, he published a tract defending the Epicurean morality, L'Épicure 
																																																								
126 The Treatise on Man was something he seems to have abandoned and was only published posthumously. This 
does not mean that some of its contents were not developed into future material, including what Descartes wrote in 
letters to Elisabeth or the Passions of the Soul. 
127 See Roger Ariew (2014), 197-199 as well as Mautner (2000), 209-232. Roger Ariew also gave a talk in Lecce 
titled “Passions of the Soul in the First Cartesians” (October 2014; unpublished) that discussed LeGrand’s Cartesian 
morality. In these places, Ariew also argued that Pierre-Sylvain Régis treats Cartesian ethics similarly. 
128 Mautner (2000), 209. 
129 Mautner (2000), 210-212. 
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Spirituel, ou l'Empire de la Volupté sur les Vertus,130 and only two years later, perhaps by 
request, he published a textbook propagating Cartesianism which received an expanded English 
translation titled An Entire Body of Philosophy According to the Principles of the Famous Renate 
Des Cartes in 1694. In this textbook, Le Grand extolls Descartes, ascribing to him the role of 
restoring philosophy.131 Following the traditional outline of a Scholastic textbook, Le Grand 
includes Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, and then in the second English edition, an Ethics. It is 
simple enough for the early Cartesians to include a metaphysics and physics in their textbooks as 
they could just generally follow the arguments in the Meditations on First Philosophy and 
Principles of Philosophy.132  The best way to go about including a Cartesian logic and ethics, 
though, was less clear: Descartes left little systematic work on these branches. In the place of 
logic, Le Grand uses the Cartesian method, not unlike the account in Arnauld and Nicole’s 
Cartesian Logic, the Port Royal Logic.133 For a Cartesian ethics, though, Le Grand must turn to 
the Passions of the Soul and the correspondence.  
 Drawing from these various resources, the chapter outline of Le Grand’s second edition 
of the Entire Body of Philosophy is as follows: 
I. Logic (Method) 
II. Natural Theology (Metaphysics) 
III. Demonology (Metaphysics) 
IV. Natural Philosophy: General (Physics) 
V. Special Natural Philosophy, the heavens and planets (Physics) 
VI. Four Bodies, Metals, and Meteors. (Physics) 																																																								
130 He published his tract on the Stoics in 1662 and the pamphlet on Stoicism in 1669. It is worth exploring in the 
future whether Le Grand found Descartes’ ethics so appealing because he claims to synthesize these two, but it is 
too tangential for my current project.  
131 Mautner (2000), 212. The text underwent several Latin editions before publication as the English version, which 
was a collection of the Latin text plus additional work by Le Grand. The English edition also had two editions, the 
second of which includes the morality. Mautner (2000) goes into this in detail. 
132 I say “generally” as Le Grand also includes discussions of angels and demons in the metaphysics, for example. 
Le Grand (1694), 74-89. 
133 It is worth noting that Descartes would have likely rejected both this account as well as Le Grand’s given his 
violent criticism of Regis for rearranging his writings and thoughts in the French Preface to the Principles of 
Philosophy.  (AT IXb, 19-20) 
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VII. Living Creatures in General, specially of Plants and Animals (Physics of Living 
Things) 
VIII. Of Man, Considered With Relation to His Body (Physics of Man) 
IX. Of Man, Considered With Relation with the Mind (Physics of Man) 
X. Ethics, or the Right Way of Ordering the Life of Man (Moral Philosophy) 
 
Following Descartes, Le Grand includes a physics of living things and a physics of man before 
he discusses ethics. In VIII, “On Man, Considered With Relation to His Body,” and IX, “Of 
Man, Considered With Relation with the Mind,” he discusses the contents of the Passions of the 
Soul—how the circulation of the blood and respiration affect the body or how the senses and 
appetites affect the nerves in order to bring about particular physical effects, for example. On the 
passions he includes their number and order, specifically discussing Admiration, Love and 
Hatred, Affections, Joy, and Sadness, all in the two chapters concerning man.134 It is not until 
Part X that Le Grand moves into what he believes is Ethics proper, which is posterior to 
discussions of the passions and focuses on topics including the Highest Good, Virtue, and right 
reason, as well as the usefulness of the passions in attaining these ends. The sum of the material 
found in what Le Grand is willing to label as ‘ethics’ is found almost entirely in Descartes’ 
correspondence, with only some overlap with Book III of the Passions. Therefore, the earliest 
instantiation of Cartesian ethics follows the physiological reading that I suggest. 
Thus, to summarize so far, I believe Descartes’ Passions are best understood as physics 
of man, a foundation for practical fruit but not the practical fruit itself. I also admit that in Part 
Three he allows himself the chance to begin to bridge the gap, providing some overlap between 
the physics and morals. I showed that internally this best represents the nature of the text, and 
externally it best fits into Descartes’ grand philosophical vision, one that the earliest Cartesians 
also saw. I will now to turn to the benefit of this reading, which is a clearer vision of Descartes’ 
moral philosophy. In short, if it is true that Descartes wrote the Passions as a natural philosopher 																																																								
134 Le Grand (1694), 333-340.  
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rather than an ethicist, his assertion that he can reconcile the claims of Stoics, Epicureans, and 
Aristotelians becomes more coherent. 
 
II. Cartesian Morality 
The tendency in recent commentaries is to classify Descartes’ morality into one of 
several ethical traditions: Virtue Theory, Stoicism, Deontology, Platonism, and so forth.135 It is 
true that Descartes often appeals to ancient ethical traditions in his letters, so I empathize with 
the motivation to classify his morality into a familiar normative category. However, I believe that 
rather than attempting to follow any particular school, Descartes is creating his own morality that 
can be explained through Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism, three positions that no 
longer contradict one another when understood through his philosophy. I will argue this position 
through three sections. First, I will outline Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian themes in 
Descartes’ letters, where they are presented with equal admiration and criticism. Second, I will 
analyze Descartes’ claim that his morality encompasses all three of these traditions. Descartes 
thinks they are reconcilable on the summum bonum and on virtue, and I argue that a 
physiological understanding of the Passions of the Soul provides space for this synthesis to 
occur. Then, third, I will show that what Descartes is doing—presenting his own ethical position 
by appealing to other schools of thought—is not new and in fact there is overwhelming historical 
precedent for his approach. Descartes cites competing authorities to lend support to his moral 
philosophy, and though he embraces aspects of their thought, sometimes explicitly, he does not 
self-identify as a member of any particular ethical tradition other than his own.  
 
 																																																								
135 Marshall (1998), Shapiro (2006), Naaman-Zauderer (2010), Shapiro (2011), Cimakasky and Polansky (2012). 
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II.a. Descartes and the Greek Ethicists 
 Descartes appeals to Stoics, Epicurus, and Peripatetics with some frequency in his late 
letters. Of these, his appeals to Stoicism are the most explicit. As I showed in my first chapter, 
after Descartes wrote his provisional morality in the Discourse, he showed very little care for 
ethics in the years that followed.  When Descartes returns to these topics later in his life, it is in 
his correspondence with Elisabeth, the Princess of Bohemia who recently suffered from a series 
of ill fortunes.136 In attempt to console and heal her, he recommends she read Seneca’s De Vita 
Beata.137 Upon rereading Seneca’s treatise himself, Descartes takes a more critical stance 
towards the text, but sees it as a good place from which to explain his own opinion. In the next 
letter addressed to her, Descartes replies,  
I have since given some thought to this and find it not sufficiently rigorous to deserve to 
be followed. […] Seneca should have taught us all the principal truths whose knowledge 
is necessary to facilitate the practice of virtue and to regulate our desires and passions, 
and thus to enjoy natural happiness. That would have made his book the finest and most 
useful that a pagan philosopher could have written.138  
 
That is, in De Vita Beata, Seneca offers a picture of virtue and self-regulating passions that 
Descartes admires, but the Stoic fails to instruct the reader how to obtain these lofty goals.139 
Nonetheless, Descartes prescribes much from Seneca: he agrees that reason is superior to 
custom, that happiness consists in contentment of the mind, and so forth.140  He also agrees that 
the best cure for misfortune is reason; this remedy will not only make her more content in spite 
																																																								
136 Charles I of England was Elisabeth’s uncle and his crown largely responsible for supporting her family, who was 
in exile. She also became quite ill. Lisa Shapiro offers a succinct but very good biographical account in the 
introduction to her translation of Descartes’ Letters with Elisabeth. (See Shapiro [2007], 1-51) 
137 In my first chapter I noted that Descartes offers Elisabeth rules similar to the ones he gives in the Discourse—but 
there are important differences. Since he gives them posterior to his physics, he is able to frame them in terms of his 
final morality. The lists appear similar, but the first is clearly framed provisionally, focusing on probability and 
custom, and the second in terms of a final morality, focusing on rational belief. Though they somewhat mirror one 
another, they are two unique lists serving two different purposes. 
138 Letter to Elisabeth, 4 August 1645. AT IV, 263, 267; CSMK, 257-258. 
139 This is also one of Pascal’s criticisms of the Stoics. I discuss this in my next chapter. 
140 Letter to Elisabeth, 18 August 1645. AT IV, 271-277; CSMK, 259-262. 
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of misfortune, but also will aid her health.141 Descartes recommends that she face her suffering 
by adjusting her disposition to consider the good that rises from misfortune, tranquility.142  
These Stoic attitudes persist in other letters throughout the same period. He tells 
Mersenne that virtue is exhibiting resolve towards what is reasonable, and that free will is the 
highest faculty because it is not controlled by anything corporeal.143 In a letter to Huygens on the 
occasion of his wife’s death, Descartes offers ‘consolation’: since the tiresome duty of caring his 
wife is complete, Huygens no longer has to bother himself with hope that she will become well. 
Since he has a strong soul, he should find interior satisfaction knowing that he was resolute in 
caring for her.144 Though Descartes’ tone towards a grieving Huygens (whose love of his wife is 
famous145) lacks expected sympathy, it echoes Epictetus, who writes in the Euchidrion:  
You are foolish if you want your children and your wife to and your friends to live 
forever, since you are wanting things to be up to you that are not up to you, and things to 
be yours that are not yours.  […] But wanting not to fail to get what you desire—this you 
are capable of. A person’s master is someone who has power over what he wants or does 
not want, either to obtain it or take it away. Whoever wants to be free, therefore, let him 
not want or avoid anything that is up to others.146  
 
His attitude on virtue is firmly Stoic in these instances. 
 While there are those explicit Stoic themes in Descartes’ morality, his attitude towards 
fortune and corporeal pleasures are more Epicurean than Stoic. Epicurus claims, “When pleasure 
is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is neither pain of body or of mind or of both 
																																																								
141 Letter to Elisabeth, May or June 1645 (AT IV, 218) 
142 Letter to Elisabeth, June 1645 (AT IV, 236) 
143 Letter to Mersenne 3 December 1640 (AT III, 248) 
144 Descartes to Huygens, 20 May 1637 (AT I, 631); Descartes discusses this point more fully in a 6 October 1645 
(AT IV, 304) letter to Elisabeth, stating that when we practice the virtue of charity, we can have more pleasure while 
weeping and under distress than while laughing. 
145 Huygens’ called his wife his Star and wrote poetry expressing his love and despair over her death (“CUPIO 
DISSOLVI. OP DE DOOD VAN STERRE,” 24 January 1637).  
146 Handbook §14, 15; Also, Handbook, §10: “Never say of anything, ‘I have lost it’; but instead, ‘I have give it 
back.’ Did your child die? It was given back. Did your wife die? She was given back. ‘My land was taken.’ So this 
too was given back. ‘But the person who took it was bad!’ How does the way the giver asked for it back concern 
you? As long as he gives it, take care of it as something that is not your own, just as travelers treat an inn.” (14) 
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together.”147  This resonates with Descartes, who writes to Elisabeth that, “in general the soul is 
pleased to feel passions arise in itself no matter what they are, provided it remains in control of 
them.”148 For Descartes, the passions are needed to inform the soul of what is good and harmful 
to the body and they should only be resisted when a passion runs counter to an already 
established firm judgment in the soul. Although this still maintains resolute judgment as a higher 
good, which is in tension with the Epicurean teaching that the good is reducible to pleasure, it is 
even further from the Stoics who argue that the passions are a sickness to be entirely eradicated 
by reason.149 For the Stoics, exterior goods are never good for the soul, nor does contentment 
(virtue) come in degrees.150 Quite contrary to this, in the same letters where Descartes discusses 
Seneca, he also tells Elisabeth that someone with more exterior goods may be happier than 
someone who does not have good fortune—desire is not antithetical to happiness and virtue is 
easy because it is not against pleasure.151  
 Still in other letters, Descartes gives Aristotelian advice that contradicts both his Stoic 
and Epicurean claims. One example comes in Descartes emphasizing the role of community in 
the good life. He tells Elisabeth,   
though each of us is a person distinct from others, whose interests are accordingly in 
some way different from those of the rest of the world, we ought still to think that none of 
us could subsist alone and that each one of us is really one of the many parts of the 
universe, and more particularly a part of the earth, the state, the society and the family to 
which we belong by our domicile, our oath of allegiance and our birth. And the interests 
of the whole, of which each of us is a part, must always be preferred to those of our own 
particular person - with measure, of course, and discretion, because it would be wrong to 
expose ourselves to a great evil in order to procure only a slight benefit to our kinsfolk or 
our country. (Indeed if someone were worth more, by himself, than all his fellow citizens, 
he would have no reason to destroy himself to save his city.) But if someone saw 
everything in relation to himself, he would not hesitate to injure others greatly when he 																																																								
147 Epictetus, The Principle Doctrines, III. (Diogenes Laetrius, X.139-141; 655) 
148 AT IV, 311; CSMK, 270. 
149 AT XI 367; 48; Greenberg, 728; See Seneca, Epistles 75; (1920), 137-147.  
150 Seneca, Epistles 92; (1920), 446-470.  
151 Letter to Elisabeth, 4 August 1645 (AT IV, 263) 
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thought he could draw some slight advantage; and he would have no true friendship, no 
fidelity, no virtue at all.152  
 
Though community involvement is an essential component to eudaimonic living for the 
Peripatetics, it comes in a rejection of the Stoic sage, unattached and self-sufficient, and against 
the Epicureans whose concept of the good makes basic social functions challenging, such as 
child rearing.153  
Descartes also recalls Peripatetic influence in the role habit takes in acquiring virtue. He 
tells Elisabeth that in addition to knowledge, “practice also is required if one is to be always 
disposed to judge well.”154 While the role of self-discipline and control could apply to any 
number of ethical traditions, he specifically credits the Schoolmen—“in this sense the scholastics 
are right when they say that virtues are habits.”155 It is easy to dismiss Descartes on this point, as 
he is often guilty of appealing to potentially unfriendly or powerful audiences in Scholastic 
language rhetorically to make his ideas more palatable; this does not seem to be entirely the case 
with ethics. Though he often appeals to Aristotelian authority when defending his physics and 
metaphysics,156 these appeals are often directed towards an audience where such an articulation 																																																								
152 Letter to Elisabeth, 15 September 1645. (CSMK, 266; AT IV, 293); He also seems to take on Aristotelian 
language in discussing courage and its excesses through acting irrationally on one hand and lacking irresolution and 
fear on the other. (Letter to Elisabeth, 3 November 1645. AT IV, 330-334).  
153 Seneca, Epistles 92; (1920), 446-470 and Epictetus, The Principle Doctrines 149-151.There are other cases 
where Stoics may seem more sensitive to the political life, such as in Seneca’s On Clemency. Seneca describes the 
kingdom as a body with the king as its head, and the king must perform certain duties in certain ways for his 
kingdom, this seems more akin to Epicurus’ advice to perform whatever role one finds him or herself in excellently 
than a universal claim. (See Seneca De Clementia; (1927), 356ff and Epictetus, Handbook §29) 
154 15 September 1645. AT IV, 295; CSMK, 267. 
155 15 September 1645. AT IV, 295; CSMK, 267. 
156 Descartes at times makes his desire to undermine Aristotle quite explicit. Other times, usually when writing to an 
audience of Scholastics, he claims that Aristotle supports his claims, that his and Aristotle’s positions are 
indistinguishable, or that or that his claims reinforce an established Aristotelian belief. For correspondence 
exhibiting anti-Aristotelianism or attacking Aristotle’s foundation instead of getting caught up in Scholastic 
disputes, see the following letters: to ***, June 1645 (Huygens?) (AT IV, 223); to Mersenne, 11 November 1640 
(AT III, 230/238); to Mersenne, 28 January 1641 (AT III, 293); to Mersenne, 31 March 1641 (AT III, 339); to 
Mersenne, 19 January 1642 (AT III, 480); and to Pollot, 6 October 1642 (AT III, 557). For correspondence where 
Descartes claims his philosophy is not contrary to Aristotle, see letters: to [Charlet], October 1644 (AT IV, 140); to 
Plempius, 15 February 1638 (AT I, 521); to [Charlet], October 1644 (AT IV, 140); to ***, 1644 (?) (AT V, 549); 
and to Charlet, 9 February 1645 (AT IV, 156). 
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would be pragmatically advantageous, such as to the Jesuits or the faculty at the Sorbonne. When 
addressing moral philosophy, Descartes’ audience is always more familiar to him and lacking in 
ecclesiastical authority or influence; Descartes has nothing obvious to gain from drawing on 
Aristotle in writing on morality.  
Descartes is not, of course, trying to advocate Aristotelian ethics either. Not only would 
that be unexpected for someone who frames his work as anti-Aristotelian, but he also specifically 
tells Elisabeth that he wants a moral philosophy that is attainable by anyone. This eliminates 
Aristotle whose morality is exclusive, requiring that someone have all the goods, interior and 
exterior, to reach happiness: someone without a high birth or good fortune is excluded. Descartes 
questions the Aristotelian assumption that these things are necessary for the good life, 
acknowledging that though someone with more exterior goods may be happier than someone 
who does not have them. For those who lack external goods, their smaller vessel can still be 
filled with contentment.157 Tranquility, then, is obtainable without external goods, though 
perhaps to a lesser degree of overall satisfaction. Not only is this against Aristotle, but also it 
runs contrary to central Stoic themes by suggesting that virtue comes in degrees.  
 
II.b. Descartes’ (Late) Ethics 
As I have shown so far, Descartes equally draws from and criticizes the Stoic, Epicurean, 
and Aristotelian moral traditions. At times he seems to prefer one to the others, and still other 
times he makes claims that contradict all three. He rejects temperance as a virtue, for instance, 
saying that it is good for medicine and in this way good for the body against the passions, but it 
																																																								
157 Letter to Elisabeth, August 4, 1645  (AT IV, 263) 
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is not clearly good for the soul.158 These tensions get fleshed out some in his discussion of the 
summum bonum in an August 1645 letter to Elisabeth. In this letter, he attempts to sketch out his 
idea of the Supreme Good, framed by a discussion of three major opinions from ancient 
philosophers—Aristotle, Zeno (of Citium), and Epicurus. These three traditions, of course, have 
a long history of tension beyond Descartes’ work, so it seems either bold or naive when he 
writes, “These three views can, I think, be accepted as true and as consistent with each other, 
provided they are interpreted favorably.”159 He elaborates on this by discussing each tradition’s 
account of the supreme good.  
According to Aristotle, the supreme good was something that consisted in all the 
perfections which humanity is capable of achieving, internal and external. Zeno believed it 
resided exclusively in virtue because that alone is controlled by a person’s free will, unlike 
Aristotle who requires external goods. Epicurus was committed to the idea that the end of human 
actions is pleasure or contentment and it is in this that happiness consists. Analyzing these 
accounts, Descartes argues that Zeno errs in making the supreme good solely intellectual, 
detached from the body; in doing so, the Stoics make virtue antithetical to pleasure. 160 Likewise, 
Descartes accepts that Epicurus is right against Zeno—happiness is not found in merely knowing 
the good in itself divorced from pleasure—but he is concerned that the hedonist does not focus 
enough on knowing the good.161 Concerning Aristotle, Descartes does not offer any substantive 
criticism. Instead, he advises that most people will not do well to follow the Peripatetics because 
their account does not apply to anyone who lacks any human perfection. That is, since Aristotle 
teaches the supreme good consists of internal and external goods it only applies to the most 																																																								
158 He discusses a man abstaining from food. See Descartes’ Letter to Gassendi’s “Champion,” Hyperaspites, dated 
August 1641. (AT III, 422) 
159 AT IV, 275; CSMK, 261 
160 AT IX, 275-7; Letter to Elisabeth, 18 August 1645. 
161 AT IX, 275-7; Letter to Elisabeth, 18 August 1645. 
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accomplished of most men. Descartes agrees that the best life will have both fortune (meaning 
external goods such as health and material comforts) and contentment, but rejects the notion 
good fortune is a necessary condition for contentment.162  
Moving beyond the criticisms (and laying Aristotle aside for a moment) Descartes argues 
that both Zeno and Epicurus are correct, only in different senses. To illustrate his point, he gives 
an analogy of someone hitting a bull’s-eye. A person is motivated to hit a bull’s-eye because of a 
prize, but cannot win the prize if s/he does not see the bull’s-eye. Likewise, even if someone 
clearly sees the bull’s-eye, s/he will not bother to shoot at it if there is no reward for doing so. 
Though virtue must be known (like seeing the bull’s-eye), we pursue it (like shooting at the 
bull’s-eye) because of the reward, which is happiness or contentment.163 Descartes believes that 
a correct view of the supreme good embraces both of these elements of Epicureanism and 
Stoicism.  
However much Descartes shows his morality encompasses important aspects of each 
ethical tradition, one remaining problem is that his account of the summum bonum here fails to 
address external goods. This is especially problematic because the way that each tradition treats 
the body is central to how each forms its opinion of the supreme good. Epicurus teaches that 
avoiding physical pain to maximize pleasure is central to virtue and Aristotle claims that external 
goods (including those for the body) are necessary but not sufficient for the good life; the Stoics 
believe the body is at best instrumentally good, clothing for the soul where true virtue lies.164 If 
Descartes believes that his system reconciles these schools of thought, he must account for this 
problem given that the body is one of the most pointed disagreements between the schools. The 
																																																								
162 AT IX, 275-7; Letter to Elisabeth, 18 August 1645. 
163 Epictetus also gives an example of obtaining virtue being like shooting at a target. (Handbook §27) 
164 See Epicurus, The Principle Doctrines, III (Diogenes Laetrius, X.139-141; 655); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
Book I, Chap. 10 (1100a10-1101a20); and, Seneca, Epistles 92; (1920), 461-470, etc.   
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answer lies in the Passions of the Soul; if the Passions are understood foremost as a physics of 
man and not an ethics (as I argued in the first half of this chapter), there is interpretive benefit. 
To expand on this point, according to Descartes, the passions are not inherently harmful; 
in fact they are quite natural and serve the important role of providing someone’s soul with 
information as to what is good and bad for the body. He writes, 
Now that we are acquainted with all the passions, we have much less reason for anxiety 
about them than we had before. For we see that they are all by nature nature good, and 
that we have nothing to avoid but their misuse or excess, against which the remedies I 
have explained might be sufficient if each person took care enough to apply them.165 
 
The practice he refers to involves training the passions through habit.166 Even with practice, 
however, “Our passions, too, cannot be directly aroused or suppressed by the action of our will, 
but only directly through the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions 
we wish to have and opposed to the passions which we wish to reject.”167 To give an example, 
someone’s pupil size cannot be changed on command; the will alone is insufficient to enlarge 
them. However, a person may change a pupil’s size indirectly by fixing his or her gaze at a more 
distant object or by shining a light into them. Likewise, someone cannot simply will a passion to 
cease, but can accomplish its cessation through focusing on a different passion, redirecting the 
animal spirits.168 
By reclassifying the passions from an intellectual sickness to a physiological event, there 
is no longer an immediate tension with the Stoic account. The passions are not caused by 
ignorance. Instead, they are a response to external stimuli, often beyond a person’s control. 
																																																								
165 a. 211; CSM I, 403. 
166 Though a similar effect is brought about through an unexpectedly strong passion that causes the exiting 
movement of animal spirits to become associated with new passions—such as when someone drinks spoiled milk, 
s/he may become repulsed whenever smelling milk, good or bad, because the strong feeling created from drinking 
the milk that was sour. See Article 50 of the Passions. 
167 a. 45; CSM I, 345. 
168 a. 44-45 
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When passions are utilized by the will correctly, they can even be good and advantageous:169 
“Indeed in general the soul is pleased to feel passions arise in itself no matter what they are, 
provided it remains in control of them.”170 The passions are good, even pleasing to the soul; 
passions are useful when they, guided by reason and resolute judgments, are used to redirect 
those that are harmful. Merely feeling anger, for instance, is not blameworthy, though giving in 
to the passion of anger and striking someone is. Since all passions by their nature are outside 
anyone’s immediate control, a person must often use one passion to counteract another that is 
harmful, as if taking her gaze off one object by looking at another. Thus, Descartes is able to 
maintain important aspects of Stoic virtue, that it is rational, while also maintaining that there is 
no need to rid oneself of passions altogether. 
Another upshot here concerns goods outside the body. Descartes says that external goods 
are helpful but not necessary for contentment. Since the passions are not blameworthy, it is 
possible to find enjoyment in an external good so long as reason judges that it is not harmful. 
This allows for something like Peripatetic eudaimonia; happiness is maximized when internal 
contentment of virtue is combined with fortune and external goods.171 Nonetheless, one can find 
pleasure in times of pain and misfortune if s/he is guided by reason. Even if bad fortune falls on 
someone and s/he experiences physical ills or suffers from material or relational loss, 
contentment is still possible. As the Stoa philosophy teaches, the best minds are those that 
																																																								
169 The Stoics do seem to think that passions can be used to subdue other passions, but this does not count as virtue. 
For more on this, see James (1993). There is also a tension with what Descartes says here and his more Stoic claim 
in Article 48 that there are souls which are neither strong nor week, that use passions to control other passions. I 
believe one way of reconciling this may be that the morally conscientious person without a strong soul may just 
blindly use a passion to subdue another; the strong soul, however, may use reason to direct one passion to subdue 
another—perhaps in the case of feeling anger, the morally conscientious weak soul may subject himself to music in 
a minor key to change his mood while the strong soul will direct his thought toward something melancholy. In the 
first case, the subduing is intentional but externally caused, while in the second the movement begins with the will 
itself.  
170 Letter to Elisabeth, 6 October 1645 (AT IV, 309-11; CSMK, 270). 
171 Letter to Elisabeth, 1 September 1645 
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consider the benefits acquired through misfortune, produced by distancing oneself from the 
passion that rises from the suffering and “turning one’s attention away from the evils which this 
thing had been imagined to contain. For no events are so disastrous […] that they cannot be 
considered in some favorable light by a person of intelligence.”172 It is in this way that Descartes 
believes that his morality is in agreement with all three of these ancient traditions. The synthesis 
that he claims is reconcilable given his physiological classification of the passions in his physics 
of man; since the passions are amoral, they are non-blameworthy and external goods are 
beneficial, though not necessary, for the good life. 
 
II.c. A Historical Precedent for Descartes’ Approach 
So far I have shown that Descartes discusses the Stoics, Epicureans, and Peripatetics in 
his letters, acknowledging their strengths and offering criticisms against each. He is constructing 
his own moral philosophy in which he believes these ancient traditions are not contradictory, and 
I have shown how their coexistence in a Cartesian morality is possible. Though most recent 
literature is guilty of collapsing Descartes’ moral philosophy into one of several moral traditions, 
this reductive approach has not always been preferred. Leibniz, for instance, writes to Molanus 
criticizing Descartes for not saying anything original in his ethics.173 He claims that though 
Descartes shows the moral philosophies of Epicurus and Epictetus are not mutually exclusive to 
one another, this idea is plagiarized from Seneca. Leibniz’s criticism is not unwarranted. Seneca 
glosses and quotes Epicurus sympathetically and with frequency. To give just one example, 
Seneca praises Epicurus for saying his happiest days were when he suffered from strangury and 
an ulcer. Seneca concludes that, “Why, then, should those goods which virtue bestows be 																																																								
172 Letter to Elisabeth, June 1645 (AT IV, 237; CSMK, 253). 
173 AG, 240-244. It is unclear to whom this letter was actually addressed.  
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incredible in the sight of us, who cultivate virtue, when they are found even in those who 
acknowledge pleasure as their mistress?”174 To extend Leibniz’s criticism, Seneca also compares 
the cultivation of virtue to an athlete’s training, sounding very Aristotelian.175 Descartes’ 
drawing from the three traditions does not appear terribly novel. 
Although I agree with Leibniz that Descartes follows Seneca’s lead here, I believe that 
the similarity is a feature, not a flaw. There is significant historical precedent of members of one 
philosophical tradition citing the works of another competing school in order to articulate an 
aspect of their own thought. That is, Descartes is not original in recognizing the similarities 
between Epicurus and the Stoics (nor the Peripatetics), but he is not alone in this unoriginality—
it is part of how many ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophers explain their morality.  
For example, Augustine and Aquinas discuss Stoicism with some frequency, and not 
always with criticism. In Civitate Dei, Augustine articulates his understanding of the passions as 
taught by the Stoics and concludes that, 
there is little or no difference between the opinions of Stoics and of other philosophers 
[the Peripatetics] on the subject of the disturbances – of passions – of the soul. Both sides 
champion the mind and the reason against the tyrant of the passions. And the meaning of 
the Stoic assertion that passions do not touch a wise man is probably that passions in no 
way cloud with error that wisdom in virtue of which he is wise, nor can they undermine 
and overthrow it.176 
 
Aquinas expresses the same sentiment in the Summa Theologica. In the article addressing 
whether every passion of the soul is morally evil, he cites Augustine, answering that, “On this 
question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that 
all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This 
																																																								
174 Seneca, Epistles 92; (1920), 463-5. 
175 Seneca, De Providentia (1927), 7-11. 
176 CD IX, Chapter 5; 348.  
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difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, 
if we consider the intent of either school.”177  
This trend continues into the Renaissance. Neostoic author Guillaume du Vair approaches 
Epictetus in the same begrudgingly positive tone as Seneca:  
And truly I cannot chuse but admire the words of Epicurus, but I would they had 
proceeded out of another mans mouth, because I would not have so worthie a sentence 
marred with the effeminatenes of the rest of his opinions: My bodie (quoth he) daunceth 
for joy, and my heart within me is ravished with pleasure, to think that I being content 
with bread & water, should bee able to contemne all the delicate fare of the world. And 
now if Epicurus gloried so much in the contempt of all dainties, what thinke you should 
the Stoicks doe?178 
 
The tendency of appropriating multiple traditions is taken even further with the Neostoics, 
making them more eclectics than unadulterated Stoics.179 They often synthesized a variety of 
traditions from antiquity to form something new of their own. Justus Lipsius and Gillaume du 
Vair, the first neo-Stoics, synthesize Stoicism with their Christian theology. Pierre Charron and 
Michel de Montaigne follow this model, incorporating Hellenistic skepticism with their Stoicism 
and Christianity.  
Descartes’ tendency to appeal to various traditions is not unique. There is historical 
precedent for this approach of drawing from, expanding upon, and synthesizing multiple 
authorities. His tendency towards any one particular school of thought at any particular time 
makes him no more self-identify with that school than it makes Aquinas a Stoic or Seneca an 
Epicurean. He follows the sentiment of Seneca, who writes,  
Any truth, I maintain, is my own property. And I shall continue to heap quotations from 
Epicurus upon you, so that all persons who swear by the words of another, and put a 
																																																								
177 ST I-II, Q.24, Art. 2.  
178 Du Vair (1951), 71-72. 
179 Sellars (2006), 10-25; this is of course a deviation from classical Stoicism where changing any doctrine was 
considered a rejection of the entire Stoic system of belief.  
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value on the speaker and not upon the thing spoken, may understand that the best ideas 
are common property.180  
 
That Descartes is creating his own morality, then, should come as no surprise, even if he does 
frequently cite other ethical traditions, which should also now be unsurprising. This is after all 
what he tells Elisabeth when they first begins discussing Seneca:  
When I chose Seneca’s On the Happy Life to suggest to Your Highness as an agreeable 
topic of discussion, I took account only of the reputation of the author and the importance 
of his topic, without thinking of his manner of treating it. I have since given some thought 
to this and find it not sufficiently rigorous to deserve to be followed. But to assist Your 
Highness to make a judgement on the topic, I will try to explain how I think it should 
have been treated by such a philosopher, unenlightened by faith, with only natural reason 
to guide him.181 
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 Over the course of this chapter I argued that Descartes is offering his own moral 
philosophy, one that often draws from or synthesizes several philosophical traditions. As evident 
from the second section, Descartes often draws from the Stoics, Epicureans, and Aristotelians, 
both positively to help articulate his project and critically to draw out the distinctions between 
his morality and theirs. In this process, he shows that the three traditions are not contradictory on 
the summum bonum due to his account of the passions: if the passions are physiological events 
(as I argued in the first half of this chapter) and not an intellectual sickness, then he has grounds 
on which to make some passions amoral, subsequently removing their blameworthiness. I also 
demonstrated that my reading not only better reconciles various aspects of Descartes’ writing, 
but it is also likely given the historical precedent: Cartesian ethics are not original in appealing to 
multiple ancient tradition, but this is not a weakness of Descartes’ morality. Rather, it is a 																																																								
180 Seneca, Letter 12; (1917), 73. There may also be some comparison to be drawn here with Augustine’s “taking the 
gold from Egypt”: the Christian should not fear what pagan authors had written because it was written by them, but 
should rather examine whether it is true, and if it is, it can be accommodated to describe his or her faith. (Augustine, 
De Doctrina Christana Book II, Ch. 40, 60) 
181 AT IV, 263; CSMK 256-257 (letter dated 4 August 1645) 
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symptom of how moral philosophy was often explained by ancient, medieval, and Renaissance 
moralists. Given the historical precedent, I maintain that Descartes’ morality is something like 
the morality for which I argued: though he borrows heavily from Stoicism, he does not self-
identify as a Stoic or any other moral tradition, but cites these ancient sources to support his own 
morality.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
PASCAL ON THE GOOD LIFE: IF HAPPINESS FAILS, TRY STOICISM 
 
Through the past century, Pascalian scholarship typically frames his moral philosophy in 
three orders: body, mind, and charity.182 Under this reading (which I will refer to as the ‘accepted 
reading’), each order is given a particular ontological status analogous to Plato’s divided line. 
Along with this ontology, various ethical attributes are paralleled with each order. The order of 
charity is associated with an Augustinian philosophical theology, where loving God allows one 
to see the Good and obtain happiness, while the orders of mind and body are respectively 
associated with the intellect and carnal pleasures.183  
I reject this reading and instead will offer one that more closely represents the structure 
and content of Pascal’s ethics. I believe that Pascal is offering a binary ethics, twice divided: first 
according to the objects of a person’s love, following Augustine’s two cities;184 then divided 
again into those who are seeking God, living an adequately content life and those who remain 
blissful in their concupiscence. In arguing this, it is helpful to first investigate the composition of 
his thought: Augustine, Descartes, Montaigne, and the Stoics (such as Epictetus). Through this, 
each piece of his complex morality will become more pronounced. Under the accepted reading, 
																																																								
182 See for example Chevalier (1922), Baird (1975), Serres (1982), James [Garber, et al] (1998), MacKenzie (2008), 
and Pavlovits (2013).  
183 I speculate that a cause for this reading may be anachronistically reading Kierkegaard’s stages on life’s way—the 
aesthetic, ethical, and religious—back into Pascal. 
184 There is also a striking similarity here found in the Stoics who make a distinction between the morally 
conscientious person and the virtuous person, who does the right action for the right reason. (See James [1993], 294-
5 and her discussion of Diogenes Laertius) This is no surprise since, “Tout ce que M. Pascal lui disait de grand, il 
l'avait vu avant lui dans saint Augustin.” (“All the great things that M. Pascal said to him, he had seen before in 
Saint Augustine.”) Pascal, Entretien avec M. de Sacy (1994), 91; translation mine.  
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the influences of Augustine are often exaggerated, and the influence from Descartes, Montaigne, 
and the Stoics are either underemphasized or misapplied; by understanding these influences 
correctly, his system more naturally follows.185 To accomplish this goal, I divide my chapter into 
three sections: first, I examine Pascal’s use of the term ‘order’ in the Pensées to cast sufficient 
doubt upon the accepted reading; in the next I will discuss the role that Augustine, Descartes, 
Montaigne, and Epictetus take in shaping Pascal’s philosophical project; in the third and final 
section, I will present a reading of Pascal’s moral philosophy that is framed within these 
influences.  
 
I. Pascal’s Use of “Order” in the Pensées  
The phrase ‘order’ (ordre) is recurrent in the Pensées. Because of this, many present-day 
scholars are tempted to use ‘order’ as a key to unlock these fragments and the justification to do 
so is not entirely unwarranted. There are, however, at least four different senses in which he uses 
the term that proponents of the accepted reading fail to acknowledge.  
Pascal’s first use is philosophically uninteresting.186 Here, he invokes ‘order’ to describe 
a sect or group, as in an order of the Free Masons or an order of monks.187 His second use 
																																																								
185 For Augustinianism, Carraud (2007) and for Cartesianism, Ariew (2007), Alexandrescu (2007), Carraud (2007), 
Lewis (2007), and Collette (2014). Adequate secondary literature on Montaigne and Epictetus’ influences is entirely 
lacking, at least in the Anglophone world, and from my research to date in French literature as well. I will be 
spending time in Conversation of Pascal with M. de Saci on Epictetus and Montaigne which incudes a helpful 
introduction by Jean Mesnard and Pascale Mengotti-Thouvenin.  
186 While I understand dismissing senses as “philosophically uninteresting” may seem uncharitable, neither of these 
are the sense to which the accepted reading refers anyhow. Neither do I think it is very contentious to claim that 
Pascal does not mean anything philosophically interesting by the term order when he says, “Tyranny consists in the 
universal desire to dominate beyond one’s order. There are various compartments of the strong, the handsome, the 
sensible, the pious; each of them rules there but not elsewhere. Sometimes they intersect. And the strong and the 
handsome fight to see who is master, but this is foolish, for their mastery is of different kinds. They do not 
understand one another. Their mistake is to want to rule everywhere. Nothing can do this, not even strength, which 
is of no use in the realm of knowledge and governs only external actions.” (Pensées S92/L58) There are, of course, 
many interesting ideas in this fragment, but none of them seem dependent on the use of order other than perhaps 
clarifying its referent.  
187 Pensées S388/L356; S92/L58. 
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denotes a proper role or use, as when a set of affairs is ‘in order’ or that a child biting another is 
acting ‘out of order’. An example of this use is found in Pascal’s account of the will: he 
compares a person’s failure to act according to his or her proper function to a foot acting as 
though it were a different part of the body—in this illustration, the foot, like the human will, is 
acting out of order and as a result, abandoning its proper role.188  
The third way Pascal uses ‘order’ is in placing one thing before another. This is the same 
sense where order is applied in mathematics: given 2x+3 = 9, the correct order of operations is to 
subtract three before diving by two. Placing subtraction before division leads to error. Pascal’s 
use in these cases is the same sense that Descartes often invokes concerning method.189 In the 
first meditation, Descartes warns that “those who do not take the time to grasp the order and 
linkage of my arguments, but will be eager to fuss over statements taken out of context (as is the 
custom for many), they will derive little benefit from reading this work.”190 In a brief diatribe, he 
expresses similar sentiment in the Preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy, 
chastising his former disciple Regius for changing the order of his philosophy. The Cartesians in 
general share a concern with this kind of order as evidenced by the first Cartesian logic book, the 
Port Royal Logic. In this text, the authors describe ‘ordering’ as “the mental action in which 
different ideas, judgments, and reasonings are arranged on the same subject, such as the human 
body, in the best manner best suited for knowing the subject. This is also called method.”191 
																																																								
188 Pensées S407/L374; This becomes important later in my discussion of divine participation.  
189 In Ariew, Des Chene, Jesseph, et al (2015), the entry on “Order” refers the reader to the entry on “Method.” This 
is the sense also that Martial Gueroult uses the term in his Descartes slon l’ordre des raisons. See Gueroult (1984, 
1985). 
190 AT VII.9-10; AC, 6. 
191 Arnauld and Nicole, 23. This distinction is logical or concerning rhetorical order, not an order or distinction in 
nature itself.  
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Pascal himself authored sections of the Port Royal Logic and he was familiar with this sense of 
the word.192  
When Pascal discusses ‘order’ it is most commonly in this third sense. He describes the 
order in which his ideas should be presented, or the correct way to present them for better 
philosophical clarity and rhetorical impact, such as when he sketches an outline of which 
sections should come first in his treatise.193 He writes, “Order. After the letter about the necessity 
of seeking God, put in the letter about removing obstacles, which is the discourse on the 
machine, on preparing the machine, on searching through reason.”194 And again: 
Men despise religion; they hate it and fear that it is true. To cure this, we must begin by 
showing that religion is not contrary to reason, but worthy of veneration and respect. 
Next we must make it attractive, to make the good wish it were true, and then we must 
show that it is true.”195  
 
This sense commonly appears in other fragments of the Pensées and his other literature including 
De l'Esprit géométrique, the work on method that contributed to the Port Royal Logic.196  
The fourth sense in which Pascal uses ‘order’ concerns orders of kind, an ontological 
hierarchy where things are ordered according to their type: body, mind, or charity.197 Susan 
James correctly assesses that in these instances Pascal “distinguishes three orders of grandeur, 
greatness—the order of the flesh, the order of the mind, and the order of charity—each of which 
constitutes a system of values and ends.”198 The carnal order esteems earthly things and 
																																																								
192 Port Royal Logic, Part I, Chapter 12 in the 1638 ed., Chapter 10 in prior editions, and Chapter 9 in posterior 
editions; and Part IV. These sections were primarily borrowed from De l'Esprit géométrique. 
193 In one case like this, he outlines that arguments on man’s wretchedness without God and that nature best proves 
its own corruption should be followed by the discussion of man’s happiness with God and demonstrate that scripture 
proves there is a Redeemer. (Pensées S40/L6) 
194 Pensées S45/L11;  
195 Pensées S46/L12;  
196 Port Royal Logic, 10; 37-38. 
197 It would be interesting to research the connection between Pascal’s three orders of kind and Cartesian dualism, 
but that is too far a divergence from my current thesis. See Descartes’ letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (AT 
III, 663).  
198 James (1998), 1387. 
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recognizes the grandeur of temporal power, such as a king, while the order of the mind values 
the intellectual and the order of charity (or the will) values the divine.199 These orders are also 
incommensurable, in that carnal people who gain their power by exercising physical strength 
have no regard for matters of the mind while intellectuals gain their power through exercising 
reason and have no concern for spiritual things, which they perceive as foolish and weak.200 
Likewise, those who are charitable demonstrate their strength through earthly weakness, which is 
really strength since it is obtained through submitting one’s will to God.  
Following Jacques Chevalier, much of the Pascalian literature take this fourth sense of 
order to be a cipher which can be used by a reader to uncover Pascal’s moral philosophy 
contained in the Pensées.201 One commentator writes that, “The three orders describe Pascal’s 
understanding of the human dilemma. The three orders provide the framework for the [Pensées] 
that he was developing… We can’t understand Blaise [Pascal] apart from this context.”202 
A.W.S. Baird, who offers the most extensive Anglophone survey of Pascal’s ethics, also takes 
this approach, though more nuanced in its appeals to Pascal’s mathematical interests. For 
example, in Le Triangle arithmétique et les traités connexes, Pascal observes that different 
geometric types are incommensurable: something of a lower order does not enter into a higher 
order by increasing its magnitude. A point is infinitely removed from a line, and a line is 
infinitely from a cube—increasing the length of a one (e.g., a line) will make it no closer to 
becoming the other (e.g., a cube), even if increased ad infinitum.203  
																																																								
199 James (1998), 1387. 
200 Pensées S339/L308, etc.  
201 Baird argues that this is the same sense of ‘order’ that is meant throughout the Pensées and should be used this 
way. Baird (1975), 1-13. See Baird (1975), 2; Serres (1982) II, 648-712; MacKenzie (2008); and Pavlovits (2013). 
202 MacKenzie (2008), vi-vii.  
203 Pascal, Œuvres [1964-1992], II 1170. Other editions list this under the Latin subtitle “Potestatum Numericarum 
Summa” (See Brunschvicg, et al (1965), Vol III, 367). Chevalier’s edition (Œuvres [1957], 1432) should be avoided 
here because there is an error in the text where instead of “On découvrira les autres sans difficulté en s'appuyant sur 
ce principe qu'on n'augmente pas une grandeur continue lorsqu'on lui ajoute, en tel nombre que l'on voudra, des 
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My concern with the accepted reading is not that it is altogether false, but that its 
conclusions go beyond what evidence warrants, making a minor point (relatively speaking) 
central to understanding his entire project. There are only two fragments in the Pensées where 
Pascal uses this fourth sense of ‘order’.204 In comparison, he uses the third sense of ‘order,’ 
placing one thing before another, with frequency. Establishing methodological order plays a 
much more central role for Pascal and it is important to avoid equivocation on the two senses of 
the term. My criticism is not merely semantic, as if Pascal discusses these themes in other places 
without explicitly identifying them as ‘orders’. Other than these two fragments, the themes of 
order qua ontological hierarchy is all but absent. The Pensées contain many fragments which are 
both notably longer than the two dealing with ontological order and more central to his project: 
the role of imagination, skepticism and dogmatism, diversion, divine hiddenness, and the infinite 
are just a few examples.205  It is not in the least bit obvious that orders of kind are central to 
Pascal’s project, let alone the secret to deciphering the fragments.  
A second criticism is that although Baird’s mathematical examples do help clarify 
Pascal’s order of kind, there is no evidence outside of those two fragments where he discusses 
the metaphysical incommensurability of these ‘orders’ to motivate imposing this mathematical 
framework upon Pascal’s morality. Though Pascal’s ethics do arguably become tripartite as 
discussed later in this chapter, the accepted reading seems ad hoc and there is surprisingly 
underwhelming evidence to make it the secret key for understanding the other fragments.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
grandeurs d'un ordre d'infinitude supérieur,” Chevalier writes “inférieur.” This is important to note since this is the 
one of the editions that Baird (1975) references concerning this text and he draws a great deal of his scholarship 
from Chevalier. 
204 Pensées S339/L308 and with slight variation, Pensées S761/L933. 
205 For imagination: Pensées S78/L44, skepticism versus dogmatism: S164/L131, diversion: S168/L137, divine 
hiddenness: S182/L149, and man’s disproportion and how he is situated within the infinite: S230/L199. 
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I do not pretend my criticisms here are exhaustive as that would require a much more 
careful analysis too tangential for my current purposes. My intention at the moment is to raise 
sufficient doubt of the accepted reading in order to make space for an alternative approach, one 
that I believe is better supported by internal and external evidence. To this end, I will turn to the 
composition of his thought in Augustine, Descartes, Montaigne, and Epictetus.  
 
II. Pascal’s Philosophical Anatomy  
 
II.a Pascal and Augustine 
 
When commentators choose to discuss the conceptual genealogy of Pascal’s work, they are 
most commonly eager to discuss Augustine’s impact, though not without voices of dissent.206 For 
one, Vincent Carraud rejects Pascal’s Augustinianism, noting that, “Pascal had not been nourished 
by the thought of Augustine as essentially as that by that of Montaigne and Descartes,” forwarding 
the even more controversial thesis that “he never thought as an Augustinian.”207  He provides three 
arguments for this claim: (1) Pascal was unfamiliar with Augustine’s writing,208 (2) When 
contrasting their Cogitos, Pascal’s rejection of Augustine’s to defend Descartes is violent;209 and, (3) 
Pascal rejects the two cities analogy that is central to Augustine’s De Civitate Dei.210  
The first two of Carraud’s arguments are compelling. Pascal refers to De Civitate Dei only a 
few times in the Pensées.211 In two of these cases, as Carraud points out, Pascal cites Montaigne, 																																																								
206 See Rescher (1985), 4 and James (1998), 1387. To the little extent that he discusses the topic, Graeme Hunter 
offers one of the few more balanced accounts. (Hunter [2013], 48; 55-58; etc.) 
207 Carraud (2007), 450-451. 
208 Carraud (2007), 454. 
209 Carraud (2007), 481-485. 
210 Carraud (2007), 459. 
211 Carraud (2007) lists four: S27/L408 and S713/L478 (since they reference the same text), S230/L199, S94/L60, 
and S268/L236. Carraud omits S802/L968. Pascal also makes several vague glosses, merely mentioning Augustine 
by name or using him as an authority on a doctrine but without citation as to where Augustine speaks to the topic 
(S329/L298, S452/L517, S480/L577, S747, S757/L930, S796/L960). He attempts to cite Augustine in S490/L591, 
but is not quite clear whether his reference is in 48 or 49 of Augustine’s letters (it was from 48). Pascal also alludes 
to Contra Pelagium (S240/L208), Sermon 141 (S222/L190), and Of Christian Doctrine (S283/L251) though it is 
unclear whether he read them or not. It would be surprising, though not impossible, for him to have read these lesser 
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completely unaware that Montaigne was quoting (or, misquoting) Augustine.212 In a third reference, 
Pascal again misquotes Augustine by quoting Montaigne; though this time he correctly attributes the 
citation to Augustine, his treatment of it again reveals his ignorance of the text. Pascal writes “Cum 
veritatem qua liberetur ignoret, expedit quod fallatur.”213 However, the text should read inquirat 
(meaning, “asks” or “seeks”) instead of ignoret (which translates “does not know”), a mistake Pascal 
again carries from Montaigne’s 1652 edition of the Essays, which contained several errors.214 
Similar errors occur in other references made to the De Civitate Dei: S230/L199 also contains an 
error transcribed from Montaigne, misquoting Augustine, and in other cases Pascal appears to be 
quoting the works of the theologian Jansen, not Augustine himself.215 It is unclear to what degree 
Pascal is Augustinian if he is so ignorant of Augustine’s popular De Civitate Dei.  
Carraud’s second argument is equally compelling. He describes Pascal’s defense of 
Descartes’s Cogito over Augustine’s as violent.216 The occasion of this discussion begins in 
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. In the Fourth Set of Objections to the Meditations, 
Arnauld accuses Descartes of plagiarizing the Cogito from Augustine’s On Free Choice of the 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
known texts and still not be familiar with City of God. The notes in Roger Ariew’s translation of the Pensées 
(Hackett, 2005) and Carraud (2007) were helpful in gathering this list with such detail.   
212 S27/L408 (“Two hundred eighty kinds of supreme good in Montaigne.”) and then again in S713/L478 (“For 
philosophers, 280 supreme goods.”). Carraud rightly notes that not only does mistakenly attributes this to 
Montaigne, but he also misquotes Augustine based on a misprint in the 1652 edition of Montaigne’s Essays – an 
error that would be very difficult to make if he’d actually read City of God Book 19 where the number, 288, results 
from an obvious calculation and must be divisible by 3. (Carrud [2007], 454). 
213 Pensées S94/L60; “When he searches [inquirat] for the truth that would bring him freedom, it is good that he 
should be misinformed.”  
214 Pensées 1995, 17n. It is likely that Pascal knew this quote from Montaigne as well, who quoted this passage with 
marginal citation in his Apology of Raymond Sebond. (Carraud, 456, 456n21) To make matters worse for Pascal, he 
misreads Augustine. In the actual text of De Civitate Dei, Augustine is citing Varro who is in turn referencing 
Scevola. (CD, IV.27) The occasion of the citation is a refutation of Varro who defended pagan religion for its 
pragmatic value. When Pascal quotes the text, he offers it as Augustine’s own opinion. This misreading is easier to 
explain, of course, if Pascal is reading Montaigne’s Essays and not Augustine himself. See Carraud (2007), 456.  
215 Carraud (2007), 456-457. 
216 Carraud (2007), 453. 
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Will.217 Less than a decade later, Pascal comes to the defense of Descartes, saying that though both 
Descartes and Augustine use the same words, they are not really saying the same thing:  
In actuality, I am very far from saying that Descartes is not the real author of these, even if he 
only learned them by reading the great saint; for I know how much of a difference there is 
between writing a word by chance without making a very long and extended reflection about 
it and perceiving in this word an admirable series of consequences that proves the distinction 
of material and spiritual natures, and making of it a firm and sustained principle of a whole 
system of physics, as Descartes claimed to do.218 
 
Pascal continues, deriding Augustine’s Cogito as accidental, accusing him of writing it “by chance” 
and neglecting its logical consequences.219 He compares Augustine’s instantiation to a thrown out 
seed that flourished in Descartes’ fertile soul and compares the difference between the two as that of 
“a dead man from a man full of life and strength.”220 Pascal’s reaction is even more critical of 
Augustine than Descartes was himself. Descartes wrote to Colvius on the matter, saying: 
I am obligated to you for drawing my attention to the passage of St. Augustine relevant to my 
I am thinking, therefore I exist. I went today to the library of this town to read it and I do 
indeed find that he does use it to prove the certainty of our existence. He goes on to show that 
… we exist, we know that we exist, and we love the existence and the knowledge we have… 
In itself it is such a simple and natural thing to infer that one exists from the fact that one is 
doubting that it could have occurred to any writer. But I am very glad to find myself in 
agreement with St Augustine, if only to hush the little minds who have tried to find fault with 
the principle.221  
 
Unlike Pascal, Descartes admits that his Cogito has the same force as Augustine’s. He even 
welcomes the comparison, though also recognizing that given the principle’s simplicity anyone 
could have written it. In contrast, Pascal is either insufficiently familiar with Augustine’s Cogito to 
appraise it fairly, or so predisposed to defend Descartes that he is willing to overlook the upshot of 
																																																								
217 Carraud (2007), 21. Arnauld also makes a similar objection in 1648, referring to Augustine’s On Free Choice of 
the Will (II.3) and City of God (XI.27) 
218 Pascal (1989), 116. 
219 Pascal (1989), 33-35 
220 Pascal (1989), 192. 
221 November 14, 1640. AT III, 247; CSMK, 159.  
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Augustine’s rendition. In either case, it would be strange to say Pascal is acting as an Augustinian 
here.  
Despite the success of his first two arguments, Carraud’s third is less successful. He argues 
that Pascal rejects Augustine’s two-cities analogy of De Civitate Dei. Augustine believes that the 
whole world is composed of two ‘cities.’ These are not geo-political or socio-economic cities, but 
rather its citizens are bifurcated throughout the world according to the objects of their love. Those 
who love God above all else comprise the city of God; as a result, the citizens in the celestial city 
also love lesser objects in their proper relation to God. Those who love themselves or other lesser 
objects greater than, or in place of, God reside in the city of man. Carraud claims that Pascal would 
be concerned with the idea that: 
...the body of Christ, which is absolutely unified, be thought of as a society, societas 
hominum, an association, that is, an association of profane interests, in the manner of those 
cities that Plato and Aristotle, “who enjoy a laugh with their friends … amused themselves” 
by laying down “rules” as if “for a madhouse”.222 
 
He argues that, for Pascal, those who love God are an organic unity whose wills are subordinate to 
God’s will. Pascal believes that God’s people are like a body, united with the one mind and will of 
Christ who is the head. Because of this, Carraud argues that the analogy of a celestial city is 
unworthy because it implies that each member still has its own will. He references letter fourteen 
Pascal’s Les Lettres provinciales to support this point.  
But there are two problems with Carraud’s third argument. The first is that he misreads 
Pascal in the fourteenth letter. Pascal is not criticizing the city of God analogy itself whatsoever, and 
in fact endorses it:  
There are two peoples and two worlds spread out over all the earth, according to St. 
Augustine: the world of children of God, who form a body of which Christ is the chief and 
																																																								
222 Carraud (2007), 459. 
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the king; and the enemy world of God, [in] which the devil is the chief and king. … 
Recognize, therefore now, my fathers, in which of these two kingdoms you reside.223 
 
His targets are the ecclesiastics, whose lifestyle does not represent the behavior of citizens in the 
divine city. His concern is not whether Augustine is wrong, but that clergy was consumed with self-
love and casuistry—he assumes the cities analogy to be correct as a background for expressing his 
concern.  
The second challenge to Carraud’s third argument is that contrary to his claim, Pascal’s 
metaphor for the people of God—the body of Christ united in his will—is nearly identical to 
Augustine’s doctrine of theosis. Augustine believed, like many theologians, that humans experience 
a union with God in a literal, though immaterial, sense.224 Not to be confused with a more gnostic 
notion of emanation, Augustine describes theosis using three images. The first is recapitulation: God 
and humanity are contraries where the greater (God) moves towards, identifies with, and then 
perfects the impoverished (humanity).225 The second is an exchange: God became human so humans 
can become gods. Like Plato, one must become like the object of one’s knowledge—as one must 
become sun-like to see the sun, he must become god-like to see God.226 The third is the image of 
divine adoption: though all creatures are sons of God in a natural sense, the elect are sons of God 
through grace.227  
																																																								
223 Les Provinciales XIV: “Il y a deux peuples et deux mondes répandus sur toute la terre, selon saint Augustin: le 
monde des enfants de Dieu, qui forme un corps dont Jésus-Christ est le chef et le roi; et le monde ennemi de Dieu, 
dont le diable est le chef et le roi. … Voyez donc maintenant, mes pères, duquel de ces deux royaumes vous êtes.” 
(Pascal Œuvres [1998-2000], 746. Translation mine) 
224 Although the term theosis is less frequently used outside of Eastern Orthodoxy, the alternative terms 
“deification” and “divine participation” are even less appropriate. Deification lacks any precedent in the Latin texts 
and divine participation can easily be broader than intended in theosis. Meconi’s argument, which I embrace here, is 
that one need not use the term “theosis” to communicate its meaning. (For an example of this, see Augustine on the 
Eucharist (s. 272 [Sermon 272]). See also Confessiones 11.9; Civite Dei, XIV.13; Sermo 23b; Sermo 166.4; and 
Enarrationes in Psalmos 117.11). For a more detailed commentary, see Meconi (2013, 2014). With Meconi, I use 
theosis to capture these themes in Augustine where a better term is lacking.  
225 Meconi (2013), 215-216.  
226 Meconi (2013), 216-219. 
227 Meconi (2013), 220. 
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The conclusion of Carraud’s third argument then does not follow. Pascal’s notion of the will 
is overwhelming Augustinian.228 Pascal assumes the two-cities distinction in Les Lettres provincials 
and both believe the human end is metaphysical unity with God, where one’s own will and thoughts 
become the will and thoughts of God. Rather than being anti-Augustinian, Pascal’s ontology (at least 
on these points) could not be more Augustinian.  
It is worth mentioning, also, that at the end of his article, Carraud notes that his conclusions 
are provisory and that Pascal’s relationship with Augustine may need to be revisited.229 I agree with 
this sentiment; Carraud’s first two arguments make a sufficiently compelling case that we should 
question the degree to which Pascal embraces Augustinianism. It is an important corrective for the 
tendency to read Pascal as an unadulterated Augustinian. But Carraud’s third argument is 
problematic and his conclusion that Pascal is anti-Augustinian is too severe a reaction. 
Though it is true that Pascal’s criticisms of Augustine are at times sharp (e.g., on the Cogito), 
that is insufficient reason to deem him anti-Augustinian outright—no more than Augustine’s 
deviations from Plato would make him anti-Platonist or Pierre-Sylvain Régis’ deviations from 
Descartes would make him an anti-Cartesian.230 Being Augustinian, like being Cartesian or 
Platonist, is more of a family resemblance than a strict set of necessary and sufficient conditions that 
which one must adhere.231  
																																																								
228 It is true that Pascal likely did not read many of the texts of Augustine that carry these themes, but Pascal also 
was immersed in Augustinianism and could have easily learned them from M. Saci or Arnauld. He also may have 
discovered some these themes through Jansen’s Augustinus II.2-4 and III. I defend Pascal’s own doctrine of theosis 
later in this chapter.  
229 Carraud (2007), 448. 
230 Augustine rejects emanation (arguing that God creates freely) and also holds the body in a much more exalted 
position than Plato, for instance—though strangely his views are more Platonic than Plotinus, his source of Plato. 
See Williams (2003). Régis rejects Cartesian dualism. See Ariew (2014) and Schmaltz (2002)  
231 I discuss this in relation to Stoics in my introduction. See also Ariew (2014), xvi; Collette (2014). What actually 
defines someone as “Augustinian,” “Platonic,” or “Cartesian” is somewhat contentious. For more on this see 
Schmaltz (2002), Ariew (2006), Dobrhe and Nyden (2013), Ariew (2014), Collette (2014), and so forth.  
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There are several reasons to paint Pascal as an Augustinian with certain qualifications. While 
Pascal appears to have read little (if any) Augustine, he was immersed in Augustinianism. He was a 
Jansenist in residence at Port Royal. The Jansenists were a sect of religious enthusiasts known for 
their extreme piety and asceticism.232 Their theology was interpreted through the writings of the 
theologian Cornelius Jansen, whose magum opus was a commentary on Augustine titled Augustinus. 
For this reason the people of Port Royal also self-identified as Augustinian.233 It would be shocking 
if Pascal, a well educated resident in an Augustinian abbey, did not understand Augustine’s 
philosophy and theology, even if it was obtained second-hand through reading Jansen or from others 
in the abbey.234 
 Augustine was also pervasive in the mainstream 17th century intellectual culture, a lasting 
impact from the interest of De Civitate Dei, a 16th century ‘best seller’.235 By analogy, today most 
people in developed countries have not read Darwin. But nonetheless, a majority of Western 
Civilization is ‘Darwinian’ in a very weak sense, in that they are familiar with a sketch of the theory 
of evolution and to this degree of understanding, adhere to it.  For all of these reasons, it is in this 
sense that I refer to Pascal’s ‘Augustinianism’.236 He clearly rejects Augustine at points, but holds 
certain themes and doctrines that are easily identified as Augustinian at points. Pascal was an 
Augustinian, but not strictly and he often let his other commitments supplant his Augustinianism.  																																																								
232 For more, see Knox (1950), 204-230. 
233 Though Pope Innocent X condemned their sect, Arnauld maintained that Jansen was merely teaching Augustine 
and that the contents of the condemnation were correct but did not correctly capture the meaning of Jansen’s work. 
For more on this controversy, see Nadler (1989), 17. 
234 M. Saci was an expert on Augustine and Arnauld appears to have known his work also. 
235 Carraud (2007), 453. 
236 It has been brought to my attention that this analogy does not quite hold. It is true that the sense in which many 
Westerners are Darwinian is very weak—there is much more to being a proper Darwinian than embracing the theory 
of evolution, and it is not at all clear that most Westerners accept whatever else actual Darwinianism entails. While 
evolution is clearly a necessary condition, this belief alone is hardly sufficient to be a proper Darwinian. In the same 
way, however, I would suggest that we are Copernicans, and Newtonians, and Einsteinians. Most westerners today, 
even scholars, may not self-identify as any of these, but the effects of their ideas are pervasive. Perhaps I do mean 
Augustinian in a slightly stronger sense than this, but I think at least for the sake of an illustrating analogy it holds 
well enough. I maintain the comparison where the analogy holds, while gladly conceding that it is a limited analogy 
that does not hold strongly in other ways.  
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II.b. Pascal and Descartes 
 
Pascal’s relation with Descartes and Cartesianism is more complex than that with 
Augustine. While Pascal was unfamiliar with some of Augustine’s most popular writings, he was 
intimately engaged with the work of Descartes. I believe this is important for understanding 
Pascal’s Cartesianism. Several recent scholars have rightfully argued for Pascal’s Cartesianism 
based on his reception by contemporaries and also his self-identification as a Cartesian, as well 
as shared philosophical themes.237  
Concerning Pascal’s reception, I begin with his familiarity with texts, which extends 
beyond Descartes’ published treatises to knowledge of unpublished manuscripts, some of which 
were closely guarded by Descartes and his confidants. The best known of these documents today 
was also one of the most guarded in their day—the manuscripts where Descartes discusses the 
Eucharist. There is good reason for their secrecy, as the documents were controversy waiting to 
happen. To offer a bit of a background, in the 16th century, the Roman Catholic Church issued a 
strong reaction to the Protestant Reformation through an ecclesiastical council, the Council of 
Trent. One of the most significant statements to emerge here concerned the Eucharist, a doctrine 
outlined with precision and care during the Council. Any deviation from the account offered 
during the Council was pronounced anathema.238  
Now, Descartes’ editor, Mersenne, was an ecclesiastic who knew how delicate, if not 
volatile, this doctrine was. When compiling the manuscripts for the Objections and Replies to the 
Meditations on First Philosophy, Mersenne redacted part of Descartes’ reply to the Fourth Set of 
Objections pertaining to the Eucharist. Mersenne’s motivation for this grew out of concern of 
																																																								
237 Alexandrescu (2007), Ariew (2007), Lewis (2007), Collette (2014). 
238 See the 13th Session of the Council of Trent. 
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offending the ‘learned doctors.’239 Clerselier, who became Descartes’ later editor, was equally 
wise to protect this document from untrusted eyes.240 After Descartes’ death, the churchman 
Robert Desgabets ‘tested the waters’ by publishing this account in his Considérations sur l'état 
présent de la controverse touchant le T. S. Sacrement de l'autel; even though it was twenty years 
removed Descartes’ death, the subsequent controversy that unfolded painfully reinforced that the 
caution shown by the editors was warranted.241  
Despite this secrecy surrounding the Eucharist manuscript, Pascal read it. This is 
evidenced by a criticism he offers in the Pensées.242 Even though Pascal’s account is critical, it is 
very unlikely that he would have seen this document at all unless Clerselier or another within 
Descartes’ trusted circle viewed him as a member of the Cartesian community.243 If Descartes or 
his confidants felt safe showing Pascal the Eucharist fragment, it would not be unreasonable that 
Pascal saw other unpublished documents by Descartes as well; there were no others as 
incriminating or so well protected. Whoever the Cartesians were in the 17th century, they seemed 
to extend trust to Pascal in a degree expected for a member of their philosophical community.  
Of course one person reading or commenting on the writings of another does not in itself 
qualify an author as the other’s disciple. If it did, then Leibniz and Hobbes would also be 
Cartesian, which is clearly false. However, the fact that Pascal’s knowledge extends beyond 
published works to unpublished manuscripts, especially those kept secretive due to fear of 																																																								
239 See Letter to Huygens, 26 April 1642. (AT III, 785) 
240 Descartes’ Letter to Huygens, 26 April 1642 (AT III, 784); Descartes also tells Mesland (2 May 1644) that he is 
avoiding the topic of the Eucharist in the reply to the fourth objection because of the Counsel of Trent.  
241 Armogathe (1998) writes an extensive account on Desgabets’ publication and its condemnation.  
242 Pascal, Pensées, S794/L957. This places Pascal most likely seeing the Eucharist writing before Desgabets: Pascal 
died in 1662 and Desgabets published his work guardedly in 1671. For a more detailed treatment of this, see 
Alexandrescu (2007). For a more detailed account of Descartes, Desgabets, and the Eucharist, see also Schmaltz 
(2002), 34-47. 
243 Antoine Arnauld is another possible source. Arnauld, Pascal’s colleague at Port-Royal, co-authored the definitive 
Cartesian logic text, the Port-Royal Logic with parts that Pascal himself contributed. His fourth set of objections to 
Descartes’ the Meditations on First Philosophy was received well by Descartes, and he is known for his arguments 
with Malebranche over the correct interpretation of Cartesian ideas. That is, the concept of ideas in Descartes. See 
AT VII, 196; also, Schmaltz (2000). 
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censure, is revealing to Pascal’s role an actor in mid-17th century intellectualism. Pascal would 
not be shown such documents, let alone secretive documents, merely out of a generous spirit of 
inclusiveness: Descartes’ reputation precedes him as someone who is not shy about ostracizing 
those he did not like or trust. He asks Mersenne, for example, to withhold unpublished views 
from Hobbes in addition to ignoring his letters.244 Pascal’s reception by the Cartesians leads to a 
reasonable conclusion that Pascal was accepted as one of them.  
This reception is again evidenced by the inclusion of Pascal’s writings in the Port Royal 
Logic. Authored by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, two of Pascal’s colleagues at Port Royal, 
the Port Royal Logic was the definitive Cartesian logic in the 17th century. The book is largely a 
paraphrase of Descartes’ writings on method expanded upon with their own additions, including 
those to make it more recognizable as a logic textbook. Included among their additions are 
excerpts from Pascal’s pamphlet on method, De l'Esprit géométrique, which was composed 
around 1658—the same period when he was composing the Pensées fragments. Arnauld and 
Nicole make the source of these sections clear in the introduction, telling the reader that chapter 
9 of Part I is taken from “a small unpublished essay by the late Pascal which he titled On the 
Geometric Mind.”245 It would be strange for them to include Pascal’s writings on method if they 
did not believe him to be Cartesian.  
It is sensible that Arnauld and Nicole chose this selection for inclusion in their text—
Pascal’s writing on method is where he exposes the strongest affinity to Descartes. In De l'Esprit 
géométrique, Pascal draws explicitly from the Discourse on Method. In addition to copying the 
rules of method nearly verbatim, he imitates Descartes’ style, repeating the same skeptical 
arguments found in the first part of the Discourse. Pascal also seems to draw from the Regulae, 																																																								
244 Descartes’ letter to Mersenne, 4 March 1641 (AT III, 319) 
245 Arnauld and Nicole (1996), 10. 
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setting about the same task (distinguish between things that are similar) and uniquely referring to 
their methods as an art, a term typically reserved for rhetoric.246 To expand on these themes, 
Descartes famously adopts Montaigne’s style and thought in the first three parts of the 
Discourse, especially concerning suspension of judgment. Once he calls into question those 
opinions formed through anything less than certain judgments, he establishes rules modeled in 
the geometric fashion that are intended to uncover at apodictic knowledge. These rules are, 
1) Never accept anything as true that was not self-evidently so, basing all basic truths on 
indubitable, clear, and distinct ideas free of “hasty judgment and prejudice”;  
2) Divide each problem being considered into “as many parts as possible” to evaluate 
each idea as carefully as possible;  
3) Always proceed “in an orderly fashion”, by embracing (1) as a foundation, then slowly 
building towards more complex knowledge composed of self-evident and derived 
principles; and,  
4) Proceed systematically and in consistently reviewing that there is surety “of having 
omitted nothing”.247  
 
Pascal borrows both of these aspects of the Discourse in his pamphlet. Like Descartes, 
Pascal follows Montaigne in suspending judgment, showing the difficulty of finding knowledge 
through the senses. For every pleasure there is another person who prefers its opposite. The 
pleasures of a rich person differ from those of the poor, a person in good health experiences 
different pleasures than another who is ill, and even the same person's pleasures will vary 
according to her health, age, and mood. Given these weaknesses, a new, different path must be 
followed, a method that leads to knowledge so certain that “once ... admitted remain firm and 
will never be denied” and that can demonstrate the “connection of truths with their principles.”248 
To this end, Pascal prescribes the following rules:  																																																								
246 There is, of course, a long tradition of the Art of Rhetoric beginning with Aristotle’s text of that title and carried 
through to contemporaries such as Hobbes, who authored treatises such as A Whole Art of Rhetoric and The Art of 
Sophistry. The term ‘art’ is not unique, but it is typically identified with rhetoric, not knowledge. 
247 AT VI, 18; The wording follows the translation by Roger Ariew (2000), 54. 
248 “Or il y a un art, et c'est celui que je donne, pour faire voir la liaison des vérités avec leurs principes, soi de vrai, 
soi de plaisir, pourvu que les principes qu'on a une fois avoués demeurent fermes et sans être jamais démentis.” 
Œuvres (1964-1992), 417. (translation mine). 
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1) Rules for definitions: Define only clear, not ambiguous, terms and when offering a 
definition, only use ideas self-evident or that clearly follow from self-evident ideas; 
2) Rules for axioms: Only accept clearly evident ideas as axioms; and,  
3) Rules for demonstrations: Prove all propositions that are slightly obscure, using only 
axioms as determined by (2) and always conceive of an actual object when considering 
a definition, with restrictions that come from (1), to avoid confusion arising from 
poorly defined terms.249  
 
These are, of course, almost exactly the same rules of method from the Discourse.  
As I also noted, in the same pamphlet, Pascal seems to draw from Descartes’ Regulae. In 
the Regulae, Descartes refers his reductive process of finding certainty in judgment as the “art of 
method”. Analogous to a blacksmith who first must make or find tools (e.g., an anvil and tongs) 
before he takes on the task producing in his craft, a person who desires sound judgment must 
acquire and learn to use these tools of reason before s/he is able to produce genuine 
knowledge.250 Pascal also refers to his method—which also consists of reducing then carefully 
analyzing ideas—as an art in De l’Esprit géométrique. The term ‘art’ in this sort of discourse is 
very common, with the tradition going back to Aristotle’s art of rhetoric. It is not even unique in 
the seventeenth century–Thomas Hobbes, for instance, authored several texts as ‘arts’ including 
A Whole Art of Rhetoric and The Art of Sophistry.251 Nor is a geometric method itself uniquely 
Cartesian; appealing to mathematical models in search of epidemic certainty is pervasive 
throughout early modernity.252 But Pascal does not argue for an art of rhetoric here, in spite of 
the subtitle of the second half of the pamphlet, L'Art de persuader. Rather than presenting an 
actual rhetoric, like Descartes Pascal calls the geometric method itself an art.253 If Pascal is 
																																																								
249 Pascal, Œuvres (1964-1992), 419-421. (The English is adapted from Popkin’s 1989 translation.) 
250 AT X, 397; AC, 19 
251 See Hobbes, EW VI, 419ff. 
252 Hobbes’ resolutive-compositive method in Part I of Leviathan and De Corpore, for example.  
253 Based on a paper given by Daniel Garber at the American Philosophical Association 2013 Eastern Division 
Meeting, these references to the art of method may be missing from the Cambridge manuscript. If this is indeed the 
case, it has some potentially interesting implications for when Pascal saw the manuscripts. (Garber, “Descartes’ 
Regulae: A New Manuscript,” Colloquium, Descartes Society meeting at the American Philosophical Association 
2013 Eastern Division Meeting, Baltimore, MD, December 28, 2013.) 
	86 
borrowing from the Regulae in addition to the Discourse, it shows evidence of Cartesianism 
from the text, while also offering additional external evidence of another unpublished manuscript 
to which Pascal had access.254 Beyond textual similarities, perhaps the clearest internal evidence 
of Pascal’s Cartesianism comes during his discussion of method and persuasion, in his defense of 
Descartes’ Cogito over Augustine’s. As I showed in the previous section on Augustine, Vincent 
Carraud offers a careful analysis of this discussion, describing Pascal’s defense of Descartes as 
“violent.”255  
Pascal’s Cartesian method extends beyond De l’Esprit géométrique. In his Préface sur le 
Traité du vide, Pascal makes a clear distinction between ‘matters of reason’ and ‘matters of 
tradition’. Tradition serves those things that have been written and are unchanging—history, 
geography, law, language, and theology. However, this is not the case for those fields of study 
that use reason or senses such as “geometry, arithmetic, music, physics, medicine, architecture, 
and all of the sciences that are subject to experience and reasoning.”256 For these disciplines, 
authority is useless; they require reasoning. Matters of reason are not stagnant; knowledge 
pertaining to them is augmented as new ways to reason and experiment are discovered; thus, 
books from the past are unhelpful. Descartes makes a very similar distinction: “...I generally 
distinguish two aspects of mathematics, the historical and the scientific. By ‘history’ I 
understand everything which has been discovered already and is contained in books. By 
‘science’ I mean the skill to solve every problem, and thus to discover by one’s own efforts 
everything capable of being discovered in that science by means of our native human 
																																																								
254 AT X, 368. 
255 Carraud (2007), 481ff. He is referring to a passage in De l’Art de persuader (Œuvres III, 424).  
256 Œuvres (1964-1992) II, 779. “C’est ainsi que la géométrie, l’arithmétique, la musique, la physique, la medicine, 
l’architecture, et touts les sciences que sont soumises à l’expériece et au raisonnement, doivent être augmentées pour 
devenier parfaits.” (Translation mine.) 
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intelligence.”257 So both in his general approach to method, distinguishing between matters of 
reason and matters of tradition, and in his specific application of method, his criteria of 
knowledge and the geometric method, Pascal exhibits Cartesianism.  
An objection, of course, is that Pascal may have been a Cartesian at least to some degree 
early in his public life, but that he distanced himself upon religious conversion, focusing then 
exclusively on theology and mysticism.258 However, such an argument is strange considering the 
intellectual climate at Port Royal and its sympathies to Cartesianism. The Pensées fragments 
confirm this, showing continued strains of Cartesian influences.  
One example of shared philosophical themes in the Pensées is dualism. Few themes are 
more central to Descartes’ philosophy than his quest to prove the distinction between mind and 
body.259 Rather than accepting an Aristotelian hylomorphism (or opting for other modern 
options),260 Pascal accepts Descartes’ view that there is an immaterial mind and a material body, 
																																																								
257 Letter to Hogelande, 8 February 164 (AT III, 722; CSMK, 144). Pascal is concerned that the schoolmen treat 
matters of reason as matters of tradition as it results in unsuccessful and obscure terms as definitions. Pascal mocks 
the Scholastic definition of light, that it is “La lumière est un movement luminaire des corps lumineux; comme si on 
pouvait entendre le mot de luminaire et de lumineux sans celui lumière.” (Oeuvres III, 396.) Descartes writes in his 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind that “...the learned are often inclined to be so clever that they find ways of 
blinding themselves even to facts which are self-evident and which every peasant knows. This is what happens 
whenever they try and explain things which are self-evident in terms of something even more evident: what they do 
is to explain something else or nothing at all...when people say that motion, something perfectly familiar to everyone 
is ‘the actuality of a potential being, in so far as it is potential’, do they not give the impression of uttering magic 
words…?” (AT X, 426; CSM, 49). Likewise, in The World, Descartes writes sarcastically that he left Aristotle’s 
definitions untranslated because they are nonsensical enough even in their original Latin. (AT XI, 39-41; CSM, 93-
94). It is worth noting, however, that this tendency is broadly modern. Hobbes similarly mocks scholastic definitions 
in Chapter 1 of the Leviathan. Nonetheless, like other early Cartesians such as Jacques Rohault (Régis’ teacher), 
Pascal believes that axioms do not need to be defined because of their extreme clarity: axioms have the certitude of 
demonstrations even if lacking the conviction of them. (Œuvres III, 401ff-428; Also, Rohault, 18) 
258 MacKenzie, for instance, sees Pascal’s mathematical and scientific pursuits as an effort to fulfill an existential 
void inside of him, one that was released as pride of which he felt guilty. (MacKenzie [1973], 114-116) MacKenzie 
does believe he maintained a scientific mindset, but now applied it to religion. (164) Hunter notes that Pascal 
apologizes to Saci for venturing into theology, a conversation presumably post-conversion. (Hunter [2013], 9) 
259 He believed that if he was able to show that the soul and body are distinct that it would prove the immortality of 
the soul. Though the Fifth Lateran Council said that the immortality of the soul was possible, this remained a 
controversial topic with figures such as Pietro Pomponazzi who continued to argue that the soul requires matter for 
existence. (Garber [1998], 761). 
260 Other modernist options such as Gassendist atomism or Hobbesian materialism. For further reading, see Ariew 
(2011), 19; 128ff and Garber (1998), 764-773. 
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which are actually distinct from one another.261 Like Descartes, Pascal describes animals as 
machines, automata that act out of habit not reason. Parrots, for instance, wipe their beaks even 
when they are clean.262 This wiping is done intermittently as a mechanical function, not with 
rational intentionality to clean what is dirty. The human body is also such a machine, “For we 
must not misunderstand ourselves: we are as much automata as minds,” and this for this reason it 
is important to know that, “Proofs only convince the mind; custom provides our strongest and 
most firmly believed proofs. It inclines the automaton, which drags the mind unconsciously with 
it.”263 As for the mind or soul, Pascal asks:  
What is the self? A man goes to the window to see the passersby; if I pass by, can I say 
he went there to see me? No, for he is not thinking of me in particular. But does someone 
who loves another because of her beauty really love her? No, because the smallpox, 
which will destroy beauty without destroying the person, will cause him to love her no 
more. And if someone loves me for my judgment, for my memory, does he love me, 
myself? No, because I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where, then, is this 
self, if it is neither in the body nor in the soul? And how to love the body or the soul, 
except for its qualities that do not constitute the self, since they are perishable? For would 
we love the substance of a person’s soul in the abstract, whatever qualities might be in 
it?264 
 
Though this fragment raises its own questions, such as what Pascal means by the self if it is 
separate from the soul and body, like Descartes he is distinguishing between the mind and body. 
In asking where the self is, Pascal acknowledges that it is found in neither of two places, the soul 
or in the body, which closely resembles Descartes’ account in the second meditation:  
But then were I perchance to look out my window and observe men crossing the square, I 
would ordinarily say I see the men themselves just as I say I see the wax. But what do I 
																																																								
261 “All bodies, the firmament, the stars, the earth and its kingdoms, are not worth the least of minds. For minds 
knows all of these, and itself, and bodies know nothing” (Pensées, S339/L308). 
262 Pensées, S139/L107. See also S140/L108. Compare Pascal’s parrot example with the following from the 
Discourse on Method, “I made special efforts to show that if any such machines had the organs and outward shape 
of a monkey or of some other animal that lacks reason, we should have no means of knowing that they did not 
possess entirely the same nature as these animals.” (AT VI, 56; CSM I, 139) Descartes continues here to list parrots 
as an example for uttering words without comprehending them (AT VI, 57). 
263 Pensées, S661/L821. 
264 Pensées, S567/L688. 
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see aside from hats and clothes, which could conceal automata? Yet I judge them to be 
men.265 
 
In addition to this mind/body distinction, Pascal also embraces a Cartesian account of the 
intellect and will. Descartes ascribes the role of assenting to the truth or falsity of an idea to these 
faculties. Those ideas accepted by means of the intellect are active judgments in accordance with 
his criteria of truth (clear and distinct ideas). Those assented through the will are passive and 
formed through habit and custom. In this second case, the intellect fails to discern which beliefs 
to accept, so a belief is passively accepted by conditioning; this can occur because either a 
person lacked necessary focus to establish a clear and distinct idea or because the person making 
the judgment is indifferent towards which belief to prefer over another. In each case, when a 
person is not intentionally guiding the will with the intellect through clear and distinct 
judgments, the will continues assenting to beliefs on its own through conditioning, detached 
from the intellect.266 
This relation between the intellect and will is central to Pascal’s philosophical project of 
the Pensées. It is the structure for understanding his Wager and “Discourse on the Machine”: 
since the body is a machine, when the intellect fails, habit and custom move the will to form 
beliefs. He writes that, “Both parts of us must be made to believe: the mind by reasons that need 
only to be seen once in a lifetime; and the automaton by custom, and by not allowing it any 
inclination to the contrary.”267 Concerning rational belief formation, Pascal also accepts 
Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas,268 though given his Cartesian themes in De l’Esprit 
																																																								
265 AT VII, 32. 
266 See the Fourth Meditation (AT VII, 53-62). 
267 Pensées, S661/L821 
268 See the Pensées S670/L512, for example, or his argument against skepticism beginning with clear and distinct 
ideas, intuitive concepts he calls the “heart” in S141/L109.  
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géométrique and Préface pour un Traité du vide it is not so surprising. He often refers to these 
self-evident first principles known through intuition as the ‘heart’ in the Pensées.  
Although there is compelling evidence for Pascal’s reception as a Cartesian among his 
contemporaries, and there are clear correlations between several of Descartes’ texts and Pascal’s, 
Pascal’s self-identification qua Cartesian is less explicit. Towards this end, it is worth recalling 
the Cogito selection discussed in the last section. In discussing Pascal and Augustine, I showed 
that Vincent Carraud convincingly argues that Pascal’s Cartesianism supplants his 
Augustinianism at times. This was illustrated by Pascal’s reaction to the Cogito: he “violently” 
defends Descartes, using the point to demonstrate a Cartesian principle of drawing careful 
distinctions. His reaction is severe, as expected from someone who identified with Descartes, 
rushing to his defense.  
Even if Pascal’s Cartesianism traces the span of his bibliography, commentators appeal to 
alternative evidence to make the case for his anti-Cartesianism. Someone who does this is 
Richard Popkin. He claims that, “After his religious conversion Pascal objected vehemently to 
the philosophy of Descartes. He kept contrasting the God of the philosophers—namely, 
Descartes’ God—with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.”269 One need not be a careful 
reader of Pascal to see the genesis of this interpretation. The source of these criticisms are 
typically correct as there are plenty of cases where Pascal disagrees with Descartes: to name two, 
there is disagreement on the vacuum and Pascal’s Jansenism leave him pessimistic concerning 
the reach of human knowledge in the postlapsarian state.270 To the benefit of those who present 
an anti-Cartesian Pascal, the Pensées also contain fragments appearing to be explicit censures 
																																																								
269 Popkin (2003), 181. 
270 Descartes’ foundationalism focuses on apodictic certainty in matters of reason, through reason alone, but Pascal 
contrarily thinks our reason and will are both corrupted. (Pensées, S164/L131) 
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including, “Descartes. Useless and uncertain,”271 and, “Write against those who delve too deeply 
into the sciences. Descartes”.272 All of these things on a first impression rightly undermine a 
Cartesian Pascal. 
As a partial response to these anti-Cartesian themes, Pascal’s censures are not as 
condemning of Pascal’s Cartesianism as they may first appear. Even in spite of their differences 
in natural philosophy, Pascal himself spent some time in the sciences, and his distinction of 
matters of reason and matters of tradition help frame what he may mean in these fragments. As 
seen by their shared method, Pascal agrees that the surest way towards rational certainty begins 
with clear and distinct ideas, providing an epistemic foundation, which is then expanded through 
reasoning and experimentation.273 Their disagreements on the Torricelli experiments, for 
example, are never methodological nor do they concern the reliability of the data itself, but rather 
are on how to interpret evidence.274 Even Pascal’s opinion that religious belief cannot be 
obtained through the understanding alone is not anti-Cartesian (that is, sacred teachings cannot 
be known through the intellect alone when unaided by divine illumination). Descartes also 
believes that theological beliefs are assented to by the will. The only difference is that while 
Pascal makes these points explicit, Descartes avoids the topic, deferring to ecclesiastical 
authority.275 
																																																								
271 Pensées S445/L887. 
272 Pensées S462/L553; Roger Ariew discusses these fragments in detail; See Ariew (2007). 
273 Pascal references the evil demon in a discussion concerning apodictic certainty and its implications, for instance: 
“What then shall man do in this state? Shall he doubt everything? Doubt whether he is awake, whether he is being 
pinched, whether he is being burned? Doubt whether he doubts? Doubt whether he exists? We cannot go that far, 
and I advance as fact that there never has been a fully effective skeptic.” (Pensées S164/L131) 
274 AT Vl, 98; CSMK, 327 (Letter to Mersenne, 13 December 1647); See also AT V, 365; CSMK 329 (Letter to 
Carcavi, 11 June 1649) and Garber (1992). 
275 See Rule Three in Descartes’ Regulae (AT X, 366) and Pascal’s in De L’esprit Géométrique (Œuvres III, 360); It 
is specifically worth considering the similarity in the discussion of the intellect and will concerning theological 
knowledge here. 
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Still, Pascal finds Descartes’ nearly exclusive focus on natural philosophy misplaced. 
Religion is a matter of higher importance than science because it deals with eternity. To these 
ends, though science and mathematics are correct, they are also useless. He writes in a letter to 
Fermat, “For to speak to you candidly of geometry, I find it to be the highest exercise of the 
mind, but at the same time I know it to be so useless, I make little difference between a man who 
is only a geometrician and a skilled artisan.”276 Though Descartes’ approach to physics and 
mathematics may successfully lead to knowledge of temporal and finite things, they are 
comparatively useless until someone’s eternal fate is secured and known: 
...that is why I will not undertake here to prove by natural reasons either the existence of 
God, or the Trinity, or the immortality of the soul, or anything of that kind; not only 
because I would not feel myself sufficiently capable of finding in nature arguments to 
convince hardened atheists, but also because such knowledge without Jesus Christ is 
useless and barren. If a man were convinced that proportions between numbers were 
immaterial truths, eternal and dependent on a first truth to which they subsist, called God, 
I would not consider him as having made much progress towards his salvation.277  
 
It is pragmatically irrational to focus on the temporal while still ignorant of the eternal. Pascal 
draws comparison between this and a convict awaiting capital punishment: aware of his 
sentence, it would be irrational for this convict to spend his remaining hours playing cards 
instead of pleading an appeal.278 This is why Pascal writes concerning physics that, “We must 
say in general: ‘This happens through shape and motion,’ because it is true.”279 Yet, the more 
important eternal matters, shape and motion have nothing to do with ‘the machine’, training the 
will towards belief; to these ends, we must say that, “it is useless, uncertain, and laborious. And 																																																								
276 Pascal, Œuvres IV, 923: The “Lettre à Fermat, le 10 août 1660”: “Car pour vous parler franchement de la 
géométrie, je la trouve le plus haut exercice de l'esprit; mais en même temps je la connais pour si inutile, que je fais 
peu de difference entre un homme qui n'est que géomètre et un habile artisan” (Translation and emphasis mine). He 
also writes: “Mathematics keeps [the correct method or order that leads to certainty], but it is useless in its depths” 
(Pensées, S573/S694). 
277 Pensées S690/L449 (Italics mine). 
278 Pensées S195/L163; Lara Buchak makes a similar argument using Bayesian analysis. The point being that 
something can be uncertain epistemically but a person can still be pragmatically rational in accepting that belief with 
limited evidence given that odds are high enough. See Buchak (2012). 
279 Pensées S118/L84 
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if it were true, we do not believe all of philosophy to be worth an hour of labor.”280 Pascal takes 
Descartes to be ‘useless and uncertain,’ but not without important qualifications. His work is 
only ‘useless’ in that it cannot answer existential questions about eternity and it is ‘uncertain’ in 
that no empirical demonstration can bridge the epistemic gap between our finitude and the 
infinity of eternity. That is, Descartes delves too deeply into natural philosophy at the expense of 
questions pertaining to eternity. Pascal’s most forceful criticism of Descartes is not a criticism 
towards the correctness of his philosophy, but the ends towards which they are directed: he 
applies his brilliance towards the wrong, less urgent end.281  
 Of course, as I said earlier, this is only a partial response to the objections of Pascal’s 
anti-Cartesianism. Pascal was no unadulterated disciple of Descartes, and it is clear that 
sometimes he rejects themes central in Descartes: his metaphysics are often more Augustinian 
than Cartesian, he favors the existence of a vacuum over the plenum, and they disagree on the 
infinite, just as a few examples.282 Nonetheless, it does not detract from an abundance of 
similarities in their thought, change his reception as a Cartesian by his contemporaries, or change 
his self-identification as Cartesian. Of course the conditions that identify anyone as Cartesian (or 
Aristotelian, Stoic, et cetera) are fuzzy; however, Pascal’s reception and identification indicate 
that he met whatever nebulous qualities contribute to this family resemblance. Pascal is a 
Cartesian, though not purely and not always.  
																																																								
280 Pensées S118/L84 
281 Ariew (2007).  
282 As to metaphysics, Pascal rejects the ability for knowledge of God outside of revelation. I consider this as a 
matter of his metaphysics and not strictly epistemology because the origins of Pascal’s tension with Cartesian 
epistemology originate with his ontology of theosis, which I discuss later in this chapter. Concerning the infinite, 
Descartes makes an epistemic distinction that matter is indefinitely divisible and is only willing to attribute actual 
infinity to God, and that the infinite can be known in part though not in its entirety. Pascal allows for the existence 
of an actual double infinity but denies that we can know its nature. See Descartes’ Letter to Mersenne, 15 April 
1630. (AT I, 146-147) and Pensées S102/L68, S141/L109, S167/L135. Also, Ariew (1987); Garber (1992), 120-2, 
270-2; and Collette (2016). For more on defining Cartesianism, see Ariew (2014), Collette (2014), and Schmaltz 
(2002). 
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II.c. Pascal and Montaigne 
 While my readings of Pascal’s Augustinianism and Cartesianism deviate from much of 
the traditional literature, there is broad consensus among scholars of the importance of 
Montaigne’s influence on Pascal.283 Montaigne’s presence is constant in Pascal’s writing. His 
name appears twenty times in the Pensées and Pascal consistently alludes to Montaigne’s Essays 
in the form of allusion, gloss, and paraphrase. In the Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et 
Montaigne, Pascal speaks of Montaigne, praises that: 
I acknowledge…that I cannot, without joy, see in this author proud reason wounded so 
invincibly by its own weapons, and this so bloody revolt of man against man, which 
throws him down into bestiality away from God’s company, to which he has raised 
himself by the maxims (of his feeble reason).284  
 
In same text, Pascal credits Montaigne as one of the two most significant influences on his own 
thought.285 Although there is dispute amongst scholars concerning the exact role that Montaigne 
plays in Pascal’s thought, the disagreement concerns the degree to which he embraces 
Montaignian skepticism, not whether he does.286  
Of the many Montaignian threads in Pascal, a reoccurring theme in Montaigne’s Apology 
for Raymond Sebond is that humans are no greater than other creatures; traditionally, it was 
reason that set humans apart from other animate beings, but Montaigne calls this into question 
both by elevating the rational abilities of other beasts while also questioning human rationality. 
Towards the first, Montaigne offers pages of travel accounts, observations, and stories from 																																																								
283 Mesnard (1969), Carraud (2007), 450; Hunter (2013), etc.  
284 “Je vous avoue pourtant, Monsieur, que je ne puis voir sans joie dans cet auteur la superbe raison si 
invinciblement froissée par ses propres armes, et cette révolte si sanglante de l’homme contre l’homme, qui, de la 
société avec Dieu, où il s’élevait par les maxims des stoïques, le précipite dans la nature des bêtes par celles des 
pyrrhoniens.” (Pascal [1994], 117-118; I use Popkin’s 1987 translation) 
285 Jean Mesnard argues compellingly that this document is trustworthy. It is likely that the dialogue itself was 
constructed, but there is good reason to believe the content itself is reliable and represents Pascal’s position at the 
time. (See Pascal [1994], “Introduction.”) 
286 For a more thorough account of this discussion, see Hunter (2013), 13-15. 
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antiquity depicting animals acting rationally, living in community, and performing other 
intellectually advanced behaviors that are associated with human rationality in order to 
undermine the belief that humans are different from and greater than the beasts.287 He often uses 
this first point to make his second that humans are weaker than they typically believe, as 
demonstrated in this travel account: 
If you let loose even some of our flies, they will have both the power and the courage to 
disperse the horde. In recent memory, when the Portuguese were besieging the city of 
Tamly in the territory of Xiatime, the inhabitants of that place brought to the wall a great 
quantity of hives, in which they were rich. And with fire they drove the bees so fiercely at 
their enemies, that they were put to rout, since they could not support their attacks and 
their stings.288 
 
Montaigne suggests that humans are so weak that even a mighty army can be defeated by the 
smallest of creatures, tiny insects. He reinforces human weakness by repeating typical 
Pyrrhonian arguments, such as the inability of our senses to produce reliable observations, and so 
forth.289 
In so far as Pascal is emulating the skeptical mode, he mimics Montaigne nearly to the 
point of plagiarizing. “The power of flies,” Pascal writes, “they win battles, hinder the activity of 
our souls, eat our bodies.”290 Though he modifies the turn of the phrase from bees, he maintains 
that even the smallest of insects can incapacitate a person. This incapacitation can occur 
physically (as in Montaigne’s travel account of a defeated army or insects feasting upon a 
corpse) or intellectually (as even something as small as a buzzing fly can distract someone from 
focusing).291 
																																																								
287 For a nice concise summary of these points, see Schneewind (2005), 212-215.  
288 Essays II, chap. 12; Apology, 39. See 10n24 of Ariew’s translation. 
289 Montaigne (2003), 150-160. 
290 Pensées S56/L22; See 10n24 of Ariew’s translation. 
291 See also Pensées S81/L48. 
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 Another point where Pascal follows Montaigne is on the power of the imagination and its 
role in forming beliefs, even when there is knowledge to the contrary. “Put the world’s greatest 
philosopher on a plank hanging over a precipice,” he writes, “but wider than it needs to be. 
Although his reason will convince him of his safety, his imagination will prevail. Many could 
not bear the thought of it without getting pale and sweating.”292 When standing upon the plank, 
reason is useless to make the philosopher believe that he is safe, even when he knows the board 
is strong enough to support his weight. Montaigne gives almost the same example in the 
Apology:  
Put a philosopher in a cage of small bars of thin iron suspended at the top of the towers of 
Notre Dame de Paris, he will see for obvious reasons that it is impossible for him to fall, 
and yet…he will not be able to keep the vision of that height from frightening and 
astonishing him. Set a plank between those two towers, of a size such as is needed for us 
to walk on it: there is no philosophical wisdom to such firmness as to give us the courage 
to walk on it as we would do if it was on the ground.293 
 
Similar arguments from Montaigne’s Apology are repeated through the Pensées.294  
Though these influences are overt, many commentators overemphasize the degree of 
Montaigne’s influence and as a result categorize Pascal as a skeptic. Richard Popkin offers the 
most popularized Anglophone account of this opinion. According to Popkin, Pascal hopes that 
doubt will drive the reader to despair, and that despair will drive the reader to seek divine 
intervention to find his prelapsarian condition: “So Pascal, in most ingenious ways, tried to make 
the reader first become a sceptic, then to realize his actual state of affairs and to cry out for 
help.”295 For Popkin, Pascal is a Christian Pyrrhonist, a skeptic.  
																																																								
292 Pensées S78/L44. See 13n29of Ariew’s translation 
293 Essays II, chap. 12; Apology, 155. 
294 See Pensées, S94/L60 and Apology, 140. For additional references see Pensées S123/L89, S134/L101, 
S168/L136, S111/L76, et cetera.  
295 Popkin (2003), 183. 
	97 
I do believe Popkin is correct in his premises – Pascal teaches that human cognition is 
corrupted, and subsequently we are unable to know truth or the good through reason. That is, 
Pascal pushes his reader towards skepticism to emphasize human depravity and its subsequent 
despair. Conditionally for Pascal, ignorance is the human state, so the Pyrrhonian description is 
correct: it is a ‘new nature’ since the old, true nature is lost.296 But while early modern 
scholarship is indebted to Popkin for his groundbreaking contributions in the history of 
philosophy, I reject his conclusion here. He is right that Pascal intends his reader to overcome 
skepticism through divine intervention, but it is this very point that calls into question Pascal’s 
true skepticism. The goal of the skeptics, particularly in the Pyrrhonian tradition, was to find 
ataraxia. Sextus Empiricus writes: 
Our assertion up to now is that the Sceptic’s end, where matters of opinion are concerned, 
is mental tranquility; in the realm of things unavoidable, moderation of feeling is the end. 
His initial purpose in philosophizing was to pronounce judgment on appearances. He 
wished to find out which are true and which false, so as to attain mental tranquility. In 
doing so, he met with contradicting alternatives of equal force. Since he could not decide 
between them, he withheld judgment. Upon his suspension of judgment there followed, 
by chance, mental tranquility in matters of opinion.297  
 
When someone is not a skeptic, Sextus believes that person suffers because false belief such as 
that s/he lacks good things and that the things following him or her are bad. When that person 
acquires something s/he believes is good, s/he is filled with an unreasonable joy in acquiring it 
while also anguishing in fear of losing it. The skeptic, however, “leaves undetermined the 
question what things are good and bad by nature. He does not exert himself to avoid anything or 
to seek after anything, and hence he is in a tranquil state.”298 Montaigne’s account is 
Christianized and more eclectic, with some tones of Epicureanism and Stoicism, but ignorance 
remains the means towards a better life: 																																																								
296 Pensées, S16/L397 
297 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism: I, XII. 
298 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism: I, XII. 
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We need hardly more duties, rules, and laws for living in our community than the cranes 
and ants in theirs. And despite this, we see that they conduct themselves in a very orderly 
way without learning. If man were wise, he would fix the true price of each thing 
according to its greatest utility and fitness for his life. 
Whoever rates us by our actions and behavior will find a much greater number of 
excellent people among the ignorant than among the learned: I say in every sort of virtue. 
The old Rome seems to me to have supported men of greater worth, both for peace and 
for war, than that learned Rome that ruined itself. Even if the rest were exactly equal, at 
least integrity and innocence would remain on the side of the old, for it dwells 
particularly well with simplicity.299 
 
Quite contrary to this, Pascal invokes skepticism in order to lead his reader to anxiety and 
despair, as Popkin notes; however, this is antithetical to the Pyrrhonian aim. Montaigne is a 
skeptic, for example, in that he believes placing all claims into skeptical equilibrium will lead his 
reader to ataraxia: peace is not found in knowledge of the good, but in following custom and 
knowing oneself.300 Popkin’s conclusion that Pascal is a skeptic does not follow. Doubt is 
something Pascal believes his reader should rise above to find the Good, a sharp contrast with 
the skeptical program.301 Against the Pyrrhonians, resignation to doubt does not bring peace—
“Nothing brings tranquility but the sincere search for the truth,” Pascal concludes.302  
These differences between Montaigne and Pascal are made sharper when discussing 
another important deviation, the ability to have probable knowledge. Apart from revelation, 
Montaigne rejects the possibility of human knowledge, repeating many of Sextus Empiricus’ 
arguments from his Outlines of Pyrrhonism:  
The Pyrrhonians use their arguments and reason only to destroy the apparent facts of 
experience, and it is remarkable how far the suppleness of our reason has followed their 
plan of opposing the evidence of facts: for they confirm that we cannot move, that we 																																																								
299 Montaigne (2003), 49. 
300 Montaigne (2003), 48-58. 
301 José R. Maia Neto wants to read Pascal’s skepticism as Charronian and less Montaignian. Although Maia Neto 
highlights interesting correlation between Charron and Pascal, it seems that most of what he discusses can be 
interpreted just as easily with Montaigne, Augustine, and Descartes; adding Charron seems to be an unnecessary 
complication, especially since Montaigne and Descartes are prominent in Pascal while Charron is barely mentioned. 
This discussion is a diversion from my thesis, however, and will need to be a focus for future writing. (Maia Neto 
[2014], 127-142)  
302 Pensées S496/L599 
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cannot speak, that there is nothing heavy or hot, with the same kind of forceful arguments 
by which we confirm more probable facts.303 
 
But Pascal believes that, though reason fails to move a person’s volition towards belief, it can 
decide that one belief has more probability of truth than another, rejecting Pyrrhonian 
equilibrium. This difference is also fundamental precondition for Pascal’s Wager—one can say I 
believe this is likely true, and I wish it were. In an earlier fragment of the Pensées, Pascal claims, 
“For we should work for what is uncertain, according to the rule of probability that was 
demonstrated.”304 He also says Augustine was right that we often work for what is uncertain—
people wage wars we have no certainty of winning and go to sea when they do not know what 
they will find or encounter—but is wrong to neglect the rule of probability that proves that we 
should.305  
With these differences, the case for Pascal’s skepticism becomes much weaker. Popkin’s 
conclusion does not follow from his premises. He is right that Pascal embraces Montaigne’s 
skepticism, but it is a mistake to call him a skeptic because of this. Pascal’s skepticism is 
methodological. It is true that Montaigne’s influence on Pascal is pervasive. Pascal imitates 
Montaigne’s skepticism in describing the postlapsarian condition, specifically the limits of 
human reason and the lowliness of mankind. However, this skepticism is methodological. As a 
result, Pascal is influenced by Montaigne, but in a way similar to Descartes. He is not a skeptic.  
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
303 Montaigne (2003), 133.  
304 Pensées, S478/L575. Also,“Let us see whether we seek God sincerely, by comparing the things we care about. It 
is probable that this food will not poison me. It is probable that I shall not lose my suit by not prosecuting it.” 
(S600/L722) Pascal thought a great deal about probability and corresponded with Fermat about it. (Pascal, Œuvres 
IV, 923) 
305 Pensées, S478/L575; also, S600/L722. 
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II.d. Pascal and Epictetus 
 Having discussed the three authors who are typically discussed in relation to Pascal, I 
now turn to a source that I believe is no less significant but is altogether neglected in present-day 
Anglophone literature, Epictetus. For those scholars who spend their entire research project in 
the Pensées, this oversight is understandable. After all, Epictetus is only mentioned by name six 
times in the Pensées, thirteen times if general references to the Stoics are included. But by 
comparison, Augustine’s name only appears fifteen times in the text. So if scholars emphasize 
the influence of Augustine so strongly, the role of Epictetus deserves at least some investigation. 
This prevalence should be no surprise given that in the Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et 
Montaigne, Pascal describes Epictetus as the other philosopher so influential upon his thought.306  
Pascal believes that Epictetus understood the duties required of man better than any other 
philosopher. Like Epictetus, Pascal argues that God is the principal object and persons should 
submit to him cheerfully. Epictetus believed that this disposition and acceptance of divine will 
halts complaints and murmurs: if my house is foreclosed, I did not lose it; if my child dies, I did 
not lose her. Instead, I restored these things to God, to the universe, from which they came.307 
Pascal agrees with Epictetus, then, that people should not worry who took these things away 
from us or why—it should only matter that who lent it to us has asked for it back. Human duty 
extends beyond what is taken into what we are currently given. Regardless of the role in which 
someone finds himself—a king or beggar—a person should perform that role like an actor giving 
his best performance. Pascal offers other Stoic themes found in Epictetus: good resolutions 
should be concealed and accomplished in secret, so as not to be indulging in the vanity of 
approval from other people, for example. Pascal believes the sum of our duty, and the part of his 																																																								
306 The other is Montaigne, as I mention above. 
307 Handbook §3, §26. 
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philosophy that Epictetus gets correct, is that the whole study of man is to perceive the will of 
God and pursue it.  
Like his treatment of Augustine, Descartes, and Montaigne, Pascal’s appraisal of 
Epictetus is not without criticism. Pascal criticizes the Stoics for teaching that humans are able to 
accomplish all of these duties through self-effort. A person’s cognitive and volitional powers are 
free, the Stoic believes, and through them, it is possible to obtain tranquility or happiness on 
one’s own. Pascal writes: 
Stoics. They conclude that we can always do what we can sometimes do, and that, since 
the desire for glory makes those whom it possess do a particular thing well, others can 
also do it well. […] Epictetus concludes that, since there are constant Christians, every 
man can easily be so.308   
 
Not only does Pascal believe Epictetus’ conclusion here is false, in that our intellect and will are 
corrupted and incapable of obtaining these goals, but also the pride that comes from accepting 
this conclusion leads to other errors of theology and right living. Pascal uses suicide as an 
example of how contradictory the Stoic exhortation towards contentment becomes, “There is a 
contradiction,” Pascal criticizes, “because in the end they advise suicide. Oh! What a happy life, 
of which we rid ourselves like the plague!”309 Among Pascal’s other concerns, he attacks Stoic 
monism. The mind is easily conflated into a part of divine substance in Stoic cosmology, which 
is different from divine participation—in the former, the transcendent divinity is collapsed into 
creation, while in the latter, there is a clear distinction maintained between creator and creature.  
 Although secondary literature has neglected Epictetus in Pascal, he himself draws a great 
deal of attention to this Stoic and the Stoic intellectual tradition. Though Pascal criticizes 
Epictetus at points, he is no more critical of him than he is of Descartes, Montaigne, or even 																																																								
308 Pensées, S179/L146. Pascal cites Epictetus’ Discourses 4.7. Seneca holds a similar opinion in the letter On the 
God Within U (Seneca [1917], 273) 
309 Pensées, S180/L147. References condoning suicide as a worthy option for exiting life is found in various Stoics 
including Epictetus’ Discourses 4.10.27 and Seneca’s De Providentia. 
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Augustine at times. The autonomy of Pascal’s thought is complex and a synthesis of multiple 
traditions that do not always seem like they should go together. Pascal makes his debt to 
Epictetus clear, nonetheless, and a goal in the next section is to begin to sort through what the 
implications of these influences on his thought are.  
I do not believe that I have exhaustively treated all that can, or should, be said about 
Pascal’s complex reception of Descartes, Augustine, Montaigne, and the Stoics, as well as how 
they influence his thought. A sufficient sketch has been made, however, in order to move on 
towards a new vision of Pascal’s ethics that is framed within these influences.  
 
III. Pascal on Morality and The Good Life 
 In the last section, I outlined the four major influences upon Pascal’s thought. Now I will 
show how Pascal draws themes from these different influences to arrive at an ethical theory that 
both is indebted a great deal to others while also uniquely his own. Pascal establishes a binary 
ethics modeled after Augustine, which is then subdivided into accounts shaped by Epictetus, 
Montaigne, and possibly Descartes.310  
It is helpful to begin framing Pascal’s ethics within his Augustinianism. As discussed 
earlier, Pascal outlines to two cities, the city of God and the city of man. In the Fourteenth 
Provincial Letter (quoted earlier), he appeals to the Jesuits, urging them to decide whether they 
are representatives of Christ or not, for their casuistry is incongruent with their claims to love 
God. That letter is also a helpful summary, not only in understanding this binary structure in 
																																																								
310 I have not provided extensive secondary literature on these points, largely because they have not been expressed 
by many; this is especially true of the Stoic themes in his work. Still, the curious reader may find more said on these 
in general in Mesnard (1969), Mesnard’s introduction to Pascal (1994), or Hunter (2013). For another interpretation, 
see Chevalier (1922). There is work by Rescher (1985) and Jordan (2006), but it is narrowly focused on the Wager. 
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general, but how it applies to his ethical framework in particular: two groups of people, divided 
according to the objects of their love. 
 As a philosopher of science and religion, Pascal is aware of the degree to which 
perspective can shape a person’s epistemic framework.311 Like all knowledge, ethics or the art of 
living-well, requires the right perspective: 
It is the same with pictures seen from too far or too near. And there is only one 
indivisible point, which is the right place. The others are too near, too far, too high, or too 
low. Perspective determines that point in the art of painting. But in truth and in morality 
who will determine it?312  
 
But while a successful artist is one who knows the proper perspective in which to capture a 
picture, which conditions satisfy the correct perspective on truth and right living are not 
immediately clear.  
Since Pascal believes all truth—including knowledge of the Good—can be understood 
when analyzed from the correct perspective, he believes the perspective in which moral good can 
be understood is found in understanding human nature.313 Though humans now lack proper 
perspective, this has not always been true: in a prelapsarian state, humans loved and knew God, 
and subsequently people knew their true nature. Like many moralists, Pascal believes that 
thinking well is the principle of morality, virtue, and the true good. Though Pascal’s opinion of 
thinking well resembles divine illumination—God is the light that allows a subject’s intellectual 
gaze to perceive intellectual objects—he intends something more robust. The Good Life and 
happiness consist not only in the intellect but also in the will. Before the fall, humans were 
joined with God ontologically. Theosis is a necessary precondition for knowledge and thus must 
																																																								
311 In the Torecelli experiment on the vacuum, for example, he and Descartes agreed on the outcome of the 
experiment, but disagreed as to how to interpret the data. In a sense, it is a lesson in theory ladenness—so long as 
Descartes believed in subtle matter, and Pascal rejected it, the data would ‘prove’ either. See Garber (1992). 
312 Pensées, S55/L21.  
313 Pensées, S12/L393; S232/L200 
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include the will: true human nature is one that loves and submits to God in such a way that it 
joins the divine, not merely in a metaphorical sense, but as a foot is actually part of a physical 
body that follows the will of the head:  
To be a member [of Christ’s body] is to have life, existence, and motion only for the 
body and through the spirit of the body. It cannot by its nature love another thing except 
for itself and to subject it to itself, because each thing loves itself more than anything 
else. But, in loving the body, it loves itself, because it only exists in it, through it, and for 
it. He who adheres to God is one spirit.314  
 
Therefore, thinking well (and as a result living well) has as a precondition in the act of the will—
submitting oneself to the divine will allows for divine illumination. In this act of the will, a 
person finds her true nature and therefore gains the correct perspective for thinking well.315  
 With a correct perspective, humans know the Supreme Good, which Pascal identifies 
differently.316 At times he identifies it with God, stating that God alone is the Supreme Good.317  
Given this claim, it may seem odd that he also identifies it as peace, which he uses 
interchangeably with happiness. Happiness and Peace are also the Supreme Good, a eudaimonia 
that all people seek: 
All men seek to be happy. This is without exception, whatever different means they use. 
They all strive towards this end. What makes some go to war, and others avoid it, is the 
same desire in both, accompanied by different perspectives.318  
 
Even those who go to war do so for this purpose, to achieve peace on their terms.319 Note the 
similarity to Augustine. In De Civitate De, Augustine claims that peace is, “the end of our 
good… For peace is a good so great, that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we 
hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly 																																																								
314 Pensées S404/L372. Pascal may have also noticed similar metaphors in the Stoics as well. In De Clementia, for 
instance, Seneca compares the body to a city and the king is the soul of the state, the state the king’s body. (Seneca 
[1927], 367)  
315 There is similarity to Descartes’ atheist geometer from the Fifth Meditation. (AT 7, 71) 
316 Mesnard (1976), 226 
317 Pensées S116/L81 
318 Pensées S181/L148 
319 Pensées S116/L81 
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gratifying.”320 Pascal, then, identifies three different goods as the Supreme Good. But rather than 
claiming there are multiple highest goods, he believes that God is the only true good. But in 
knowing God, the elect also experience eternal peace and happiness by participating in the divine 
will, so in a sense these are also the Supreme Good. Though they are conceptually distinct, none 
can be understood without the others.321 
Pascal believes that humans no longer have this perspective, though. Whatever peace and 
happiness humans had were lost: “It is quite certain that there is no good without knowledge of 
God, that we are happy to the extent we get closer to him, and that ultimate happiness is to know 
him with certainty; that to the extent we get farther from him, the more wretched we are.”322 
According to the traditional Christian narrative, humanity is fallen. As a result, Pascal believes 
the intellect and will are both corrupted: “[mankind] has obviously gone astray and fallen from 
his true place, lacking the power to find it again. He looks for it everywhere anxiously and 
unsuccessfully, in impenetrable darkness.”323 Separation from God, given Pascal’s ontology of 
theosis, is a literal loss—an ontological dismemberment and shift in human nature. True human 
nature participates in God, and in losing divine participation the accompanying cognitive and 
volitional perspectives are also lost.324   
One consequence of a corrupt intellect is losing moral knowledge, resulting in moral 
skepticism. This is a descriptive state for Pascal, as it merely describes the present human 
condition without prescribing how it ought to be. He finds robust resources for describing this 
state, the city of man, in Montaigne’s Apology for Raymond Sebond. After offering many 
traditional Pyrrhonian arguments, Montaigne concludes in his work that religious and moral 																																																								
320 De Civitate Dei XIX, 11; translation from Bettenson’s translation, Augustine (2003), 866. 
321 Pensées S181/L148 
322 Pensées S661/L821 
323 Pensées S19/L400 
324 Pensées S120/L86 
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knowledge cannot be obtained, at least through natural means.325 Since he lacks knowledge, 
reasoning cannot bring man to happiness or lead him to the good. These things can be gained 
only through authority and custom, not reason. Morals are arbitrary and relative to one’s culture 
and customs: convention instructs right living.326  
 Pascal agrees—having lost true human nature, and subsequently moral knowledge, a new 
second nature is created through power and custom.327 This also means that tyranny becomes the 
new ‘justice’:  
The only universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary things and of the majority 
in others. … Since we are unable to make might obey justice, we have made it just to 
obey might. Unable to strengthen justice, we have justified might, so that justice and 
might should unite and there be peace, which is the supreme good.328  
 
Peace, the Supreme Good, occurs when power and justice exist in harmony with one another, 
and since peace cannot be obtained through those in power acting justly, tyranny enforces its 
own ideals, making a false peace under a new ‘justice.’ While tyranny and justice should be 
antithetical, power is the only way to obtain peace without true justice. 
 This state has a drastic effect on the life of man. He realizes his own ignorance, and how 
that impedes his desire to be happy; as a result, he will die alone and unhappy.329 If someone is 
left to his own thoughts he is miserable. Finding this way of living unbearable, instead of 
contemplating the source of his unhappiness, he instead seeks diversion and distraction to avoid 
thinking at all. When not busying himself with games, going to the theater, hunting, and so 
forth—for it is not the win or the hare people seek, but activity itself—he also distracts his mind 
																																																								
325 Montaigne (2003), 7. He also writes here that, “We are Christians in the same way that we are Perigordians or 
Germans.” (Ibid) 
326 Montaigne (2003), 68-9 
327 Pensées S159/L126; See also Pensées S181/L148 
328 Pensées S116/L81 
329 Pensées S170/L138 
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by focusing it in places other than the present.330 When not consumed by distracting activity, 
people deflect their thought from the present where they feel their nothingness; they instead 
contemplate the future and wish for the past, but never live in the unbearable moment. Pascal 
writes:  
Examine your thoughts, and you will find them wholly occupied with the past or the 
future. We almost never think of the present, and if we do so, it is only to shed light on 
our plans for the future. The present is never our end. The past and the present are our 
means; only the future is our end. So we never live, but hope to live, and, as we are 
always planning to be happy, it is inevitable we should never be so.331  
 
Although diversion is a solution to mitigate despair, ironically it becomes the greatest source of 
our misery: by avoiding the anguish of the moment, a person no longer searches for truth. This 
momentarily eases the misery, but its price is satiating that person’s dreadful march to death in 
ignorance—“diversion amuses us and guides us imperceptibly to death.”332 A person’s passions 
are also of terrible disservice here: they are both antithetical to the Supreme Good, training the 
will to love things above God, and their nature of immediacy further distracts someone from 
happiness. Pleasures that flow from passions are false pleasures, another diversion and substitute 
for happiness that brings a person into further wretchedness.333  
 The remedy for this misery in the city of man is found in knowing and loving God. If 
someone is able to enter into union with God, s/he is able to have knowledge and happiness once 
again—s/he enters into the city of God. However, as a people with a dysfunctional cognition and 
volition, none can know God through self-effort and mere reason. In the case of a priori proofs, 
such as the ontological argument, Pascal complains that:  
The metaphysical proofs of God are so remote from men’s reasoning and so complicated 
that they make little impression. And when they are of service to some, it is only for the 																																																								
330 Pensées S168/L136 
331 Pensées S80/L47; See also Pensées S70/L36 
332 Pensées S33/L414 
333 Pensées S107/L73 
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instant during which they see this demonstration. But an hour later they fear they have 
been mistaken.334 
 
Human reason is weak and an individual’s concentration is easily broken. It does not take a loud 
cannon to distract someone from deep contemplation—all it takes is a small object’s creaking or 
a fly’s buzzing to render someone incapable of sound reflection.335 Even when a person properly 
follows such an argument, its conclusions lacks any conviction, and s/he quickly forgets the 
soundness of the reasoning, and begins doubting it or is easily swayed to believe contradictory 
claims.  
Pascal also has little confidence in the ability of a posteriori arguments to demonstrate 
truth with any conviction. When considering cosmological or teleological arguments, for 
instance, he is clear that nature cannot prove God exists.336 The book of nature—observing the 
sky and birds, and so forth—offers no conclusions beyond what the onlooker already believes; 
what it tells the observer depends entirely on the epistemic perspective in which s/he is already 
operating. Only those who already believe that God exists find these arguments compelling 
proofs for God’s existence.337 
Given these limits to human understanding, Pascal believes a different type of ‘proof’ is 
needed. Instead of more traditional arguments, there are other kinds of proofs that function to 
show religion is reasonable and that it understands man: arguments from morality (which are 
focused on man’s unhappiness and desire to be happy), miracles, prophecies, and figures (that is, 
ancient types in Hebrew literature such as Moses prefiguring Christ).338 Pascal believes these 
‘proofs’ show that religion is not irrational and that is worthy of respect because it explains the 
																																																								
334 Pensées S222/L190 
335 Pensées S81/L48 
336 Pensées S38/L3 
337 Pensées S38/L3 
338 Pensées S21/L402 
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human condition with better clarity than competing narratives and because its narrative has 
prevailed over enmity and difficult circumstances for millennia.339 He also offers up proto-
existential arguments—theology best explains the reason for existence at all, as well as existence 
at a particular time and place.340  
 However, even if someone is able to overcome his or her intellectual limits with these 
different proofs, s/he is no closer to knowing God. Knowing God requires loving him, and love 
is volitional, not intellectual. The strongest proofs are still only able to move the intellect, not the 
will. Even if someone is able to overcome his cognitive barriers—which is unlikely—he faces 
further difficulty, since his will is also corrupt.  
 Pascal’s answer to this is the machine, commonly known as Pascal’s Wager. As I showed 
earlier in this chapter, unlike Montaigne, Pascal believes someone who seeks God can at least 
know that his religion has a higher probability of being true than not being true. This is a 
fundamental necessity for the Wager—that one can say I believe this is likely true, and I wish it 
were. In an earlier fragment of the Pensées, he writes, “For we should work for what is 
uncertain, according to the rule of probability that was demonstrated.”341 If knowing God is 
foremost volitional, then someone who finds religion attractive and believes it is likely true 
should focus on the disposition of her will. In this sense, some contemporary philosophers of 
religion rightly refer to Pascal’s Wager as a theology of hope.342 By immersing oneself in 
religion, and participating in religious rites, exercises, and community—what Daniel Garber calls 
the Pascalian Regimen—that person becomes more disposed towards embracing religious 																																																								
339 Pensées S46/L12 
340 Pensées S102/L68 
341 Pensées, S478/L575; Also, S600/L722: “Let us see whether we seek God sincerely, by comparing the things we 
care about. It is probable that this food will not poison me. It is probable that I shall not lose my suit by not 
prosecuting it.”  
342 Resher (1985), 104-18 and Jeff Jordan (2006), 166-196. I do find other aspects of their evaluations problematic, 
but I do appreciate the sentiment of hope that is emphasized here in understanding this part of Pascal’s thought. 
	110 
faith.343 Still, the hopeful believer has no guarantee of faith however much the Pascalian 
Regimen may dispose his will towards belief. As a Jansenist, Pascal believes that faith, and 
subsequently loving and knowing God, are beyond the postlapsarian human’s own ability. God is 
hidden and remains hidden to those whom he has not dispensed effective grace. 
 This, of course, is disconcerting for Pascal’s interlocutor in the Discourse on the 
Machine. It is true that happiness and knowledge of the good are found in God; it also the case 
that the interlocutor does not have this at the moment. S/he is in the city of man but desires to be 
in the city of God. In Pascal’s ideal case, if the interlocutor undergoes the Pascalian Regimen, 
then God bestows effective grace upon him or her. But for those who do not receive this 
effective grace, Pascal does not want to just abandon them to a life of concupiscence. Although 
effective grace is a divine gift, practically speaking, someone who attends to religious rites, 
practices, and community is more disposed to receive grace than someone who spends his free 
time indulging in a vicious life of sensual pleasures and excesses: the sincere church-goer is 
more likely to find God than someone who is getting drunk in a casino with a prostitute. 
Nonetheless, if divine favor is a necessary condition for faith and it cannot be gained through 
self-effort, what is the use trying? “‘But this is what I am afraid of’,” his interlocutor states.344  
As a reassurance, Pascal offers an alternative morality: Neostoicism.345 The resident in 
the city of man may never have happiness, but so long as s/he is living a life in ignorance of the 
good, s/he can focus her efforts on making her life less miserable. The Pascalian Regimen not 
only inclines the will to be more predisposed towards faith, but it also trains one in some general 
Stoic exercises, allowing for a more content life than the alternative. As I showed earlier, Pascal 																																																								
343 Garber (2009), 14. 
344 Pensées S680/L418 
345 Many of the Neostoics have eclectic tendencies, synthesizing parts of Stoicism with other systems of belief—
Justus Lipsius and Guillaume du Vair with their Christian faith, and in a more qualified sense, Montaigne with his 
skepticism. I discuss this more in other places of the dissertation, including the introduction.  
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believes that the passions are an obstacle to achieving the Good Life as they keep a person 
attached to his concupiscence instead of seeking the source of potential happiness. However, by 
reducing one’s passions it is also the case that, “You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, 
generous, a sincere, true friend. Certainly you will not be taken by unhealthy pleasures…”346 
This is different from ataraxia, the tranquility of the skeptics. Although Pyrrhonianism has a 
moral force as I discussed concerning Montaigne, Pascal’s doubt is anti-skepticism in the end, 
for it seeks to distress the doubter, not console him. According to Pascal: 
to doubt is then to be unhappy, but there is an indispensable duty to doubt. And thus 
anyone who doubts and does not seek is at once unhappy and wrong. If, in addition, he is 
cheerful and presumptuous, I can find no words to describe so extravagant a creature.347  
 
The primary goal of the doubt is to cause discomfort and move one towards finding true peace in 
the city of God.348 
However, by seeking, the hopeful believer is able to find truth even in the city of man; 
though s/he cannot find truth with certainty, s/he can find it with some probability. As the Stoics 
taught, s/he will realize that the divine will is beyond his control. Since this is the case, s/he 
cannot initiate her love of God. Instead, s/he can focus on that which is within her control—
know thyself and reduce one’s passions:  
…the righteous man takes nothing for himself from the world or its applause, but only for 
his passions, which he uses as a master, saying to one, Go and [to another] Come. Your 
desire shall lie below you. The passions thus subdued become virtues… we must use 
them as slaves, leaving them their nourishment, but prevent the soul from taking any. For 
when the passions are masters, they become vices, and then they give their food to the 
soul, and the soul nourishes itself upon it and is poisoned.349 
 																																																								
346 Pensées S680/L418 
347 Pensées S661/L821 
348 I discuss this in more detail above in the section on Montaigne. It is true that Pyrrhonian skepticism has a moral 
force—by refraining from judgment, one is able to find peace in realizing it is a mistake to become anxious over not 
knowing that which one cannot know, or that one may be wrong about that which there is no compelling proof for or 
against. Pascal’s project is different: like the Stoics, it requires knowing truth to find this tranquility. 
349 Pensées S500/L603 
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Pascal is synthesizing his Augustinianism with Stoicism. In addition to what seems to be a clear 
‘two cities’ distinction in his morality, Pascal consistently draws from and admires the Stoic (and 
Neostoic) literature, particularly in Montaigne and Epictetus. In ways, Pascal models 
Montaigne’s solution: when ignorant of the good, the wise man knows himself, learning to 
accept that which he cannot control and in turn follows customs and authority.350 The difference 
is of course that Pascal believes knowing oneself and subduing one’s passions cannot lead to 
tranquility, though they are a better life than a life of diversion and concupiscence. As I outlined 
in the previous section of this chapter, Pascal also attributes a great intellectual debt to Epictetus 
in the development of his own philosophy. I showed that Pascal’s criticism with Epictetus is not 
that he was incorrect, but that he taught human duties can be fulfilled through a person’s own 
volition.351 Pascal’s familiarity with Stoicism allows him to comfortably borrow from it, 
synthesizing it with his own system similar to his appropriation of skepticism. The Stoic themes 
in Epictetus again resonate with Pascal’s hopeful believer: like Epictetus, Pascal believes that 
God is the principle object and that people should gladly submit to the divine will. Also, it is God 
who dispenses all things, and therefore both fortune and misfortune should be accepted as good. 
And so forth. 
In concluding, I want to acknowledge that there are two cases where Pascal’s moral 
philosophy as outlined in this chapter may be accounted for with a different explanation. The 
first is that it is possible given Pascal’s Cartesianism that he draws this Neostoicism from 
Descartes’ morale par provision in the Discourse on Method instead of directly from Epictetus 
or Montaigne. This is not an implausible reading as Pascal had closely read the Discourse as I 
argued in the first half of this chapter. However, given the variety of Stoic and Neostoic 																																																								
350 I argued in my first chapter that some interpretations of Montaigne classify him as a Stoic. 
351 Entretien avec M. de Saci. Pascal (1994), 96-98. See also Pensées, S179/L146 
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influences on Pascal, I suspect this fact is overdetermined; regardless of the answer, it does 
nothing to undermine the structure of Pascal’s moral philosophy that I suggest.352 The second 
case is that the classical Stoics make a two-fold distinction between someone who performs the 
right action but not in accordance to nature, and who performs the same type of action but is 
motivated by reason and not passion: that is, a distinction between a morally conscientious 
person and someone who is genuinely virtuous.353 Though other parts of Pascal’s morality are 
clearly Augustinian, such as his theosis, I would gladly concede that the binary division of his 
ethics follows from the Stoics and not Augustine—after all, everything that Pascal learned about 
Augustine he already found in Montaigne and Epictetus.354 In either case, it also does little to 
undermine the structure of Pascal’s philosophy I offered.  
 At the end, Pascal’s ethics are actually tripartite, not dual. There is the city of God, where 
true happiness and good are obtained. However, the city of man can be subdivided into those 
who seek God and learn to control their passions—a Neostoicism to make life more bearable 
while awaiting effective grace—and those who revel in misery, indulging in passions and 
concupiscence. These two, or three, categories make understanding his morality through the 
three orders of kind (charity, mind, and body) tempting, and it is understandable why the three 
orders are imposed as a framework for understanding his morality given the similarity. However, 
while evidence does not support the three orders reading, a two-cities structure with Neostoicism 
as a ‘second best alternative’ seems to more naturally follow from his four major influences. 
Neostoicism is not ideal, but it better predisposes one towards loving and knowing the Supreme 																																																								
352 Pascal is not the only Augustinian Cartesian to develop an ethics following the two cities distinction. Nicolas 
Malebranche takes a similar stance on moral philosophy. In his Treatise on Ethics, Malebranche separates his 
morals twofold: an eternal society and one enslaved by the passions. Though he works through the details of this 
distinction in his own unique way, where the passions actually serve a positive purpose to draw the reprobate 
towards God, there is enough resemblance to give contextual support to my reading, to prefer an Augustinian two-
cities distinction as the basis for understanding Pascal’s moral theory. 
353 On the Philosopher’s Mean; Seneca (1917), 20ff. 
354 Pascal (1994), 83ff 
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Good—which is that for which one should hope—and if that fails, it is an alternative morality, an 
adequate placeholder for him who God has not chosen. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
SPINOZA’S ANTI-STOICISM, OR, SPINOZA AMONG THE NEOSTOICS 
 
 
 
 Of the popularized philosophical literature from the 17th century, Spinoza’s work draws 
the most obvious affinities with Stoicism. A précis of the Ethics may closely resemble the 
Hellenistic philosophy with its pantheistic monism and description of the passions as an illness 
of the intellect with the centrality of rational beliefs prescribed as its cure. The distinctively Stoic 
quality of Spinoza’s Ethics and Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being did not go 
unnoticed by his contemporaries. Leibniz, for instance, criticizes Spinoza with these accusations: 
The sect of the new Stoics believes that there are incorporeal substances, that human 
souls are not bodies, and that God is the soul of the world, or, if you wish, the primary 
power of the world, that he is the cause of matter itself, if you wish, but that a blind 
necessity determines him to act; for this reason, he will be to the world what the spring or 
the weight is to a clock. […] In fact, these are Spinoza’s views, and there are many 
people to whom Descartes appears to be of the same opinion.355 
 
Though Stoicism was a central criticism of Spinoza in his time, these themes were neglected in 
contemporary literature until recently.356  
Since then, the tide of scholarship has returned to being more sensitive to these 
correlations.357 In general, much of this literature shows a careful analysis of Spinoza’s texts and 
a keen understanding of the Stoics. Nonetheless, I believe that it is not without its problems.  																																																								
355 AG, 282. Two Sects of Naturalists.  
356 This criticism was central because the Stoics were known for their heterodox theology: if Spinoza was a Stoic, 
and the Stoic teachings of pantheistic monism are false and dangerous, then Spinoza (by extension the philosophy of 
the Stoics) is also false and dangerous. As far as contemporary treatment, in 1930, C.D. Broad offered the first 
significant contemporary study on Spinoza in his Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 
1930). The reason for the neglect in this and subsequent works could be because of only a more recent shift towards 
doing the history of philosophy contextually in the Anglophone world or because Spinoza only mentions the Stoics 
once in his Ethics, and that is a criticism. (PV, Preface)  
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My first concern is that, from my experience, the majority of commentators who take on 
the task of examining these affinities state their position too strongly, overemphasizing Spinoza’s 
Stoicism. In the introduction to my dissertation, I discussed the problem of what it means to be a 
Stoic and I arrived at the conclusion that whatever family resemblance one might identify as 
‘Stoic’, self-identification seems to be an important factor when recognizing an author as an 
actor within a particular intellectual tradition. In this sense, Spinoza is not so comfortably 
classified as a Stoic.358 He views no tradition as off limits for appropriation or criticism, drawing 
from and criticizing a variety of philosophical schools, both ancient and modern, while making 
no exception for Stoicism. He rarely refers to the Stoics—only once in the Ethics, and in that 
instance, in order to offer a criticism.359 Furthermore, as far as Stoic doctrines go, in spite of 
similarities, there are also central Stoic themes that he rejects, such as teleology.360 It is not 
entirely clear that it is fair to identify Spinoza as a Stoic in this strong sense of some 
commentators.  
Also, with an exception of one recent monograph by Jon Miller,361 the literature on 
Spinoza and the Stoics strongly, if not exclusively, focuses on his morality. Spinoza is presented 
as a Stoic ethicist—not metaphysician or physicist. In this context, he is presented as a unique 
champion of Stoic thought in his time. So my second concern is that there is a tendency to 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
357 Several articles investigating Spinoza and his relation to the Stoic philosophy have been published in both 
journals and collected volumes (James [1993], Long [2003], Miller [2003]) and at least two monographs now exist 
on the subject. (DeBrabander [2004], Miller [2015]) 
358 Though like I said above, some of Spinoza’s contemporaries accused him of Stoicism. See AG, 282. 
359 PV, Preface; In addition to the one citation in the Ethics, he also mentions the Stoics in the Treatise on the 
Emendation of the Intellect (70) in a discussion on the soul. 
360 I will address this in the second section of this chapter.  
361 Miller (2015). Jonathan Israel also discusses the Spinoza and the Stoics, but it is a historical survey of how 
contemporaries of Spinoza responded to him and not an attempt by himself to classify Spinoza in any particular 
way. It seems that the reception of Spinoza was mixed in whether or not he was identified with the Stoic philosophy, 
which is telling and corresponds with some of my later conclusions. (Israel [2006], 457-470) 
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present Spinoza’s Stoic ethics as a 17th century novelty, a shocking moral view for his time. 
Susan James writes, for instance, that: 
Although twentieth-century scholars have largely lost sight of the Stoic elements in the 
Ethics, these would unquestionably have been evident to many of Spinoza’s 
contemporaries. To be sure, it is difficult to tell what proportion of his readers would 
have possessed a sufficiently detailed knowledge of Stoicism to appreciate the full extent 
of his intellectual debt. But it is clear that many of them would have recognized the 
provenance of specific doctrines which were widely identified as Stoic. For example, the 
claim that all passion is inimical to virtue, so that in so far as we become virtuous we 
become free of passion, was regularly decried by seventeenth-century philosophers and 
moralists as a Stoic aberration.362  
 
Although Spinoza’s work is indeed novel, and he was harshly accused of Stoicism by some of 
his contemporaries, the Stoic morality was hardly a fringe position in his time. Stoicism’s rebirth 
during the Renaissance as Neostoicism had lasting influence into following centuries. As a 
result, Stoic themes, especially Stoic morality philosophy, are pervasive throughout early 
modernity.363 
In light of the recent literature that has emerged on this topic, in this chapter I do not 
intend to provide an exhaustive account of any particular Spinozistic doctrine, nor of his relation 
with Stoicism. Recent literature has allowed for significant gains in scholarship pertaining to 
both of these topics and I do not feel the need to repeat what has already been said well by 
others. Nonetheless, for the two concerns stated above, I believe that the present-day discussions 
continue to mischaracterize the role that Stoicism plays in Spinoza’s thought. In this chapter, 
then, I aim to resituate Spinoza’s morality with a greater sensitivity to his anti-Stoicism and to 
the philosophies of other Neostoics in his day. Doing this will allow for a better frame of 
reference from which to understand his moral philosophy.  
																																																								
362 James (1993), 291. She cites Henry More, J.F. Senault, N. Coeffeteau, and Nicolas Caussin as evidence of those 
who “decried” these qualities as a “Stoic aberration.” (Ibid, n.10) 
363 To get a feel for what some of these influences were, see Long (2003) and Kraye (1998). 
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In this chapter, I will argue that rather than offering an altogether unique morality for his 
time (as the literature suggests), Spinoza is part of an established Neostoic tradition. This will be 
accomplished through the following three sections: in the first section, I will give a brief survey 
of Spinoza’s Stoicism as portrayed in contemporary literature, showing areas of neglect and 
problems to be resolved; in the second, I will push back against these readings by showing 
predominant anti-Stoic themes in Spinoza’s morality; and, finally, in the third, I will place 
Spinoza into the tradition of Neostoicism by comparing his Stoicism (and anti-Stoicism) with 
others in the Neostoic tradition.  
 
I. Some Interpretations of Spinoza and the Stoic Morality 
 
As outlined above, there are two present-day views pertaining to Spinoza’s Stoicism. The 
first are those that neglect Stoic themes altogether; this is typical of less recent scholarship. 
These commentators are interested in other philosophical problems in Spinoza’s work, such as 
meta-ethics. For example, Edwin Curley examines Spinoza’s moral psychology against claims 
that he is a psychological egoist. In Curley’s analysis he is not concerned with Stoicism, though 
he does identify the end towards which Spinoza’s ethical theory is aimed as an enduring state of 
mind, writing:  
What is of primary importance, morally, is the quality of consciousness from which 
action flows, and one of the main problems of moral philosophy is deciding whether 
there are, ‘…any techniques for the purification and reorientation of an energy which is 
naturally selfish, in such a way that when moments of choice arrive we shall be sure of 
acting rightly’.364  
 
The quote that Curley includes in this explanation is from Freud, which he finds to be an apt 
paraphrase of themes in Ethics Part IV where Spinoza describes a gradual formation of a 																																																								
364 Curley (1973), 374. He is quoting Iris Murdoch’s The Sovereignty of the Good (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1970), 70-71. Curley also provides an astute commentary on Spinoza’s moral philosophy in Curley (1988), but 
that also does not make the Stoic connection. This is not necessarily a weakness in this work but rather just not 
where Curley intends to focus. 
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character less prone to harmful emotions.365 There are shadows of Stoicism lurking behind 
Freud’s analysis cited here; Martha Nussbaum, for instance, frames Stoic morality as a form of 
psychotherapy, drawing Freudian comparisons.366 But Curley does not draw this connection.  
Likewise, there are many other authors who provide strong enough summaries of 
Spinozistic philosophy in the Ethics but neglect its correlations with Stoicism. Stuart 
Hampshire’s succinct introduction to Spinozism highlights several influences on Spinoza’s 
thought, such as Hobbes and Descartes, and like Curley, he also draws correlation between 
Spinoza and Freud, but there is no mention of the Stoics or their influences on his philosophy.367 
The same is true for Genevieve Lloyd. In her detailed analysis of the Ethics, she focuses on 
topics where Spinoza has clear affinities with Stoicism, such as substance, and could provide a 
suitable place for introducing similarities in their thought, but she does not.368  
Most of these texts are models of excellent scholarship in as far as the authors achieve 
what they set out to accomplish. Fully acknowledging each of the traditions which influence an 
author’s work may not be a necessary condition for interpreting his or her writings correctly. 
Nonetheless, there certainly is good motivation for exploring these similarities.369 One way this 
need is evident in particular is that though much recent literature has ignored Spinoza and the 
Stoics, the issue of Spinoza’s Stoicism was important to his contemporaries. Jonathan Israel 																																																								
365 See Ethics P.IV, Appendix 14-16, 27-28, etc. Curley similarly notes that in Ethics PV, Spinoza prescribes 
techniques designed to accomplish this goal of character formation. 
366 In The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. See Nussbaum (1994), 439, etc; Susan 
James makes this connection between Freudian and Spinozistic psychotherapy explicit, drawing also from 
Nussbaum. See James (1993). 
367 Hampshire (1987), 98-132. 
368 There are others, but Curley, Lloyd, and Hampshire serve as effective examples. There is a great deal of topical 
literature as well that deals with themes relevant to the question of Spinoza’s Stoicism: Kashap (1987), Lin (2006), 
Kisner (2013), and so forth. I am indebted to Miller (2015) for his analysis as it has helped me frame some of this 
literature as I have. 
369 Though context may not be a necessary condition for interpreting a philosopher correctly, it certainly helps a 
great deal in drawing an interpretation and safeguarding against misinterpretation. Without context, there is the 
danger of philosophy texts becoming nothing but a mirror of the reader’s own existing beliefs, an unfortunately 
common occurrence among historians of philosophy who reject external evidence. 
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describes the intellectual climate well; many criticisms advanced against Spinoza were 
accusations of Stoicism given their resemblance to some of the themes in his work: 
While these modern [that is, present-day] scholars do not, of course, share the motives 
which inspired earlier comparisons of Spinozism with Stoicism, the effect, were their 
reading correct, might well be similar. For by labeling Spinoza a ‘Stoic’, Early 
Enlightenment critics questioned both his originality and integrity, reminding readers that 
Christianity had long since disposed of the arguments of the Stoics, back in late 
antiquity.370  
 
While I do not share Israel’s confidence that Christianity disposed of Stoicism – there is 
overwhelming evidence that it was appropriated, not disposed371 – the overall force of his claim 
is helpful. Understanding Spinoza’s relation with Stoicism, seeing to what extent he identifies as 
a Stoic, and reconsidering where he rejects Stoic thought all help to illuminate the thought of 
Spinoza himself.  
Towards this end, a second set of present-day literature turns its attention towards 
Spinoza’s Stoicism. One of the first to do so is Paul Oskar Kristeller. Kristeller sets Stoicism 
against an alleged Aristotelianism, arguing that Spinoza is better identified as a Stoic and 
Neoplatonist than an Aristotelian: in short, he claims it is false that Spinoza is influenced by 
Aristotle because he is a Stoic. He appeals to Spinoza’s morality, highlighting the correlations 
between their theories of the passions. In Kristeller’s account, conatus is “nothing but the 
impulse of self-preservation which occupies a central place in the Stoic system of ethics.”372 																																																								
370 Israel (2006), 458 
371 The Rennasiance Neostoics Lipsius and Du Vair exemplify this. See also Troels Engberg-Pedersen’s “Stoicism in 
the Apostle Paul: A Philosophical Reading” and Richard Sorabji’s “Stoic First Movements in Christianity” (found in 
Strange and Zupko (2004), 52-75 and 95-107) for examples of how even the canonical Christian texts incorporate 
important Stoic themes. A great number of medieval references to Stoicism are not critical, and sometimes are used 
to illustrate an author’s point. See my appendix for a list of these.  
372 Kristeller, 5-6. I do find Kristeller’s article troubling in that he seems to set out to solve a problem that never 
existed: Spinoza’s rejection of Aristotelianism seems obvious and the evidence used to support Spinoza’s 
Neoplatonism is lacking. It is true that Spinoza uses terms such as substance, attribute, and mode that originate in 
Aristotle. However, he seems to be borrowing these from Descartes, who wrote the Principles of Philosophy in the 
tone of a scholastic textbook, not from Aristotle himself. Descartes’ original plan was to publish the principles 
alongside a traditional scholastic textbook, but later abandoned this idea to publish his own “Summa” of philosophy. 
(See letter to Mersenne, 25 December 1639; AT II, 626) Kristeller also makes the case that Spinoza’s geometric 
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Although credit is due for being among the first modern scholars to note the similarities between 
the two philosophies, even at the points where Kristeller is right in his article, he overemphasizes 
the role that Stoicism plays in Spinoza’s thought. In treatment of Spinoza’s Ethics, he quickly 
identifies him as Stoic while overlooking aspects that run contrary to Stoic thought.373  
Another author who discusses Spinoza’s Stoicism is Susan James. While others argue 
similarly, I find her account the most compelling.374 She approaches her discussion from the 
place of Spinoza’s definition of virtue, which can be summarized as freedom from passion 
resulting from a complex process of moral growth. She notes that Spinoza’s concept of virtue is 
composed of two parts that are analogous to the Stoic opinion. The first is that virtue is living in 
agreement with nature, or assenting only to actions that are in accordance with nature. However, 
she notes that, according to Spinoza, the person who is merely living in accordance with nature is 
likely to choose things that are morally indifferent, such as helping a sick friend because of pity; 
this is a passion, instead of a rational emotion. This person, though morally conscientious, lacks 
virtue. Because of this, the virtuous person requires an additional quality: living according to 
right reason. James argues that following the Stoic doctrine that Diogenes describes as “knowing 
your proper function,”375 Spinoza’s conception of virtue requires more than right action. Moral 
worth resides not in what action is done, but whether that action is done with a virtuous 																																																																																																																																																																																		
method is Neoplatonic, though he also admits that there is no tangible evidence for Spinoza’s Neoplatonism: “If we 
try to find earlier examples for the application of the method of geometry, that is, of Euclid, to a philosophical 
treatise, we do not find it in the Aristotelian tradition and not even in Descartes, but in the Elements of Theology and 
in the Elements of Physics of the Neoplatonist Proclus who also composed a commentary on the first Book of 
Euclid. The analogy strikes me as significant, although there is no clear evidence that Spinoza knew or imitated 
Proclus.” (Kristeller, 3; italics are mine) 
373 Kristeller, 6-7. To be fair to Kristeller, he seems to be drawing broad strokes in order to draw attention to the 
Stoic aspects in Spinoza that had been entirely neglected before him. 
374 She frames her article in rejecting Spinoza’s Cartesianism, a thesis I reject. See Collette (2014). A.A. Long offers 
a list of others in Miller and Inwood (2003), 27n9. This was a helpful list of resources in exploring literature for this 
chapter. The list includes Dilthey, who he quotes: “Spinoza’s entire individual ethics, the aim of his work, is based 
on the Stoa – in fact in such comprehensiveness and with such agreements in detail that it seems unavoidable to 
assume his using the most widely read of the reworkings of the ancient tradition by the Dutch humanist Lipsius, his 
De Constantia.” Dilthey (1977), 285. Translation by Miller.  
375 James (1993), 292 
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disposition. She concludes that Spinoza’s morality is best understood as Stoic, then, and 
identifies his Stoicism as an early modern aberration, appealing to criticisms raised against 
Spinoza by Henry More and John Locke where he is accused of Stoicism.376 James makes 
Spinoza into an unwavering champion of the Stoic philosophy; with most of the literature on the 
topic following this opinion, it would be easy to believe that Spinoza’s morality is 
unquestionably Stoic. 
  The bulk of present-day commentators, then, can be identified with these two views, 
those who neglect Spinoza’s Stoicism and those who classify his morality as wholly Stoic and an 
early modern novelty. There are two exceptions worth mentioning that do provide a more 
balanced account. One is Steven Nadler’s introduction to the Ethics where he acknowledges that, 
“Plato, Aristotle, and the ancient (and modern) Stoics all belong to the intellectual background of 
the work.”377 He also notes some similarities Spinoza shares with the Stoic theory of the passions 
as well as a their prescriptions to the good life, living according to nature.378 To Nadler’s credit, 
though he makes connections between the two schools of thought, it is without overstating the 
influence of one upon the other, realizing that, “The deeper one goes into the Ethics, and the 
further one proceeds from the metaphysics and epistemology of the early propositions into the 
domain of psychology, social and political philosophy, and moral philosophy, the wider range of 
intellectual contexts within which Spinoza’s ideas can be situated.”379 Nadler recognizes many 
other intellectual traditions besides Stoicism that also help shape Spinoza’s ideas: Hobbes, 
Descartes, Jewish rationalism, and so forth. Nadler’s approach is refreshing, but it is a generalist 
																																																								
376 She also argues that in 17th century, the idea that virtue is incompatible with the passions is criticized. 
377 Nadler (2006), xiii. 
378 Nadler (2006), 196, 226, 235.  
379 Nadler (2006), 248. 
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introduction and as a result he does not intend to provide a detailed analysis of the Stoic themes 
in particular.  
 The second exception is Jon Miller, whose recent, aptly titled monograph, Spinoza and 
the Stoics, provides the most detailed treatment of the topic to date. He does not set out to 
establish Stoic lines of influence on Spinoza, but embarks on a much safer project, to explore 
their conceptual affinities. I commend Miller’s work here, and there is value in his approach—
this is an area of investigation still in its infancy, and it is a much more difficult task to prove an 
author’s influence than to highlight similarities.380 Compared to the Stoics, there is much 
stronger record of Spinoza’s familiarity with Cartesian and Jewish texts than the Stoic 
writings.381 It is unclear whether all of his Stoic influences are direct, or if they are indirect 
through someone else, such as Descartes.382 This is not a problem, then, of Miller’s work, but it 
is helpful to acknowledge what he is and is not accomplishing. Another strength in this work is 
that his account is also more extensive. Where the other commentators strictly focus on 
Spinoza’s morality,383 Miller’s analysis parallels the five parts of the Ethics, following 
correlations between the Spinozistic and Stoic philosophies in metaphysics, epistemology, 
philosophical psychology, meta-ethics, and normative ethics. The result is a more robust 
presentation of how Spinoza’s philosophy relates with, and often resembles, Stoic philosophy. 
Miller’s work is an important a contribution to present-day Spinoza scholarship for this reason. 
																																																								
380 Especially problematic is that the evidence can be both underdetermined and overdetermined. Underdetermined 
in that it is not always clear which books an author had in his or her library, actually read, etc. Thus separating a 
similar but original thought from a true influence in these cases can be difficult. Overdetermined in that there may 
be many places where an author learned a particular doctrine, and it is difficult to say that s/he drew it from one 
tradition rather than another. Pascal, for instance, says everything he learned from Augustine was already present in 
Montaigne and Epictetus. Which actually influenced him, if not all three, is a challenging if not impossible question 
to fully answer.  
381 This is evidenced by the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy and Metaphysical Thoughts as well as his Hebrew 
Grammar. See Nadler (2006), xiii, etc. 
382 Spinoza draws the comparison between the Stoics and Descartes himself in the Preface to PV . 
383 This is also true for the only other monograph on the subject, DeBrabander (2007). 
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Thus, Miller accomplishes what he sets out to do, but for this very reason he does not treat anti-
Stoic themes in Spinoza’s works. And while an important first step, I would question the lasting 
philosophical payoff of merely drawing comparisons between two philosophies without taking 
the further steps to say that the correlations are more than mere happenstance.384 Finally, in 
making a weaker argument, it also sidesteps the question in the second set of literature as to how 
unique Spinoza’s Stoicism really was in his day.  
Thus, what remains is literature that neglects Spinoza’s affinities with Stoicism, and 
literature that discusses it but either neglects his anti-Stoicism or portrays Spinoza as Stoic moral 
philosopher, unqualified and unprecedented. I am aware that my treatment of the literature in this 
section is hardly exhaustive, but my task was to give a sketch of the climate of present-day 
literature and nothing more, at least to this point. In the next section I will turn directly to 
examining Spinoza and the Stoics, emphasizing the anti-Stoic themes are also prevalent in his 
work.  
 
II. Spinoza’s Anti-Stoicism 
 
In the last section I gave a brief survey of present-day commentaries on Spinoza. I 
showed that while the majority of authors ignore Spinoza’s Stoicism, those who acknowledge 
their affinity provide accounts that are misguided in that they overemphasize the Stoic influence 
on his morality, underplay his anti-Stoicism, or both. Left to the current state of literature, then, 
Spinoza should be taken as a Stoic. But Spinoza’s contemporaries were not always so quick to 
draw this connection, which is a good reason to at least give pause and examine the issue more 
																																																								
384 I do not mean to say that Miller’s work is not valuable nor that his work does not have lasting philosophical 
payoff. Like many important works, it makes significant gains on its own while also creating space where additional 
work must be done. I mean that to stop here and accept what Miller has done as the end of this investigation is 
inadequate.  
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closely before drawing that conclusion. Israel identifies Bayle’s shift in tone towards Spinoza, 
noting:  
In his late work, though Bayle ceased identifying Stoicism as the prime ancient parallel to 
Spinozism, […] he also highlighted what he now saw as serious inconsistencies in 
Stoicism […] All the affinities between Spinoza and the Stoics in the end, Bayle came to 
see, are more apparent than real.385  
 
As Bayle saw, in spite of similarities between the two, the case for Spinoza’s Stoicism becomes 
less compelling when their inconsistencies are also included in the analysis. In this section I will 
reject the notion that Spinoza is a Stoic in a strict sense. Since the present-day literature focuses 
on Spinoza’s morality, it is there where I will also focus in emphasizing anti-Stoic themes 
prominent in the Ethics.  
It is true that there are many disagreements amongst the Stoics themselves, which may 
complicate establishing what exactly is an inconsistency or which ideas qualify as Stoic as 
opposed to anti-Stoic. Among the Stoics, variations in doctrine are unexceptional: Aristo 
believed that some external objects are indifferent and can be preferred over others; Posidonius 
rejected a monist psychology, replacing it with a Platonic tripartite division; and late Stoics, such 
as Seneca and Epictetus, had much less to say about physics and almost entirely neglected logic; 
just to give a few examples.386 There are nonetheless particular themes that are persistent 
throughout the Stoic literature. Three of these themes are teleology, free will, and moral 
perfectionism, all of which Spinoza rejects.387  
The first, teleology, is central to the Stoic project. Stoic teleology shapes their physics 
and metaphysics, which serves as a basis for their moral psychology, meta-ethics, and normative 
ethics. According to the Stoics, the universe is divinely orchestrated according to providence. 																																																								
385 Israel (2006), 462. 
386 Sellars (2006), 5-13.  
387 There is a fair amount of literature on each of these topics individually. However, most of it explores one of these 
three topics, and not their relation to Stoicism. I will discuss each below. 
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Furthermore, humans are created as rational beings, a quality held in common with the divine. 
As a result, the universe is designed with specific purposes and predefined goals designed to 
point humans towards the good life. The Stoics, of course, define the good life as living in 
accordance to nature, which is exchanging harmful passions for rational beliefs.  
Seneca, for instance, takes it as obvious that the universe has a caretaker that orchestrates 
all things towards the good end of humanity:  
What, then, is the part of a good man? To offer himself to Fate. It is a great consolation 
that it is together with the universe we are swept along whatever it is that has ordained us 
so to have, so to die, by the same necessity it binds also the gods. One unchangeable 
course bears along the affairs of men and gods alike. Although the great creator and ruler 
of the universe himself wrote the decrees of Fate, yet he follows them. He obeys forever, 
he decreed but once. […] I suffer nothing against my will, and I am not God's slave but 
his follower, and the more so, indeed, because I know that everything proceeds according 
to law that is fixed and enacted for all time.388 
 
Epictetus likewise describes humans as endowed by nature for greatness.389 After defending 
divine providence through something like teleological argument, he explains,  
…while for us, to whom He has made the additional gift of the faculty of understanding, 
these things are no longer sufficient, but unless we act appropriately, and methodically, 
and in conformity each with his own nature and constitution, we shall no longer achieve 
our own ends. […] God has brought man into the world to be a spectator of Himself and 
His works, and not merely a spectator, but also an interpreter. Wherefore, it is shameful 
for a man to begin and end just where the irrational animals do; he should rather begin 
where they do, but end where nature has ended in dealing with us.390 
 
While Seneca and Epictetus represent the opinions of later Stoics, the early and middle Stoics 
share this doctrine as well.391 Diogenes Laertius reports that, “Zeno first, in his book On Human 
Nature, said that the goal was to live in agreement with nature, which is to live according to 
virtue. And similarly Cleanthes in On Pleasure and Posidonius and Hecaton in their books On 
																																																								
388 De Providentia; Seneca (1928), 39 and 37; See also, 3-5. 
389 Discourses I.II, p.23-25.  
390 Discourses I.VI, p. 41-45. 
391 That is, ones from the third through first centuries BCE such as Zeno and Chrysippus, contrasted with the later 
Stoics in first and second centuries CE such as Seneca and Epictetus.  
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the Goal.”392 For each of the Stoics, teleology permeates their vision of what it means to exist in 
the world. Furthermore, it plays an important role in solving potential Stoic difficulties, such as 
the problem of evil. That is, they believed everything is both determined and good, two concepts 
that are difficult to reconcile together with human suffering. Teleology serves as an important 
explanatory function, in that it can say that suffering exists because it is divinely orchestrated to 
cultivate virtue, which is our end.393 
There is some disagreement concerning how to interpret Spinoza on teleology. Bennett 
suggests that he rejects all three forms of teleology available for consideration: divine 
providence, goal-directed human action, and what Martin Lin describes as “unthoughtful 
teleology.”394 Several others reject Bennett’s thesis, directly and indirectly, by arguing that 
Spinoza allows for at least one kind, teleological explanation of human actions.395 In either case, 
what is nearly uncontroversial is Spinoza’s rejection of divine teleology. In the Appendix to Part 
I of the Ethics, Spinoza observes the qualities of nature that are often attributed to teleology and 
divine providence, noting that,  
Now all the prejudices which I intend to mention here turn on this one point, the 
widespread belief among men that all things in Nature are like themselves in acting with 
an end in view. Indeed, they hold it as certain that God himself directs everything to a 
fixed end; for they say that God has made everything for man’s sake and has made man 
so that he should worship God. […] men always act with an end in view, to wit, the 
advantage that they seek. Hence it happens that they are always looking only for the final 
causes of things done, and are satisfied when they find them, having, of course, no reason 
for further doubt. But if they fail to discover them from some external source, they have 
no recourse but to turn to themselves, and to reflect on what ends would normally 
determine them to similar actions, and so they necessarily judge other minds by their 
own. Further, since they find within themselves and outside themselves a considerable 																																																								
392 Diogenes Laertius 7.87; Long and Sedley (1987), I. 63.  
393 Consider Seneca, who writes, “Do not, I beg of you, shrink in fear from those things which the immortal gods 
apply like spurs, as it were, to our souls. Disaster is Virtue’s opportunity.” (De Providentia; Seneca [1927], 27) And, 
“Also so, in the case of good men the gods follow the same rule that teachers follow with their pupils; they require 
most effort from those of whom they have the surest hope. […] Why, then, is it strange if God tries noble spirits 
with severity?” (31) 
394 Lin (2006), 318-9; Bennett reads Spinoza as rejecting all three. See Bennett (1983) and Bennett (1984). 
395 See Curley (1988), Della Rocca (1993), Garrett (1999), Manning (2002), and Lin (2006) 
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number of means very convenient for the pursuit of their own advantage—as, for 
instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, cereals and living creatures for food, the sun 
for giving light, the sea for breeding fish—the result is that they look on all the things of 
Nature as means to their own advantage. And realizing that these were found, not 
produced by them, they come to believe that there is someone else who produced these 
means for their use. For looking on things as means, they could not believe them to be 
self-created, but on the analogy of the means which they are accustomed to produce for 
themselves, they were bound to conclude that there was some governor or governors of 
Nature, endowed with human freedom, who have attended to all their needs and made 
everything for their use.396  
 
Spinoza seems aware of the arguments, the same types advanced by the Stoics, that the world is 
made in such a way as to serve human needs. He rejects the notion that just because humans find 
ways that make the world fit their ends that there is any divine principle orchestrating these 
things towards any particular end.  
Though Spinoza’s rejection of divine providence is uncontested, Miller denies that 
Spinoza is advancing his criticism against Stoic teleology, arguing instead that he targets Judeo-
Christian instantiations. Miller appeals to Ethics I, P33Sch2 as an example of this; here, Spinoza 
discusses how everything necessarily follows from God based on his nature, and criticizes those 
saying God created freely.397 Stoics agree, says Miller, there is nothing outside of nature that it 
could take as a goal for its actions. However important immanence is here, Spinoza’s criticism 
does not quite so carefully avoid the Stoic account as Miller suggests. The argument he rejects 
strongly correlates with Stoic accounts of divine providence in other ways. Seneca writes, for 
instance, that,  
it is unnecessary to show that this mighty structure of the world does not endure without 
some one to guard it, and that the assembling and the separate flight of the starts above 
are not due to the workings of chance; that while bodies which owe their motion to 
accident often fall into disorder and quickly collide, this swift revolution of the heavens, 
being ruled by eternal law, goes on unhindered, producing so many things on land and 
sea, so many brilliant lights in the sky all shining in fixed array; […] But let such matters 																																																								
396 Ethics, PI Appendix; 239. 
397 Miller, 56 
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be ketpt for their fitting time,—all the more so, indeed, because you do not lack faith in 
Providence, but complain of it. 
 
Likewise, Epictetus says while for the irrational animals, 
it is sufficient to eat and drink and rest and procreate, and whatever else of the things 
within their own providence the animals severally do; while for us, to whom He has made 
the additional gift of the faculty of understanding, these things are no longer sufficient, 
but unless we act appropriately, and methodically, and in conformity each with his own 
nature and constitution, we shall no longer achieve our ends. […] But God has brought 
man into the world to be a spectator of Himself and of His works, and not merely a 
spectator, but also an interpreter. Wherefore, it is shameful for man to begin and end just 
where the irrational animals do; he should rather begin where they do, but end where 
nature has ended in dealing with us.398 
 
The distinctions that Miller intends to draw between Judeo-Christian and Stoic teleology are not 
at all clear. Although the Stoics believe the universe is created from necessity and deny God’s 
transcendence, they also believe nature favors certain kinds of individuals—the universe is 
structured for the benefit of rational beings. Spinoza rejects this aspect of teleology as well: for 
him, nature is indifferent to humans, equally beneficial and harmful to all beings. There is no 
unique bond between nature and humans due to a shared essence of reason. All differences 
according to Spinoza are differences of degree, and without a special connection with humans, 
there is no reason to prefer them to other beings.399  
After denying that Spinoza intends the Stoics as his target of teleology, Miller then tries 
to reconcile the Spinozistic and Stoic accounts of divine providence to show that the targets of 
Spinoza’s criticism were directed elsewhere, but that the two are not irreconcilable. He claims it 
is possible that the Stoics only held their teleological position because of inferior science and 
because of this, it is not a necessary condition for Stoicism.400 Miller believes that the Stoics, 
though well intended, did the best they could with their obsolete natural philosophy, and if they 
																																																								
398 Epictetus Discourses I.VI; (1956), 41-45. Miller attributes this to Becker.  
399 Miller compares this to Garrett’s Incremental Naturalism. Garrett (2008), 18-19 
400 Miller (2015), 57 
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only lived today they would have rid their project of immature teleological notions and formed a 
Stoicism sans teleology. I do not find Miller’s attempt to reconcile these two satisfying. Stoic 
philosophy is systematic, and to remove its metaphysics and physics is to dismantle the entire 
project. Removing teleology from Stoicism would be similar to removing the logic from 
Stoicism, which may seem inconsequential to us, but which Epictetus warns that, “without 
receiving exercise in these matters [that is, logic], or even being, by me at least diverted from the 
study of morality, we nevertheless make no progress toward the beautiful and the good.”401  
Furthermore, in order to maintain Stoicism without teleology, Miller is forced to reduce 
‘Stoicism’ down to something so vague that it could include anyone who meets the broadest 
affinities with this Hellenistic school. Under these conditions, Kant could also be understood as a 
Stoic; he explains moral psychology in terms of conflicting natural inclinations that are shared 
with irrational creatures, and rational inclinations that resemble the divine will.402 Kant also 
argues that an action is praiseworthy if and only if it is done freely out of duty alone, following a 
priori motivations, and not natural inclinations. This is similar to Epictetus, who writes that, 
As it is, however, we are not inasmuch as these two elements were comingled in our 
begetting, on the one hand the body, which we have in common with the brutes, and the 
other, reason and intelligence, which we have in common with the gods, some of us 
incline toward the former relationship, which is unblessed by fortune and is mortal, and 
only a few toward that which is divine and blessed.403  
 
For both Kant and Epictetus, morality is grounded in acting rationally, which is also to act well. 
Although there may be these Stoic similarities with Kant’s metaphysics of morals, I would be 
																																																								
401 Epictetus, Discourses I, VIII; (1956), 61.  
402 Kant, Religion 6:46-7, etc.   
403 Epictetus Discourses I.III; (1956), 25.. 
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remiss to identify him as a Stoic.404 Stoicism cannot be reduced to such a vague set of principles 
without resulting in these problems.  
So when Miller offers a construction of Spinoza’s conception of nature sans teleology, it 
seems to compromise the entire Stoic framework. Whatever the Stoics were in the ancient and 
early modern world, teleology was essential to their philosophy as a whole, and it is a feature 
that Spinoza rejects. Although Miller is correct that Spinoza’s rejection of divine freedom aligns 
with the Stoic account of a necessary creation, it seems that given the differences between the 
two views outlined above that it is unfair to exclude Stoic teleology from the scope of Spinoza’s 
attack.405 Regardless of whether Stoicism was Spinoza’s only target in the Appendix to Part I, 
arguments that it was not at least one of the objects of his criticism are unconvincing. Spinoza 
rejects divine providence, which is central to the Stoic philosophy.  
Moving on, Spinoza’s second important deviation from Stoicism concerns free will. Free 
choice of the will is a fundamental part of human existence, and a precondition for virtuous 
living, according to Stoic teachings. Although external matters, such as good fortune, are 
determined, free will is implicit throughout the Stoic writings as it is required in order to respond 
to these determined events in a virtuous way. Seneca, for example, believes that it is not what the 
virtuous person bears but how s/he bears it that is important.406 He writes, 
There await us, if ever we escape from these low dregs to that sublime and lofty height, 
peace of mind and, when all error has been driven out, perfect liberty. You ask what this 																																																								
404 That does not mean that there may not be Stoic influences on Kant, but that it is incorrect to call him a Stoic. This 
is a topic I will leave for future research as it raises additional problems that I am not willing to digress into here: 
e.g., various Cartesians rejected in some capacity or another nearly every doctrine that Descartes held central and 
dear, so why wouldn’t Kant be a Stoic? Part of it seems to be identification. Cartesians such as Regis who rejected 
the method of doubt and Empiricist Cartesians such as Rohault self-identified, and identified by others, as 
Cartesians. I am not aware of anyone who identified Kant as a Stoic, nor did Kant self-identify with this Hellenistic 
tradition, yet it seems that according to Becker’s account, Kant meets sufficient conditions for Stoicism.   
405 See also Seneca (1927), De Providentia, 43. Seneca says, “Whatever it is that has ordained the mode of our life 
and the mode of our death has bound the gods, too, by the same necessity. The course that carries human affairs and 
divine alike is irrevocable.” 
406 Seneca (1927), De Providentia, 9 
	132 
freedom is? It means not fearing either men or gods; it means not craving wickedness or 
excess; it means possessing supreme power over oneself. And it is a priceless good to be 
master of oneself.407  
 
Freedom is essential to transcending the passions, applying the intellect to overcome them. 
Epictetus also refers to this in Discourses, where he writes, 
But I have never been hindered in the exercise of my will, nor have I ever been subjected 
to compulsion against my will. And how is this possible? I have submitted my freedom of 
choice unto God. He wills that I shall have fever; it is my will too. He wills that I should 
choose something; it is my will too. He wills that I should desire something; it is my will 
too. He wills that I should get something; it is my wish too. He does not will it; I do not 
wish it. Therefore, it is my will to die; therefore, it is my will to be tortured on the rack. 
Who can hinder me any longer against my own views, or put compulsion upon me? That 
is no more possible in my case than it would be with Zeus.408  
 
For Epictetus, it is his will that allows him to live in accordance with nature, to replace irrational, 
destructive passions with rational emotions.  
Contrarily, Spinoza denies free will. There is only one place where Spinoza explicitly 
addresses the Stoics in the Ethics and it is to criticize them on this point. In the Preface to Part V, 
he writes,  
Now the Stoics thought that the emotions depend absolutely on our will, and that we can 
have absolute command over them. However, with experience crying out against them 
they were obliged against their principles to admit that no little practice and zeal are 
required in order to check and control emotions.  
 
After comparing this view to Descartes, showing where the Passions of the Soul makes 
analogous claims, Spinoza levels a tirade against Cartesian freedom, which also applies to 
Stoicism by extension.  
The third notable deviation that Spinoza takes from Stoicism is on moral 
perfectionism.409 In short, this is the belief that complete virtue is attainable in this life. More 
																																																								
407 Seneca (1920), Epistle LXXV, On The Diseases of the Soul; 147. 
408 Epictetus (1952), Discourses Book IV, 275.  
409 Firman DeBrabander offers an astute discussion of Spinoza’s treatment of this in his article and book on the 
topic. See DeBrabander (2004; 2007). He writes that there are many appealing aspects of Stoicism, including 
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particularly, this teaching in Stoic doctrine consists of three parts: (1) the unity of the virtues; (2) 
that either a person is entirely virtuous or does not express virtue at all; and, (3) completeness of 
virtue, or moral perfection, and as a result, also tranquility, are attainable in this life.  
To the first, the Stoics believe that if someone has a single virtue, then s/he has them all. 
Reporting on Stoic perfectionism, Plutarch describes that,  
They say that the virtues are inter-entailing, not only because he who has one has them all 
but also because he who does any action in accordance with one does so in accordance 
with them all. For they say that a man is not perfect unless he possesses all the virtues nor 
an action either, unless it is performed in accordance with all the virtues.410 
 
They believe that the virtues as a whole cannot be separated from one another, and it is 
impossible for someone to have a single virtue detached from the others. Plutarch’s report also 
leads into the second part, that virtue is not acquired in degrees. Since there is a unity of the 
virtues, if someone embraces one virtue, s/he has them all; it is the same with those who lack of 
virtue, that they have none. It is Stoic doctrine, Diogenes Laertius writes, “that nothing is in 
between virtue and vice, though the Peripatetics say that progress is in between these. For as, 
they say, a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, but not 
either more just or more unjust, and likewise with the other virtues.”411 This second part also 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
happiness in this life that is attainable for all rational beings. This is found in specific doctrines. The first is their 
immanentist theology; God, or the universe, can be fully apprehended by the human mind. The second is that virtue 
is indicated by natural impulses. Third, that the primary obstacle to virtue is the diagnosis of passions. Fourth, that 
psychotherapy is the means to happiness. DeBrabander, like many other commentators, is glad to acknowledge that 
Spinoza resembles the Stoics in several ways—their accounts of God as nature, the similarity between their accounts 
of the role of virtue in relation to the passions which disrupt the cognitive lives of men, and that a psychotherapy is 
at the center of their ethics, are just a few examples he offers. (198-201) However, DeBrabander shows that Spinoza 
deviates from Stoicism in rejecting the idea that any person can have absolute control over his or her passions; that 
is, he denies moral perfectionism. In fact, Spinoza’s only specific mention of the Stoics is on this point. Spinoza says 
that humans are part of the universe and desiring otherwise leads to suffering; however, the Stoics say that virtue 
places man in another region of the universe. (See Seneca De Constantia 15.3, for instance.) 
410 Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1046E-F (SVF 3.299, 243); Long and Sedley (1987), 379. See also On 
Stoic self-contradictions 1050F, 1051A-B (SVF 2.1181, part; 1182);  Long and Sedley (1987), 382. 
411 Diogenes Laertius 7.127; Long and Sedley (1987), 380. The unity of the virtues is also a common Stoic doctrine. 
See Stobaeus 2.63,6-24. 
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applies to the degrees in which one may express the virtues as a whole. Stobaeus reports that the 
Stoics think the wise man does all things well concluding, 
In their opinion, the doctrine that the wise man does everything well is a consequence of 
his accomplishing everything in accordance with right reason and in accordance with 
virtue, which is expertise concerned with the whole of life. By analogy, the inferior man 
does everything that he does badly and in accordance with all the vices.412  
 
The virtuous person is morally perfect. Plutarch states this more strongly, also appealing to the 
third part of this doctrine, where moral perfection and its resulting tranquility can be established 
in this life. Subsequently, those who are not complete in their virtue do not obtain any virtue or 
tranquility: 
… just as in the sea the man an arm’s length from the surface is downing no less than the 
one who has sunk five hundred fathoms, so even those who are getting close to virtue are 
no less in a state of vice than those who are far from it. And just as the blind are blind 
even if they are going to recover their sight a little later, so those progressing remain 
foolish and vicious right up to their attainment of virtue.413 
 
Moral perfectionism is prominent in how the Stoics see virtue and the good life, which is the end 
for their teaching. 
In Spinoza’s case, it seems that he is willing to admit the unity of the virtues.414 However, 
his account of human nature is bleaker than the Stoic view. Although moral perfectionism cannot 
be easily divorced from how the Stoics see the ethical life, Spinoza still must reject one of the 
last two parts of this doctrine. He believes that human power is limited and is subject to an 
insurmountable amount of external forces. These forces influence a person’s ability to 
successfully have all of his or her irrational passions changed into rationally grounded adequate 
beliefs. In the Appendix to Part IV of the Ethics, Spinoza claims that: “human power is very 
limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and so we do not have 
																																																								
412 Stobaeus 2.66,14-67,4 (SVF 3.560), Long and Sedley (1987), 379-380. 
413 Plutarch, On common conceptions 1063A-B (SVF 3.539, part); Long and Sedley (1987), 382. 
414 See James (2011), 227.   
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absolute power to adapt to our purposes things external to us.”415 And he confirms this in the 
Preface to Part V:  
Above all I shall be showing the degree and nature of its command over the emotions in 
checking and controlling them [that is, the power of the mind or reason]. For I have 
already demonstrated [in Part IV] that we do not have absolute command over them.416 
 
For Spinoza, moral perfection is impossible. As such, if virtue and its resulting tranquility are to 
be achieved at all, then virtue must be present but imperfect. This forces Spinoza to deny (2) or 
(3): either it is possible to be virtuous in varying degrees that are less than complete and still 
have virtue, or the good life is not possible in this life.  
Firman DeBrabander takes this criticism further, noting that it is not just because of 
external causes that people always fail to be fully virtuous, but that there are internal reasons as 
well. For Spinoza, he argues, it is impossible for a person to have completeness of virtue because 
there is always a laden desire motivating all rational judgments. He notes that Spinoza’s conatus, 
the internal striving common to all rational agents, motivates all of a person’s judgments. As a 
result, desire is implicit in any cognition, for the motivation to be virtuous is itself a non-rational 
desire. Virtue is acquired for Spinoza when a person transforms beliefs from mostly passive to 
mostly active—turning inadequate ideas into adequate ideas. So a belief stops being a passive 
emotion when it is clear and distinct. The principle of Spinozistic ‘psychotherapy’, then, is the 
ability for reason to produce new, more powerful emotions to combat and offset the passions.417 
The goal is not to altogether transform or eradicate the passions, but to control and overcome 
																																																								
415 PIV, Appendix 32.  
416 PrPV 
417 DeBrabander (2004), 204; Ethics Pr. 49, II:96; Sch. Pr. 9 III:109. The term psychotherapy is, of course, an 
anachronism. However it is the one used in a great deal of the literature, including DeBrabander and James, so I will 
use it to avoid confusing things. 
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them by producing stronger rational emotions.418 It is impossible, then, to rid oneself of desires 
and emotions because they are a necessary and irremovable part of one’s own cognition. 
Spinoza clearly rejects (2), then. Complete virtue cannot be attained in this life due to the 
strength of external causes combined with the inability for someone to fully separate his or her 
desires from the process of forming rational beliefs. If Spinoza were a Stoic, this would be the 
end of his story, where the failure of reason at the hands of passions is inevitable, and the 
morally hopeful person is left unable to reach the good life.  
However, in the Appendix to Part IV Spinoza allows for (3), that virtue is possible in this 
life. Different than the Stoic view, rather than worrying if one will reach perfection, which 
Spinoza has already rejected, the prescription is resignation—to accept that moral perfectionism 
is unattainable, but persevere in pursuing the Good Life nonetheless.419  There is still a sense of 
futility involved, but it is not nihilistic. Consistently replacing passions with adequate ideas is 
enough to lead to tranquility, even if this practice is not complete. Perpetual combat against the 
passions will always be necessary; life is an ongoing pursuit of tranquility, of making all ideas 
adequate. True moral perfection can only be achieved when fully reunited with the infinite 
substance.420 Until then, the impossibility of moral perfection only becomes clearer as one 
pursues and gets closer to it. DeBrabander describes Spinoza’s ethics as one that transcends the 
Stoic ethical ideal: where the Stoics are “fatally optimistic” concerning the wise man’s victory 
																																																								
418 DeBrabander (2004), 207. This difference is analogous to the difference between setting an object on fire (which 
entirely transforms, if not eradicates, the object) versus controlling a wild animal on a chain. In the case of the 
animal, it is very much the same as it was before the chain was attached, but it is kept from destructive behavior 
since the person holding the chain is stronger. The Stoics believed the passions could be eradicated and replaced 
with or transformed into rational emotions, but Spinoza believes the passions will always be present, but can be 
controlled by producing a stronger emotion. This is reminiscent to Descartes in the Passions of the Soul where he 
says that it is not possible to choose not to fix one’s gaze at something, but must direct the gaze at a different object 
and thus indirectly remove the first object from sight. (Article 44) 
419 “…that part of us which is defined by the understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be fully resigned and 
will endeavor to persevere in that resignation.” (Ethics IV, Appendix 32) 
420 DeBrabander (2004), 210. 
	137 
over fortune, Spinoza instead prescribes resignation over the existential condition. The wise man 
in Spinoza’s mind is only “saved” in recognizing “his normalcy.” The only difference, then, 
between the wise and ordinary man is “a few degrees of intellectual clarity.”421 The whole life is 
an ongoing endeavor to reach the mind of God; it is only fully reached upon death when it 
reunites with the one substance.422  
On moral perfectionism, then, though Spinoza accepts (1), he emphatically rejects (2), 
believing that it is possible to obtain virtues incompletely. As for (3), though like the Stoics he 
believes virtue, and tranquility as a result, is attainable in this life, what this actually means is 
very different given Spinoza’s rejection of (2). The virtuous person is one who is not morally 
perfect, but one who acknowledges this perfection is impossible, but perseveres in the becoming 
more virtuous anyhow.  
To step back, then, and consider this section as a whole, moral perfectionism now joins 
teleology and free will as central Stoic themes that Spinoza rejects. It is more challenging to see 
him as a Stoic with this in mind, even if in broad strokes his account resembles their story that 
the passions are a sickness of the intellect whose cure is found in reason. Furthermore, all three 
of these anti-Stoic doctrines are important parts of the ethical theories of both schools of thought; 
to imagine a Spinozism with free will and teleology is just as unimaginable as a Stoicism without 
them. Since present-day literature draws special attention to Spinoza’s Stoic ethics, it is 
disconcerting that he repeatedly rejects these doctrines in his moral philosophy.  
The question remains what to make of Spinoza and the Stoics, then. One option is the 
approach taken by present-day commentators, to maintain that Spinoza is a Stoic. But I have 
spent this second section discrediting that opinion: there may be resemblance, but Spinoza 																																																								
421 DeBrabander (2004), 210. 
422 DeBrabander (2004), 210. 
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cannot be a Stoic moralist in a robust sense if he rejects central ideas of Stoic virtue, free human 
action, and teleology. Another option would be to outright reject his Stoicism while admitting 
that there is some correlation between them. Under this option, we could agree that there are too 
many reasons to reject Spinoza’s Stoicism to give it any credence. However, I do believe the 
commentators are right in drawing out the similarities between the two philosophies. Spinoza is 
recognized as a Stoic not only recently, but even Spinoza’s contemporaries accused him of 
Stoicism.423 Because of this, I believe it is unfair to entirely dismiss Spinoza’s Stoic tendencies. 
This leads me to a third option, which I believe is the best solution. Under this option, the way to 
make sense of the problem at hand is to identify Spinoza not as a Stoic, but as a Neostoic. 
Neostoicism is the tradition of commentators, interpreters, and philosophers during the 16th and 
17th centuries that held Stoicism as foundational to their intellectual framework while 
appropriating it to fit their other intellectual commitments. As a Neostoic, Spinoza is part of an 
established tradition of moral philosophy. Rather than being a 17th century novelty as James and 
others suggest, he is an important part of a vibrant school first established in the Renaissance. It 
is helpful to understand Spinoza from this context, which is where I will now turn in the third 
section.  
 
III. Spinoza Among the Neostoics 
At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted Susan James, who advances two claims 
concerning Spinoza’s Stoicism: first, that Spinoza is best identified as a Stoic, and from that, 
second, Spinoza was advancing a controversial tenet of Stoicism through his morality. As for the 
first, that Spinoza is a Stoic, at the end of the last section I arrived at the conclusion that he is not 																																																								
423 I showed Leibniz’s criticism at the beginning of this chapter (AG, 240-244) and as I will soon discuss, James also 
mentions Senault, Coeffeteau, and Caussins.  
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best identified as a Stoic, but as a Neostoic. Concerning her second claim, that Spinoza’s 
Stoicism is moral in nature and controversial in its reception, it is entirely false.  
Controversy undoubtedly follows Spinoza. He is excommunicated by the Dutch Jews. 
His philosophy is condemned by philosophers and theologians alike. The Ethics was only 
published posthumously for fear of its reception, an even bolder treatise following the 
publication of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, which was itself a “scandalous treatise” that 
Steven Nadler aptly refers to as “a book forged in hell.”424 What we do not see, however, is a 
widespread condemnation of his morality. This does not mean there are not exceptions: Henry 
More found problem with it, as well as some theologians such as Jean-François Senault, Nicolas 
Coeffeteau, and Nicolas Caussins.425 James appeals to these critics at the beginning of her 
argument. Her sample set is weak, however. All four of them had very specific theological 
motivations that were threatened by both Spinoza and Stoicism. Henry More was among the 
Cambridge Platonists, religious apologists whose efforts focused on defending doctrines such as 
dualism against Hobbes and Spinoza. Their criticisms have a common flair for rhetoric, if not for 
arguing ad hominem, which included levying accusations such as atheism, aimed to discredit 
opponents.426 The Cambridge Platonists’ accounts of others should be treated cautiously when 
not supported by other evidence. As for Senault, Coeffeteau, and Caussins, they were theological 
moralists and preachers—while what they have to say should be taken into consideration, 
conclusions should not be drawn based on these minor theologians alone while ignoring what 
influential contemporaries such as Leibniz and Bayle also have to say.  
																																																								
424 See Nadler (2011), 7-8 for more on these issues including the excommunication. In this chapter I also show 
Leibniz’s criticisms as well as note ones that Jonathan Israel and Susan James cite including the Cambridge 
Platonists. 
425 James (1993), 291n10 
426 See Kraye (1998), 1292 and Armogathe (1998b), 305-313, etc.  
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If this sample set is expanded, it becomes evident that Stoic morality is not as exceptional 
as James makes it out to be, but a fairly common 17th century manifestation that emerges from 
the Renaissance. Neostoic morality begins with the Renaissance Humanists such as Justus 
Lipsius and Guillaume du Vair. They published popular translations of Seneca and Epictetus, as 
well as each publishing his own Neostoic philosophy. These Neostoic treatises “baptized” 
Stoicism, giving a palatable Stoic morality to the Christian west.427 They replaced a pantheistic 
monism with the monotheistic Judeo-Christian God. They also minimized what would have been 
more embarrassing Stoic themes for their day, such as panpsychism. In addition to Lipsius and 
du Vair, others during the 16th century, such as Michel de Montaigne and Pierre Charron, began 
producing more complex philosophical accounts that were clearly Stoic but also took liberties in 
their adaptions. Even more than those preceding them, these Neostoics were eclectics, 
synthesizing multiple traditions together, rejecting aspects of each school when needed to fulfill 
their philosophical vision. In their case, they synthesized Christianized Stoicism with 
Pyrrhonianism.  
These Renaissance Neostoics have a tremendous impact on the 17th century. In the first 
three chapters, I showed that Descartes and Pascal both draw significantly from the Stoic 
tradition in forming their morality.428 This is not to mention other philosophers who, though 
lesser known, shared similar moral accounts. Among them was Princess Elisabeth, whose 
correspondence helped Descartes in forming his morality, and Pierre-Sylvain Régis, an early 
																																																								
427 This was not too far a deviation from the later Roman Stoics anyhow; Epictetus placed much greater emphasis on 
the moral elements of Stoic thought than its physics and metaphysics. 
428 Less strongly, Hobbes is clearly working through Cicero and Seneca in his work, and though he is influenced by 
Stoicism to a lesser degree, it is treated much more fairly than nearly all other sources he writes on, ancient and 
modern. His politics could be influenced by Stoicism at points. For example, though his appeal to the 
Commonwealth being a body with the Sovereign as a head may be a biblical reference (Lev. Part II, Ch. 22-23), 
Hobbes also may be referring to a text like Seneca’s On Clemency where the same analogy is used. See also 
Oestreich (1982). 
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Cartesian who interpreted the Passions of the Soul as a physiological text and prescribed 
Neostoic morality as the way to the Supreme Good.  
Among the Cartesians there was also Antoine Le Grand, whose importance as a 
systematizer of Cartesian ethics I discussed in my last chapter. Though he became yet another 
prominent Cartesian to promote a Neostoic morality, his Neostoicism predated his Cartesianism, 
publishing a pamphlet promoting Stoicism, Le Sage des Stoiques, ou l'Homme sans Passions 
(1662), several years before his Cartesian textbook.  
So by the time Spinoza writes his morality, there has already been a thriving tradition of 
Neostoics for almost a century. Typically, they maintained free will and divine providence, but 
reject an imminent theology along with monism and pantheism. However, what they all have in 
common is that they interpret and appropriate a Stoic morality into their own philosophical 
systems, selectively picking which parts cohere with their system and leaving behind those parts 
they find cannot be reconciled. This is, of course, exactly what Spinoza is doing with Stoicism. 
Spinoza enters into a tradition of Neostoicism, which is not to question the originality of his 
work—Spinoza’s addition to the Neostoic tradition is important. Also, the goal of identifying 
Spinoza as a Neostoic is not to downplay the other important influences on his thought, such as 
Hobbes or Descartes; Spinoza’s philosophy is undoubtedly complex, and I gladly admit that his 
Neostoicism allows for a diversity of influences, like Montaigne and Charron exhibited in the 
previous century. I do believe it is helpful to understand him in this tradition, however, because it 
is corrective against the first two options I laid out above, that Spinoza is either not a Stoic at all, 
or that his morality is a robust Stoicism unparalleled in the 17th century. The Stoic influence on 
Spinoza is symptomatic of a more widespread Stoic impact in the 17th century that affects many 
others. Rather than his morality being considered a fringe “Stoic aberration” as James claims and 
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many others infer, Spinoza’s morality is strikingly ordinary in the face of the 17th century 
conversation filled with eclectics, Neostoics, Epicureans, Scholastics, and many others who 
embraced a variety of ancient traditions that were stirred up in the Renaissance.  
Still, it would be disingenuous to say that Spinoza’s Stoicism is not unique among the 
early moderns, even among the Neostoics. What makes Spinoza particular, then, and especially 
controversial, is that he is the only major figure in modernity that dares to leave intact the more 
‘embarrassing’ aspects of Stoic physics (and metaphysics in a more qualified sense) which the 
other Neostoics avoided. That is, like those of the Stoics, Spinoza is a pantheist, panpsychic, and 
monist; he advances a theology of immanence and denies divine transcendence. Although this 
itself deserves a more detailed study, I do not believe it changes the status of Spinoza in relation 
to this Hellenistic tradition; his morality is less Stoic than other Neostoics, while his physics is 
clearly more-so. This simply fits the Neostoic tendency to selectively embrace certain themes in 
classical Stoicism while rejecting others; Spinoza is unique in how he practices his Neostoicism, 
not in that he is one.429 
  
																																																								
429 For both Spinoza and the Stoics, the line between physics and metaphysics is often blurry. To explore some of 
these topics apart from discussions of Stoicism properly, I recommend Curley (1969) as well as Melamed (2013). 
There is no major investigation of Spinoza and the Stoic physics. I hope to pursue this question someday. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Over the course of this dissertation I examined the moral philosophies of René Descartes, 
Blaise Pascal, and Benedict Spinoza. My first point of investigation was the morale par 
provision of Descartes from the third part of the Discourse on Method. In this first chapter, I 
defended the traditional reading that the provisional morality is a temporary morality, a ‘shelter’ 
from where to provide moral guidance until a more permanent ‘structure’ is established. Many 
who reject this traditional reading believe Descartes should be understood as a Stoic. I showed 
that though it is true that he should be understood as a Neostoic in the morale par provision, it is 
an extension of his writing under a veil of doubt. He enters this mode in the first part of the 
Discourse and does not emerge until the fourth part, after the morale. In taking on a skeptical 
mode, he is mimicking the doubt of Montaigne and Charron who both complete their skeptical 
accounts by providing a guide to living the good life when ignorant of the good, a life presented 
as a Stoic Sage. For Descartes, the morale is provisional because the doubt is also.  
In the second chapter I continued my investigation into Descartes’ ethics, turning to the 
moral philosophy outlined later in his life through correspondence, most notably with Princess 
Elisabeth, Pierre Chanut, and Queen Christina. In these letters, Descartes claims that his ethics 
satisfies the competing traditions of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus. Creating a moral 
philosophy that comfortably draws from all three of these traditions, Descartes believes that the 
Supreme Good is virtue, which is primarily an internal state that is pleasurable in itself, and it 
can also include external goods. He also claims virtue is obtained through cultivating habit and 
	144 
practice. In the first half of this chapter, I showed that Descartes creates the intellectual 
groundwork for doing this through his physics of man, the Passions of the Soul. This synthesis is 
made possible by relocating the cause of the passions: the passions for Descartes are not an 
intellectual illness that grows from ignorance, but an amoral physiological event. Descartes 
embraces Stoicism, but not exclusively; he is not forwarding any morality but his own, but his 
doctrines are often, as he makes clear himself, similar to those of the Stoics, but not exclusively. 
I turned to Pascal in my third chapter, arguing that he accepted Stoicism as an alternative 
morality for those who lack moral good and happiness. An Augustinian in his theology, Pascal 
provides a binary ethics that divides humanity into two groups based on the objects of their 
affections, God and created things. Happiness and the Supreme Good, he believes, are only 
obtained through knowing and loving God. As a Jansenist, Pascal believes that in the 
postlapsarian state, loving God requires a movement of the will that a person is incapable of 
making on his or her own, requiring effective grace. However, this means many people will 
never know true happiness and will remain ignorant to the nature of the good. Since he hopes all 
people will nonetheless pursue the good life, Pascal does not want to abandon those who do not 
know God to concupiscence. His answer for the person who does not know the good is to 
continue to seek God and embrace a Neostoic morality. By reducing one’s passions and 
resigning oneself to the omnibenevolent divine will, though the morally hopeful person lacks 
tranquility, s/he can still live a moderately content life, markedly better than a wretched life 
enflamed in the passions. And from this place, s/he can continue to seek God, who is both the 
source and essence of the summum bonum. When Pascal embraces Stoicism, it is not the good 
life, but an acceptable alternative morality for those who cannot achieve their highest end. 
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The fourth chapter, on Spinoza, took on a different approach than the previous three. 
While the previous chapters argued that Descartes and Pascal exhibit Neostoic tendencies in 
previously misunderstood articulations of their morality, this chapter encountered a Spinoza who 
is already portrayed as a Stoic moralist by recent commentators. My aim here, then, was to 
resituate his morality, agreeing that there are many affinities with Stoicism but refusing to accept 
these similarities at the cost of reducing him to an unqualified Stoic. I showed that in addition to 
their likeness, Spinoza also has a strong sense of anti-Stoic themes in the Ethics that should 
disqualify him from being an unadulterated Stoic. Given Spinoza’s mixture of Stoicism and anti-
Stoicism, I more carefully situated him within the Neostoics; this allows for Stoic themes to still 
be acknowledged in his work, but with the necessary correction that Stoic themes should not be 
attributed where they are absent.  
It is fitting that my final chapter is on Spinoza. The chapters do follow the chronological 
and philosophical development of these philosophers, beginning with Descartes, then moving to 
Pascal who enters the discussion of Cartesian thought, and is then followed by Spinoza who 
enters modernity as it advances from its earliest stages. All else aside, this is already an effective 
arrangement. But by concluding with Spinoza, I am able to bring attention to the Neostoic 
tradition in which he falls. That is, there is a broader implication that I intend to draw from this 
dissertation study beyond better understanding the ethical theory of these authors individually. 
There is an inclination towards Stoicism in early modernity that begins to emerge when seeing 
themes common to them all. Stoicism is the ‘gravity’ of the 17th century, a background force that 
is easily overlooked if a reader is not attentive; but it is always there, lurking just below the 
surface, shaping and bending the intellectual landscape of authors who otherwise may have little 
in common. And, like gravity, if attention is paid to the effects of Stoicism during this time, the 
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impact is not just present but significant. This is the overarching theme that I have worked to 
demonstrate beyond the examination of each individual philosopher. I end with Spinoza, seeing 
him as a member of a tradition, Neostoicism, that was shared with Pascal, and before him, 
Descartes.  
There is much more research that deserves to be done on these topics, but this dissertation 
provides a foundation for these new studies by uncovering the breadth of Stoic influence and the 
diversity of forms in its adaptation. By design, I hardly think that this research program is over. 
Many other early modern authors discuss Stoicism, both positively and critically, and my 
research program provides a framework from which to consider these additional texts. Although 
the diversity in the thought in Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza make an effective sample group, by 
expanding the scope of authors considered in this investigation, the claims that I forwarded will 
be strengthened or, if necessary, qualified. I am open to the hypothesis, for example, that 17th 
century Neostoicism is a broadly Cartesian phenomenon. This is certainly true of early 
Cartesians, such as Le Grand and Régis, and though identifying Pascal and Spinoza as Cartesian 
is contentious, it would not be a radical claim to call some of the Stoic themes in their morality 
‘Cartesian.’430 It could be beneficial to begin one of these future studies with Leibniz, whose turn 
from Cartesianism is absolute and emphatic, and whose Stoic epithets of Spinoza are intended to 
be anything but positive. Leibniz’s relation to Stoicism would be a productive first step in testing 
the thesis of whether Neostoicism is a strictly Cartesian tendency in the 17th century. His work 
would also be an interesting object of study since in his philosophy he embraces themes opposite 
to Spinoza, such as teleology. Whether this teleology is in some way Stoic, though, I leave for 
this future project.  																																																								
430 This warrants further investigation for several reasons, including that there is already an exception: Le Grand’s 
Stoicism predates his Cartesianism. 
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 There is also further work that should be done towards the moral philosophies of the 
authors I have discussed individually. Concerning Descartes’ early morality, a more detailed 
analysis in the thought of Pierre Charron vis-à-vis Descartes is warranted. Richard Popkin and 
José R. Maia Neto have already contributed important research towards this end,431 but I believe 
a slower (and lengthier) study limited to Charron’s On Wisdom and Descartes’ morality in the 
third part of the Discourse would be fruitful. Concerning Descartes’ later morality, a broader 
analysis of the Passions of the Soul qua physics of man will help further highlight the relation 
between Descartes’ physics and the applied philosophies (medicine, mechanics, and morals). In 
Spinoza, a lengthier treatment on teleology, free will, and moral perfectionism as they pertain to 
Stoicism would be helpful in filling an area of commentary that is still lacking; the same is true 
for unpacking the correlations between Spinoza and the Stoic physics. At the moment there is a 
great deal of literature on these topics in isolation432 and they would provide a fertile ground for 
developing these ideas further in a Stoic context. A robust account of Spinoza and the Stoic 
physics still remains to be written, and unlike his morality, I believe it would better bring out the 
unique aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy that are more clearly Stoic. 
Pascal leaves the most work still to be done. If I have accomplished nothing else in this 
dissertation as it pertains to Pascal, my hope is that a reader may become more sympathetic to 
him as a philosopher, someone who has more to contribute to philosophy than ‘the Wager’ (for 
analytic philosophers) or marginal proto-existentialism (for the continentals). Needless to say, 
there is a great deal to still uncover, including and beyond his Stoicism. A good place to start 
here may be looking at his Discours sur les passions de l’amour. I also would like to see an 
English translation of the latest manuscript of Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et 																																																								
431 Popkin (1954) and Maia Neto (2003; 2014). 
432 Curley (1969), Kashap (1987), Della Rocca (1993), Lloyd (1994), Garrett (1999), Manning (2002), Smith (2003), 
Lin (2006), Youpa (2009), Kisner (2013), Melamed (2013), Kisner and Youpa (2014), and so forth. 
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Montaigne with Pascale Mengotti and Jean Mesnard’s introduction. All of the existing 
translations are of an older and less complete manuscript, and the introduction helps counteract 
some of the popular misconceptions that currently exist concerning the document’s reliability.  
Nonetheless, by understanding the Stoic themes present in the moralities of Descartes, 
Pascal, and Spinoza, it allows for a clearer reading of their texts, reconciling what are apparent 
inconsistences in their work and correcting misinterpretations that prevail in present-day 
commentaries. There are certainly drawbacks with focusing my study on these three authors 
instead of just choosing one of them; that is, I have had to strike a balance between depth and 
breadth.  However, if I had focused on only one as some others have, it would have lost the 
greater benefit of uncovering the Stoic inclinations present throughout the period, and that is the 
ultimate goal of this project. 
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APPENDIX  
 
MEDIEVAL REFERENCES TO STOICISM 
 
I am sure I have overlooked a great number of references from both major and lesser-known 
medieval texts, but the list of some references from two of the major figures, Augustine and 
Aquinas, is helpful to illustrate how the Stoic philosophy was received in the period. That is, 
they were not forgotten and not always viewed so badly. These are based on occasions of the 
terms ‘Stoic’ and its variations, plus individual Stoic philosophers (‘Seneca’, ‘Cicero’, 
‘Epictetus’, et al) as they appeared in Civitate Dei and Summa Theologica. 
 
Augustine 
 Major References 
 
 CD IX.4 Stoics agree with Platonists and Peripatetics in different words 
 CD XIV.8 Stoics believe perturbations in the soul are allowed in the 
place of grief or sadness. 
 
 Quotes, Glosses, Minor References 
 
 CD I.11 Quotes Antonius on human ends and that godliness is better  
than wealth 
 CD IV.30 Stoics still teach a shadow of truth regarding religion 
CD V.2 Posidonius the Stoic says twins born and conceived under the 
same constellation (he read too much astrology) 
CD V.9-10 Cicero is wrong to dismiss all foreknowledge in his criticism 
of the Stoics. Stoics do not say things happen out of necessity 
but out of destiny. Necessity in the will. 
CD VIII.5 The first Principle of Stoicism is Fire; Plato is Better 
CD XIV.2 Stoics were wrong to only value the spirit over the body; both 
will live on in afterlife. 
CD XVIII.41 Against Epicureans, Stoics hold that the world was ruled and 
defended by the gods 
CD XIX.1 Discussion on Varro’s accounts of the supreme good. Stoics: 
supreme good is only in virtue.433 
CD XIX.4 Perplexion that the Stoics presume to say that there are no 
ills, though at the same time they permit that the wise man to 
commit suicide if he cannot, or ought not, to endure his 
ills.434 																																																								
433 This is the account that Pascal (mis)quotes from Montaigne’s Essays as I discussed in my third chapter. 
434 Pascal says the same thing in Pensées S180/L147, but he does not attribute it to Augustine. 
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Aquinas 
 Major References 
 
 ST I-II,  
Q.24, Art. 2 
Stoics do not distinguish between the sensitive and appetitive 
soul; thus, all the passions are evil. Still, not a big difference 
between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. Every passion 
lessons the good of an act. 
 ST I-II 
Q.52, Art. 1 
Stoics say some things, like art, come in degrees while other 
things (like virtue) do not. 
 
 
 Quotes, Glosses, Minor References 
 
 ST I-II 
Q. 59, Art. 2 
Cites Augustine’s CD IX.4: Stoics and Peripatetics hold same 
opinion as them. 
  
ST I-II 
Q. 59, Art. 3 
Cites Augustine’s CD XIV.8: There are three good passions 
according to the Stoics, which they identify as disturbances; 
the wise man has no sorrow. 
 
ST I-II 
Q. 66, Art. 1 
The Stoics believe that virtue does not come in degrees; that 
no one can be virtuous unless s/he reaches highest degree 
(and that is wrong). Like Aristotle, it’s enough that s/he 
approaches the mean. 
ST I-II 
Q. 73, Art. 2 
Stoics say all sins are equal, which is the source of heresies. 
Privation, the only aspect of sin considered. 
ST II-II 
Q.123, Art. 10 
Stoics say, against Aristotle, that a brave man never uses his 
anger. 
ST III  
Q. 15, Art. 4,  
Reply to Obj 2 
Notes Tully who references the Stoics, criticizing that they 
only named the passions that lead to disorderly conduct. 
ST III,  
Q. 15, Art. 6,  
Obj. 2 
Stoics assert there is no one saddened except at the loss of 
goods; the just man esteems justice and virtue as goods and 
he cannot lose those. 
Reply to Obj 2 Cites Augustine’s CD XIV.8, that there are three good 
passions and the wise man has no sorrow. 
 
 
